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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how the expansion of a steam-powered Royal Navy from the second 
half of the nineteenth century had wider ramifications across the British Empire. In 
particular, it considers how steam propulsion made vessels utterly dependent on a 
particular resource – coal – and its distribution around the world. In doing so, it shows that 
the ‘coal question’, almost totally ignored in previous histories, was central to questions of 
imperial and trade defence, required the creation of infrastructures that spanned the 
globe, and connected British sailors with a plethora of different imperial, maritime, and 
foreign peoples. 
 Although a limited number of studies have highlighted the importance of coal to 
imperial defence, this thesis considers the wider context of the period 1870−1914 in order 
to understand the significant place of coal in these discussions. In doing so, it shows coal’s 
place within wider changes to political ideologies, imperial defence schemes, popular 
imperialism and navalism, knowledge collection, and the growth of the state apparatus.  
A robust coaling infrastructure was required to ensure quality naval coal was 
available globally on a huge geographical scale. This involved a large number of bodies, but 
this has never been examined by scholars for this period. Although naval coaling relied 
heavily on the coal export industry, the Admiralty had a key role in ensuring that the 
infrastructure, particularly after 1880, could cope with increases in ship size and number 
and competition from its rivals. The thesis also shows how these processes worked on the 
ground, from testing and purchasing coal to the methods and labour used to load in on 
warships.  
The thesis also shows that the necessity of coaling in foreign stations fostered new 
interactions between naval personnel and the wider world. Although naval visits to these 
places are prime examples of British encounters beyond its own shores at the zenith of 
empire, these are largely absent from existing studies. Thus, it explores how the 
interactions with local populations, other maritime visitors, and the stations themselves 
shaped the experience of sailors abroad, and created a maritime community spanning large 
oceanic spaces. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Figure 1.1 The Fighting Temeraire Tugged to Her Last Berth to Be Broken Up, by J.M.W. Turner, 1839. 
 
One of the most celebrated paintings in British art is The Fighting Temeraire Tugged to Her 
Last Berth to Be Broken Up, by J.M.W. Turner, painted in 1839. In it, the artist depicts the 
ship, which had performed a notable role in the British victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 
1805, as it is taken to be dismantled, hauled by a steam-powered paddle-wheel tug. At the 
time of its destruction, the Temeraire was one of the last surviving ships that had been 
present in Nelson’s great victory, and the painting depicts the sense of loss of such a 
majestic vessel. The magnificence of the sail-ship provides a contrast to the small dirty tug-
boat, which is taking it to its grave as the sun sets. Although clearly a lament for such an 
undignified end to a ship that had served Britain so admirably, it also shows a wider 
recognition of the end of the era of the wooden-hulled, sail-powered navy of Nelson. The 
dirty prosaic steamboat is quite literally shepherding the Fighting Temeraire out of use, but 
also metaphorically showing the gradual demise of the romantic age of sail, hastened by 
12 
 
the onset of the steamship era.1 Like William Blake’s ‘dark satanic mills’, not only were 
these new ships more dirty and less aesthetically pleasing than their predecessors, they 
were no longer solely driven by the forces of nature − wind and tides − but by the filthy 
fuel of industry, coal. 
The demise of the wooden warship of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
was a result of their extreme susceptibility to exploding shells and inability to match the 
advantages of iron-clad steamships. In particular, steam propulsion allowed ships’ routes to 
be more direct, and their speed to be increased. Furthermore, it enabled the use of iron 
and steel in hull design, and for the mastless decks to hold better positioned guns, making 
warships far more formidable in battle. The transfer from a sail to a steam navy was 
gradual, with hybrid ships powered both by sail and steam used while early steam engines 
lacked sufficient power and efficiency. Thus, even though the Battle of Navarino in 1827 
was the last to be fought by the British Navy entirely with sailing ships, it was the end of the 
Crimean war in 1856 that marked a watershed in the use of steamships as the dominant 
warships in the Royal Navy.2 The use of steam technology in naval ships revolutionised the 
Royal Navy, and by 1864 the Navy had been become ‘unrecognisable’ from that of a 
decade before.3 The importance of these developments cannot be underestimated. Robert 
Kubicek has argued that in terms of state and private sector empowerment, ‘none were 
more significant than the steamship’; it profoundly altered the strategic balance between 
land and sea, which enhanced Britain’s ability, as the foremost maritime power, to become 
a world superpower.4  
                                                                    
1
 Turner, Joseph Mallord William, The Fighting Temeraire, 
http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/joseph-mallord-william-turner-the-fighting-temeraire. 
2 Robert Wilson, ‘Fuelling the Steam Navy: Naval Coal Supplies from Comet to the Carnarvon 
Commission’ (MA Dissertation, Exeter University, 2010), 14. 
3
 Roger Willock, Bulwark of Empire: Bermuda's Fortified Naval Base, 1860-1920, 2nd ed. (Bermuda: 
Bermuda Maritime Museum Press, 1988), 7; Andrew Lambert, Battleships in Transition: The Creation 
of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1984), 53-55. 
4 Robert Kubicek, ‘British Expansion, Empire, and Technological Change’, in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire. Vol. 2, the Nineteenth Century, A.N. Porter (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 249.  
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Although it offered clear advantages to Britain, the emergence of a steam-powered 
navy in the second half of the nineteenth century also came with its own problems. Most 
notable of these was that steam engines were fuel hungry, which meant that coal, and in 
particular high-quality steam-coal, was required in order for a navy to perform any of its 
duties. Thus the navy had a constant need for coal and a supporting infrastructure, such as 
coaling stations, across the world. 
The value of coal to Britain and its success was recognised in 1865, in a hugely 
influential investigation into the fuel by W.S. Jevons. In it, he stated that ‘coal in truth 
stands not beside but entirely above all other commodities. It is the material energy of the 
country — the universal aid — the factor in everything we do’.5 Nowhere was this high 
value placed on coal truer than for the Royal Navy as it shifted from sail to steampower. So 
central was this fuel to the British navy, state, and empire that a contemporary term used 
for lumps of steam-coal was ‘black diamonds’.6 Unlike diamonds however, its value was not 
monetary − the cost of this coal was far below any precious stone − indeed, it was usually 
used as return cargo as its price was so low. Without it, though, the Royal Navy would be 
unable to fulfil its global role as the primary defence of British commerce and possessions, 
and thus, to Britain, its worth was immeasurable. This importance also led to it acquiring 
another nickname: King Coal. An article of 1898 declared that ‘coal is the source of 
[Britain’s] commercial prosperity and the secret of our naval supremacy ... coal is the first 
requisite of empire’.7 Thus, it was reasoned, ‘the black diamond really sways the destinies 
of Empires’.8 Indeed, it was pointed out by contemporaries that ‘a country may have the 
                                                                    
5
 W.S. Jevons, The Coal Question: An Enquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the 
Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal-Mines (London: Macmillan, 1865), viii. 
6 'Masker', ‘The China Station in Other Days’, The Naval Review, 25, no. 3 (1937), 522-533; 
Christopher McKee, Sober Men and True: Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy, 1900-1945 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 119-122; ‘King Coal’, Western Mail, 9 November 1898. 
7 Archibald S. Hurd, ‘Coal, Trade, and the Empire’, The Nineteenth Century, November 1898. 
8 ‘King Coal’, Western Mail, 9 November 1898. 
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most powerful navy in the world, but if it be without coal it will be in the position of a man 
with a pipe and matches and no tobacco’.9  
A need for a constant supply of coal at these stations meant that it became the key 
global strategic resource in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; Britain’s ability to 
control its naval supply was crucial to the security of imperial possessions and long-distance 
commerce. This requirement for coal supply on a global scale necessitated the 
establishment of a chain of coaling stations to service the Royal Navy’s needs. These sites 
varied enormously, ranging from existing naval stations, the environs of commercial ports, 
and strategic spaces often no more than tiny littorals or islands. Although largely located 
within the formal British Empire, they also included sites in the informal empire and 
territory possessed by its allies. While there were areas which possessed concentrations of 
stations, the chain of British naval coaling stations stretched across the globe (see Figure 
1.2).  
  
                                                                    
9 Hurd, ‘Coal, Trade, and the Empire’. 
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Coal was essential for the three elements of British power – its commerce, its navy, 
and its empire. This makes it an ideal lens through which to view wider aspects of Britain’s 
global history in the late nineteenth century, the connections between them and the 
importance to them of coaling sites, networks, and labouring bodies. This thesis therefore 
uses coal and coaling stations as a vehicle with which to explore these elements in four 
aspects of British imperial history: the defence of British possessions and interests, the role 
and management of global networks and infrastructure, the labour and mechanisms of 
coaling, and the contact zones and communities created in far-flung parts of the globe.10 
With coal as its central focus, this thesis seeks to illustrate the interconnectedness 
of the British imperial world, linking subjects which have often been studied entirely 
separately. Primarily, it seeks to re-establish the importance of coal to the maintenance of 
British naval, imperial and commercial global pre-eminence, a fact that was widely 
recognised by contemporaries, at least by the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
The importance attributed to coal during this period, however, had multiple effects, both in 
Britain and abroad. Indeed, the emergence of a steam navy had effects on issues as diverse 
as imperial defence, state bureaucracy, commercial infrastructure, trade networks, labour 
migration, imperial contact zones, and the strengthening of imperial bonds. Although 
contemporary concerns about coal focused primarily on the highest level of state and 
government, the reliance on coal affected large swathes of people and places − British, 
imperial, and foreign. Those affected ranged from politicians, Naval Lords, and shipping 
magnates, to ordinary sailors, residents in maritime spaces, and local populations. 
The story of the coaling station is as much an international one as it is British. 
Steamships’ reliance on coal had consequences for all modern navies, and as none of 
Britain’s rivals possessed as extensive a global chain of coaling stations, even its nearest 
                                                                    
10 Indeed, many elements of the ‘New Imperialism’ − great power competition, faith in progress 
through technology, and global interconnections – can be grasped through an analysis of coaling. 
See Valeska Huber, Channelling Mobilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15. 
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rival for much of the period – France − was often forced to rely on British stations.11 This 
not only gave the Royal Navy a strategic advantage, but also meant that an international 
naval community emerged around and across British coaling stations as foreign crews 
refuelled at them. As a result, this study of coaling stations reveals both the 
interconnections and tensions between Britain and its rivals, in both geopolitical and 
personal contexts.  
Such a study is unavoidably global, uncovering the often obscured networks, 
infrastructure, and agents that facilitated the maintenance of the British imperial machine. 
Analysis of these hidden facets reveals not only the workings of the navy and empire in the 
late nineteenth century, but also points to the wider interactions outside of the state and 
imperial spheres. Indeed, this thesis shows the crucial importance of spaces outside of 
what is often considered the formal empire, including those in-between places, situated in 
foreign lands and the informal empire, and especially the vast swathes of water containing 
the lifeblood of Britain and its empire: its trade routes. Furthermore, it recognises the 
actors outside of the state which had a huge impact on Britain’s ability to protect its naval 
dominance − in particular its reliance on private coaling infrastructure, labour pools, and 
networks.  
The history of naval coaling is, therefore, one that extends far beyond local 
histories of mines, ports, islands, and littorals. Coal has been largely ignored in imperial 
histories of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the volume of the Oxford History of the 
British Empire covering the nineteenth century has more references to coconuts and coffee 
than to coal, which only has three mentions. Yet, naval coaling infrastructure was, in fact, 
integral to Britain, empire, and the world in the nineteenth century.12 
                                                                    
11 For an excellent account of this reliance in Asia, see James R. Fichter, ‘British Infrastructure and 
French Empire: Anglo-French Steam Interdependency in Asian Waters, c.1852–1870’, Britain and the 
World, 5, no. 2 (2012), 183-203. 
12 A.N. Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 3, the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following a chapter that reviews key work and ideas in the fields of naval, imperial and 
global history, the rest of the thesis is divided into four substantive chapters. Each explores 
a different aspect of imperial coaling, showing the depth and breadth of the wider 
implications of the change from wind to steam power. Although the chapters’ themes are 
diverse, all explore the consequences of a reliance on coal on a global scale. In doing so, this 
thesis interweaves issues of naval, imperial, commercial, infrastructural, and cultural 
history. 
The first substantive chapter, ‘The Rise of Coal Consciousness: Imperial 
Philosophies, Knowledge and Bureaucracy’, analyses the growing appreciation of the 
importance of coal to the navy. Britain’s position as the undisputable oceanic power faced 
increasing competition as the period 1870−1914 progressed, with its relative commercial 
and naval advantage diminished by the rise of other powers. Furthermore, the 
establishment of overseas coaling stations by rival powers allowed them to further their 
sphere of naval influence and their ability to attack British trade (see Figure 1.3). This 
changing situation acted as a catalyst for the realisation of the importance of coal to the 
British fleet, and precipitated security concerns about the naval coal supply − what is 
termed a ‘coal consciousness’. This anxiety, espoused by a few marginal navalists in the 
1870s, had become a general ‘coaling consensus’ by the 1890s.  
The rise of coal consciousness needs to be understood within the wider context of 
British politics, navalism, and imperial defence. It had a profound influence on imperial and 
naval defence policy, and especially in changing attitudes towards the importance of 
coaling station defence for the continued prosperity and security of British interests 
abroad. A major factor for this shift was the changing global situation. In particular, the rise 
of other industrial and naval powers, especially towards the turn of the twentieth century, 
19 
 
created a greater awareness of issues concerning the governance, security, and quality of 
coal supply worldwide. An increased coal consciousness was not only influenced by 
geopolitics, but in turn had effects on British defence strategy. A reliance on coal made 
British coaling stations a particularly attractive target to enemy cruiser attacks, which could 
potentially cause fuelling disruption or even immobilise ships in the wider empire. 
However, if the coaling infrastructure was properly organised and defended, then Britain 
could profoundly affect the ability of rival powers to challenge it in the wider world, both 
by its strength and mobility, and by its ability to deny fuel to others. 
The emergence of a coaling consensus was largely a result of the work of the 
Carnarvon Commission, which sat at the end of the 1870s. Its conclusions, which 
recommended an integrated system of imperial coaling station defence, formed the basis 
of the strategy implemented from the mid-1880s onwards. As well as being crucial to the 
instigation of a wider coal consciousness, it was also key to the emergence of other 
imperial defence policies towards the end of the century based on belief in the motto si vis 
pacem, para bellum (‘if you want peace, prepare for war’). These included the gathering of 
data, the establishment of governmental bodies, and the funding for ambitious defence 
schemes. As a result, this coaling consensus also helped to precipitate change within the 
state, as the need to gather and process vast amounts of data continually required 
specialised and increasingly permanent state bodies. These changes were not isolated, 
however, and can be seen as part of wider changes in knowledge collection and the 
expansion of the state apparatus. 
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The chapter concludes by considering the effect of this coaling consensus, and 
attempts to assess its relative success in terms of professionalisation, imperial defence, 
mobilisation, and cost.  Certainly measures implemented for the defence of coaling stations 
acted as successful deterrents during the period 1870−1914, but the emergence of 
Germany as the primary rival at the turn of the twentieth century shifted the focus of naval 
power away from the empire to the North Sea, somewhat diminishing the importance of 
imperial coaling stations by 1914. Despite this, it is important to recognise that coal 
consciousness had a lasting effect on changes wrought by the shifting geopolitical balance. 
Indeed, it was key in the instigation of permanent bodies for imperial defence and for naval 
intelligence.  
Establishing − and protecting − overseas stations was only a small part of the 
ramifications caused by a reliance on coal, however. Suitable coal was not found at or near 
the majority of stations, and thus Britain faced complex logistical issues in ensuring enough 
coal, of the right quality, reached each station in use. It is these issues that the next 
chapter, ‘The Development of a Coaling Infrastructure’, considers. The journey from pit to 
port was far from straightforward, and required a number of actors, processes, and 
networks. The first of these processes was the selection of coal. As the navy required fuel 
with specific characteristics, it invested significant time and resources into sourcing and 
testing different coals. This process was constant, as the Admiralty sought to maintain high 
performance, while accounting for cost and increased consumption. With the advent of 
coal consciousness came more consideration of the primacy of quality over cost and 
distance, and thus processes became more stringent throughout the period. As a result, 
many sources of coal used at the beginning of the period were no longer deemed to be of 
acceptable quality after 1880. High-quality coal from South Wales and New Zealand 
consequently dominated naval supplies, which then had to be sent huge distances globally. 
Once a coal was deemed suitable through extensive trials, the Admiralty would need to 
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arrange its purchase, loading, and shipping to the site of export. The dominance of Welsh 
steam-coal globally meant that an export industry already existed in Britain and thus these 
processes, like victualling, were arranged through private companies. Furthermore, the 
navy was able to utilise the commercial global coaling networks in order to ship quality coal 
to all its overseas stations.  
The rise of coal consciousness did not only bring to the fore issues of coal quality. 
As the global strategic situation changed, new strains and stresses emerged on British naval 
coaling infrastructure. As the Royal Navy found itself more credibly challenged, the 
Admiralty responded by expanding the fleet with a series of ever-larger ships. To allow the 
coaling infrastructure to remain robust, methods of maintaining it had to adapt, 
necessitating the instigation of measures to improve both the management of supply and 
the quality of fuel available. Strategic concerns towards the turn of the century also forced 
the government to confront issues with mobilising the fleet for war more seriously. This 
was, of course, not limited to fuel, but the ability to provide enough fuel worldwide for the 
fleet should a war occur was a major concern for the Admiralty. This evolution of coaling 
infrastructure and management was crucial to the remarkable robustness shown by British 
naval coaling being maintained throughout the period. As a result, instances where British 
infrastructure faltered were few, and relatively minor. In comparison, its rivals experienced 
far more serious problems, as a result of their limited coaling infrastructure and reliance on 
Britain. Thus, despite its huge complexity and global scale, Britain was able to sustain an 
advantage over all rivals worldwide. Not only was it able to supply its fleet with quality fuel 
even in the far-flung spaces of empire, but it was also effectively able to deny the same 
ability to its rivals, seriously hampering their capacity to conduct naval operations 
worldwide.   
Coaling stations were crucial nodes of this huge infrastructure, and the third 
substantive chapter, ‘Coaling Labour’, looks to analyse how they functioned as working 
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environments. Even by 1914, coaling was still a process performed largely by human 
labour, and thus the chapter explores the use of ships’ crews and local heavers for this 
work. The methods employed to load coal were determined by the station in question, the 
availability of labour, and the number and size of ships in port. The situation at each station 
did not remain static, however, and as ship numbers rose, and their size increased, they 
were less able to use facilities within the confines of many stations. Thus, after the 
shipbuilding programmes of the 1880s onwards, ships were more regularly coaled by their 
crews from a collier in harbour at many stations. Despite this general trend, at stations 
where labour was particularly plentiful and cheap, and the facilities allowed, local heavers 
were still primarily used. Regardless of the labour or method used, the process of coaling 
was an enormous physical effort, and was hugely dangerous. Although generally being the 
most hated part of being on a warship, coping mechanisms and incentives, which often 
centred on competition for record coaling rates, helped to alleviate the pain and 
monotony. The rivalry that emerged over speedy coaling became especially important as 
the period went on, as it was recognised that these were crucial to the swift mobilisation of 
ships against potential enemies. 
Recollections of coaling not only show the minutiae of the process of coaling, but 
also give an insight into how sailors thought about the labour practices of naval crews and 
local heavers. Exacerbated by the pressured environment of the ship during coaling, the 
sailors’ ingrained ideas of racial hierarchies and work ethics often came to the fore. Belief 
in the superiority of their own labour and of the importance of naval-style discipline meant 
that local heavers were judged against the yardstick of the sailor. Local labour forces were 
assessed purely by their efficiency while coaling, and characteristics of their performance 
were ascribed to perceived racial difference. As a result, even where workers were praised, 
heavers were reduced to no more than their role in the process, not individual humans, but 
labour purely for the use of the navy. 
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Although coaling was the primary reason for ships to visit these stations, leave 
would regularly be given to crews after it was carried out. The final chapter, ‘Sojourning at 
the Station’, explores these periods of leisure, and analyses how British seamen 
experienced these stations during their stay there. As sailors were afforded lengthy spells 
to explore freely the environs of stations, these stays were defined their interactions with 
the characters of stations, which included their landscape, wares, animals, and buildings. 
Perhaps most distinct was the array of different peoples these stations contained. The 
complex requirements for the supply of coal to stations meant that at any time sailors, 
garrisoned soldiers, colliers, coal heavers, local residents, foreign naval men, and those 
providing services for naval ships could be present. Coaling stations were thus unique 
imperial, maritime, and international contact zones, distinct spaces which existed on the 
edges of empire with highly multi-cultural and multi-ethnic make ups. Where British sailors 
interacted with fellow westerners, fraternal connections were often established. These 
relationships were frequently cemented through participating in activities at the station, 
which included sports, balls, visiting theatres, and drinking. These connections were crucial 
to the global maritime identity which was pervasive at these stations. Although each 
station was unique, the chapter considers that the existence of this community linked 
coaling stations in global, naval, transoceanic, and transnational networks.  
The thesis therefore looks to do much more than simply tell the story of the 
strategic importance of coal, but to understand how this importance had effects across a 
range of British, imperial, and global contexts. It aims to show that what at first seems like 
a straightforward problem involving an unspectacular commodity had huge political, 
strategic, and infrastructural impacts in the nineteenth century. These ramifications were 
felt far beyond politicians and Naval Lords, but throughout the empire, and across the 
globe. It necessitated new types of worker and labour practices, and constructed 
international and transoceanic human connections. These effects were not incidental, but 
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are crucial to understanding the impact of truly revolutionary change to the navy, and to 
the defence of empire and British interests in the wider world. As Turner demonstrates 
with The Fighting Temeraire, the pre-industrial age of sail was ending, and the beginning of 
the steam age had transformed the navy that Britain had known at the beginning of the 
century. While his painting creates a melancholic mood, perhaps evoking a sense of 
nostalgic loss, the idea of inevitable change, even at a cost, is clear. This thesis therefore 
looks to bring our attention to the dirty, paddle-wheel steam tug, to the new coal-driven 
ships that would replace the Temeraire, and to the systems and structures that they were 
reliant on. 
 
Notes on Sources 
 
Analysing something like coal and coaling across a series of different historical registers – 
politics, technology, local social and cultural histories – means drawing on a range of 
sources and source types. Where this thesis analyses the high politics of the coaling issue, 
Hansard debates, Parliamentary Papers, and committee minutes offer a relatively complete 
picture of events for this period. Furthermore, much of the correspondence between 
departments still exists. Correspondence with foreign stations, and details of the works 
carried out at them, is less complete however.  
Analysing the details of contracts between the Admiralty and commercial 
companies, especially those for the buying and transporting of coal, is far more 
problematic. Admiralty records have been largely lost, so a complete picture of how the 
system functioned, especially before the 1880s, is impossible to discern. However, the 
existence of sources which contain key information such as Admiralty Lists, which show all 
the collieries that could supply the Admiralty, references to meetings for the tendering of 
contracts, and two surviving supply and contracts indexes allow an insight into the 
26 
 
mechanisms at work in the supply of coal to overseas stations. Further details can be 
gleaned from the records of the collieries and coaling agents themselves. Here, however, 
other problems emerge, as there is rarely any differentiation between commercial and 
naval coal, and stations are often grouped together, sometimes in huge geographical areas, 
making it difficult to analyse the specifics of both naval coal and individual stations. Even 
books which listed extensive export statistics for Welsh coal do not mention the Admiralty, 
bar references to the Admiralty List.  It is possible, however, to draw some general 
observations about how the Admiralty arranged contracts with collieries, through the 
fragments of evidence that remain, and the arrangements that other customers used.  
The analysis of coaling stations as places of both work and of leisure is largely 
reliant on the records, whether in text and recorded interviews, of those naval men who 
visited these spaces. Surviving examples largely comprise of the reminiscences of the crews 
of British naval vessels stationed in foreign waters. Accounts of local workers are almost 
entirely absent, and those of other Britons, such as those working on colliers, and the 
relatively few soldiers who served in coaling station garrisons, are rare if they exist at all. As 
a result of this limitation, the sources remaining are merely the impressions of those naval 
men who recorded their visits to these far away and often alien places across the empire. 
Thus it is very much a view of the shore from the sea, with little of the viewpoint of those 
on shore looking out.  
The thesis is therefore largely based on sources shaped by the identity and culture 
of those British sailors writing. This is particularly problematic, as distinguishing an identity 
and culture for such a large and disparate entity as the Royal Navy necessarily results in 
vague assertions. Although they were often contemporaneously portrayed collectively as 
‘domesticated servant[s] of a civilising empire’, differences in marital status, rank, age, and 
place of birth shaped sailors’ identities, but such factors are often absent or ambiguous in 
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these sources.13 It is clear, however, that sailors saw themselves as different from most 
Britons in the late nineteenth century, the result of being predominantly from port towns, 
and subsequently spending long periods abroad and at sea.14 Although Peter Mandler has 
suggested that ‘British’ was the de facto trump identity of sailors which overrode all others, 
at the foreign station they can be seen to exhibit imperial, western, or maritime identities. 
Thus, it is imperative to recognise how the ‘foreignness’ of these stations directly affected 
what would be written about a certain place.15 Of course, these records were also 
influenced by the purpose for which they were created. While it is important to treat 
sailors as transient beings, these were not travelogues intended for a market. Indeed, 
sailors were differentiated from tourists and explorers by the fact that they were travelling 
due to vocational necessity, constrained in their movements by naval duties. They were 
therefore not travelling with the express purpose of the pursuit of knowledge or cultural 
immersion. Most of their accounts were simply collections of memories from commissions, 
written for their families and those who served with them. It is also worth considering what 
rank of seaman wrote such logs. Although literacy rates had improved, most ‘sailors who 
wrote books were not typical sailors’, but were, in general, junior officers.16 Although this 
may had some effect on what was included, many of their reminiscences described the 
activities of all ranks of seaman. That is not to say that such activities were communal, 
however, and it is clear that bluejackets and officers mixed with those of their own rank 
and status, whether British or foreign. 
Where the logs are published, an important consideration is the motives of Lionel 
Yexley, the editor of many of these printed by the Westminster Press, which makes up the 
                                                                    
13 Leggett, ‘Navy, Nation and Identity in the Long Nineteenth Century’, Journal for Maritime 
Research, 13, no. 2 (2011), 151-163. 
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 Ibid.  
15 Peter Mandler, ‘What Is “National Identity”? Definitions and Applications in Modern British 
Historiography’, Modern Intellectual History, 3, no. 2 (2006), 271-297. 
16 I. Land, War, Nationalism, and the British Sailor, 1750-1850 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
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authors give no hints as to what rank they hold. 
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majority of surviving records. Yexley explicitly encouraged the authors to tell the story of 
their commissions in order to portray the sailor as a moral defender of empire.17 This 
editing process created a body of volumes which give details of largely positive experiences 
at stations, masking many of the less pleasant and ‘immoral’ aspects of serving abroad. This 
thesis therefore relies on other sources to fill the gaps left by these logs, particularly in 
analysing drink, vice, and venereal disease. 
Although they may have not been written for public consumption, the publishing of 
many of these logs alongside a voracious public appetite for the Royal Navy meant that 
they shaped the public perception of naval life abroad. Indeed, they appear to have been 
very popular, with over forty being published by the Westminster Press, and many being 
published by other presses in addition. Generally priced at four shillings, these would have 
been easily affordable to contemporaneous members of the middle class and above, and 
available to others through public and circulating libraries. Thus, like travel books, they 
gave domestic Britons ‘a sense of ownership, entitlement and familiarity with respect to 
the distant parts of the world that were being explored, invaded, invested in, and colonised 
… They created a sense of curiosity, excitement, adventure and even moral fervour about 
European expansionism’.18 Moreover, not only did these logs allow those at home to feel 
part of the imperial project, they also cemented the link between the Royal Navy and the 
empire. 
As well as recording station life in logs, some seamen used their naval training to 
produce watercolour landscapes and charts. Later, seamen recorded similar landscapes of 
ports and their interiors and portraits of local peoples through the medium of photography. 
Often these served no official function and they were not produced for the Admiralty or 
the Hydrographic Office, but they were nevertheless an important addition to the imperial 
                                                                    
17 Leggett, ‘Navy, Nation and Identity in the Long Nineteenth Century’, 7. 
18 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), 
3. 
29 
 
archive. Moreover, the consumption of these images in Britain in turn helped shape 
impressions of the navy abroad, both in the public imagination and in the folk memory of 
sailors. As with the descriptions found in text, these present highly selective moments, 
putting forward to readers a version of the coaling station as imagined by the sailor. In this 
way, they should not be seen as ‘projections or snapshots’ of the place, but as evidence of 
those experiences that sailors wished to remember.19  
 
 
 
                                                                    
19 Early periods of naval sketching have been discussed in Felix Driver and L. Martins, ‘John Septimus 
Roe and the Art of Navigation, c.1815-1830’, History Workshop Journal, 54(2002), 144-161. 
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Chapter 2: Historiography 
 
A history of British imperial naval coaling necessarily covers many diverse topics, from coal 
mines to Chinese ports, from imperial defence to Victorian and Edwardian ideas about 
race, and from government policy to international maritime communities. As a result of 
this, the historiography that this thesis is situated within and builds upon is wide-ranging. 
Although, as this thesis shows, there are key connections between each historiography, for 
convenience this historiographical discussion is divided into three, analysing works on the 
Royal Navy, the British Empire, and global history respectively. Such divisions are not 
discrete, but reflect the way such histories have largely been written.  
 The first section analyses the historiography of the Royal Navy in the period 
1870−1914. It begins by analysing the pervasiveness of histories of technology and 
strategy, and how this has caused the historiography to be skewed. It then assesses how 
more recently historians have attempted to rectify this bias by considering the wider 
economic and human contexts of the navy in the nineteenth century. Finally, it shows that, 
although there has been limited work on naval infrastructure, the navy’s connection with 
empire, and the sailor himself, gaps still exists in these areas, particularly for the 
nineteenth century period. 
 The second section looks at how the connection between the British Empire and 
the ocean in the nineteenth century has been explored. In doing so it shows the limited 
ways in which naval histories have been brought together with empire, and, indeed, how 
imperial histories have been slow to embrace an oceanic frame of reference, despite the 
rise of transnational history. It then shows how oceans have become a fertile area of study 
in their own right, but it is only really through commodity histories that these have been 
extended to show transnational and imperial networks that spanned the globe. Finally, it 
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shows the limits of these histories, with few of these commodity histories covering the 
nineteenth century, and often luxury goods have been studied instead of key bulk cargoes.  
This ‘material turn’ has, however, emphasised how following a commodity can 
reveal the global, and often trans-oceanic, nature of networks in the nineteenth century, 
and it is the historiography of the global that the third section assesses. To assess the 
transnational of empire in the nineteenth century generally needs a huge geographic 
perspective, and thus it has reached its apogee with global history. Much of the global 
history that has been attempted by scholars can largely be described as histories of 
globalisation, however, which often risk teleology and narratives of the ‘rest and the west’. 
Where scholars have used a global framework for assessing imperial networks and 
infrastructure, however, it has shown much more promise. Indeed, such histories have 
allowed a fuller understanding of the non-linear imperial connections, and have negated 
the idea of periphery and centre. Despite this important work, there are still clear gaps in 
the historiography − principally that historians have so far failed to follow the lead of 
infrastructural historians in considering the materiality of these networks and flows. 
 
Historiography of the Royal Navy, c.1870−1914 
 
The enormous changes wrought by the adoption of steam technology in the second half of 
the nineteenth century saw a technological revolution in the Royal Navy, and this has 
precipitated a historiography predominantly concerned with technology and strategy. The 
constant competition generated in both commercial and naval spheres continually pushed 
engineers to drive forward the pace of technological change, and a large number of works 
analyse the many important evolutionary advancements in this period.1 Jon Tetsuro 
                                                                    
1 David Evans, Building the Steam Navy: Dockyards, Technology and the Creation of the Victorian 
Battle Fleet 1830-1906 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2004), 12. These included the screw 
propeller, compound and triple expansion engines, condensers, and iron hulls, see Andrew Lambert, 
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Sumida has suggested that these developments occurred in eight year cycles consisting of 
action, rival reaction, counter reaction, and change.2 Similarly, Roger Willock has stated 
that this period witnessed a ‘complete revolution in naval architecture, construction and 
marine engineering’, which completely transformed the navy.345  
 The advent of fully iron, and later steel, hulls revolutionised both ship design and 
naval strategy.6 Moreover, the adoption of compound engines largely solved the earlier 
issues of poor power and limited range, as they offered an efficiency improvement of 100 
per cent.7 The direct result of these changes was the first mastless ship in the Royal Navy in 
1871, allowing much more efficient and effective placing of armaments, as well as saving 
weight. Consequently, it also spelled the end of the sailing ship in the Royal Navy − the last 
was launched in 1875.8 The subsequent adoption of triple then quadruple expansion 
engines, followed by steam turbines, which again improved efficiency and speed, have also 
been widely discussed.9 Iconic ships, such as the Dreadnought, and the role of ‘great men’ 
such as Jackie Fisher and Winston Churchill in the ‘reinvention’ of the Royal Navy in the first 
decade of the twentieth century have also received ample attention.10 Such histories argue 
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that the importance of these technological developments were crucial to Britain’s ability to 
become a world superpower.11 Steam warships allowed power projection on a whole new 
scale, and Britain was able to use its navy both as a deterrent against attacks on British 
interests and as a ‘bargaining chip and lever’ to benefit its commerce.12 The success of this 
strategy is shown in Britain’s ability to avoid major maritime warfare until 1914.13 
Such rapid change in ship design and manufacture had inevitable strategic 
implications, and thus the historiography also reflects the strategic uncertainty created by 
the new steam navy. Such studies argue that the introduction of steam caused a ‘paradigm 
shift in defence thinking’.14 The immediate impact of steam navies was a fear for the safety 
of Britain itself. At its peak in the 1860s, a fear of French invasion led to the ascendancy of 
the ‘bricks and mortar school’, advocating the land defence of British ports.15 The fact that 
the introduction of steam warships did not have an immediate effect in either naval or 
imperial strategic thought has caused considerable historiographical debate about what 
has become known as the ‘dark ages’ of the Royal Navy. This theory suggests the mid-
nineteenth century was a period of poor administration, characterised by a reticence to 
introduce new technology, and an absence of a wider defence strategy.16 Revisionists have 
argued against this idea suggesting it is too simplistic, whiggish, and lacking contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Arthur Jacob Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Era, 1904-1919 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); Parkinson, The Late Victorian Navy. 
11 Kubicek, ‘British Expansion, Empire, and Technological Change’, 249.  
12
 Andrew Lambert, ‘Economic Power, Technological Advantage, and Imperial Strength: Britain as a 
Unique Global Power, 1860-1890’, International Journal of Naval History, 5, no. 2 (2006). The use of 
the navy to obtain compliance can be seen in Peru in 1857, and Chile in 1863, see Keith Neilson and 
Elizabeth Jane Errington, ‘Introduction’, in Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington (eds), Navies 
and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 2; Andrew Lambert, 
‘Under the Heel of Britannia: The Bombardment of Sweaborg, August 1855’, in Peter Hore (ed.), 
Seapower Ashore (London: Chatham, 2000), 124.  
13
 Lambert, ‘Economic Power, Technological Advantage, and Imperial Strength’. 
14 Parkinson, The Late Victorian Navy, 239. The attitudes of the Admiralty board are discussed in C.I. 
Hamilton, The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805-1927 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
15 Beeler, ‘Steam Strategy and Schurman’, in Kennedy, Neilson, and Schurman (eds), Far-Flung Lines, 
28.  
16 See, for instance N.A.M. Rodger, ‘The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-1885. Part I, Business 
Methods, 1868-74’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 61 (1975), 331-344; N.A.M. Rodger, ‘The Dark Ages of the 
Admiralty, 1869-1885. Part II, Change and Decay, 1868-74’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 62(1976), 33-46.  
34 
 
context. Certainly, a serious discussion of strategy was largely absent, especially before the 
end of the 1870s, but this had been the case since the 1820s, and strategy had remained 
fundamentally unchanged since that time.17 Furthermore, bar the French invasion scares of 
the early 1860s which led to large spending on home defences (the so-called ‘Palmerston’s 
follies’), rival weakness and wars on the continent left the Royal Navy largely unchallenged, 
and thus little strategic innovation, or substantial naval investment, was required.18 These 
works therefore suggest that the state of technology itself had some bearing on how 
quickly it was adopted. With her rivals weak, or engaged in continental war, Britain could 
afford to stand back and ‘wait and see’ while technology changed at an unprecedented 
pace.19 This policy was somewhat vindicated when, in 1870, the hurriedly designed H.M.S. 
Captain sank, with the loss of nearly 500 lives.20 Such revisionist histories therefore 
highlight the importance of context when discussing the adoption of technology, 
questioning narratives of inevitable progress.  
In the 1880s, however, a notable move towards the ‘blue-water school’ can be 
seen, with the advocating of the primacy of naval power in the defence of the empire. In 
existing literature, analysis of this change has tended to concentrate on the three key 
factors suggested by Roger Parkinson: a succession of imperial crises which indicated naval 
weakness and overstretch; strategic uncertainty; and the increasing reliability and certainty 
of naval technology.21 More recent studies have attempted to place these technological 
changes within the immensely complicated economic, geopolitical, technological and 
political context, however, which had an equally prominent role in the course of naval 
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history. A particularly important driving force behind the evolution of the navy, and its 
wider role in imperial defence, was economic. As Britain’s enormous power rested on its 
economy, which was in itself reliant on oceanic commerce, it was imperative that seaborne 
trade remained open and undisturbed. Thus, because of a need to control the sea for the 
purposes of trade, the navy became especially important. This was increasingly true as the 
century progressed, with Britain maintaining a large and stable share of the tenfold 
increase in trade between 1860 and 1910.22 Andrew Lambert asserts that as long as 
‘Europe was stable, balanced and prosperous, British interests were secure’, at least until 
the last decades of the nineteenth century, and this goes some way to explain a British 
policy driven by economy at home (including the Mediterranean), and circumstance 
abroad.23 Additionally, Britain’s avoidance of war not only reflected the success of naval 
deterrence but a coherent strategy to evade damage to its commercial interests.24 To this 
end, Basil Greenhill has stated that ‘naval, political, industrial, financial and merchant 
shipping developments inextricably mingled and must not be treated in isolation from each 
other’.25 Thus Lambert has suggested that the role of the Royal Navy was not to defend 
Britain’s burgeoning empire, but to protect its seaborne trade and thus ‘to stabilise the 
international capital market for the City’.26 It is therefore imperative to note that the 
possessions and interests abroad that the Royal Navy sought to defend were not the red 
areas of imperial maps, but the sea lanes and trading ports crucial to British global trade.  
The nature, or indeed the existence, of an overall steam navy strategy has been a 
subject of some debate, ranging from Donald Schurman’s assertion of a ‘steady policy of 
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careful preparation’ to Geoffrey Till’s idea of a strategy ‘stumbled into’ rather than 
consciously developed, although Peter Burroughs is probably most accurate in his 
suggestion of a fragmented strategy, balanced by individual circumstance.27 What is clear, 
however, is that for the entire period the main British naval forces therefore remained in 
British, Mediterranean, or Chinese waters, where its trade faced the strongest threat, 
showing the importance of a wider economic context to naval history.28  
Despite these works, the period of Pax Britannica still remains far less studied than 
the navy in the eighteenth-century, or in the world wars and beyond, particularly in recent 
years.29 Indeed, Crosbie Smith has argued that the age of steam is practically invisible from 
naval history, treated almost as if its development was an inevitable fact, with the 
dreadnought era studied only for nostalgia. What the historiography lacks, he contends, is 
a ‘socio-cultural history of the ocean steamship’, which assesses context, agency, 
technological change, communities, and networks.30 
Matthew Seligmann has pointed to a recent renaissance in studies of the Victorian 
and pre-war navy, but despite large changes in the writing of nineteenth century history 
more generally, the studies he points to show no diversification from traditional themes, 
concentrating on strategy and ‘great men’.31 Indeed, little appears to have changed since 
Barry M. Gough suggested in his survey of the Royal Navy and empire published in 1999, 
that ‘the general linkage of Navy to Empire continues to escape historians, perhaps 
because the task is such a daunting one’. Despite this, he suggested that exploring such 
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connections could be extremely beneficial, and although ‘naval historians love to write 
about battles’, by analysing the navy’s imperial connections ‘they [can] find unexplored 
subjects of equal excitement and value’. Pointing to the direction such studies might take, 
he suggests that ‘treating naval history as a branch of defence history or even strategic 
studies goes only part of the way towards integrating the study of the navy and the empire. 
Far from being an old-fashioned field of enquiry, naval and imperial themes are rich in 
possibilities for studying the interface of societies, systems, and states’. 32 
 Lacking such a focus has left the historiography skewed. Indeed, ‘narrative histories 
of navies [are generally] concerned with policy, politics and operations, with relatively little 
attention paid to economic, financial, or logistical context’.33 Although, as described above, 
Lambert and Sumida have addressed the economic and financial context to some extent, 
little has been done in terms of infrastructure.34 Yet this is key, particularly from 1870, with 
the demise of the sail navy. Trade could only be fully protected with a comprehensive 
command of shipping routes worldwide, and without extensive coaling and docking 
facilities even a fleet as large and powerful as Britain’s was rendered impotent. Despite this 
clear need for coal and coaling infrastructure for steam warships to function, it has largely 
been neglected in the historiography. Assurance of the availability of coal for warships 
worldwide was clearly crucial to the Royal Navy‘s ability to mobilise, yet studies such as S.T. 
Grimes recent work Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 do not even 
contain an entry for coal in the index.35 Similarly, Daniel Headrick’s Power over People 
contains an entire chapter on steamboat imperialism, yet there is no mention of coal. 
Instead it deals with the effects of the technological evolution of warships without ever 
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considering the enormity of the infrastructure required for these ships to function 
abroad.36 Indeed, many of these histories assume that naval power is based merely on the 
number and types of ships, without considering the coal and associated infrastructure 
necessary to project their power across oceans.37 There have been attempts to look at 
nineteenth-century naval infrastructure, and Lambert has gone as far as to suggest that 
‘the dry-dock would be the pivot around which British Imperial strategy was transformed 
between 1860−1890’, but these are exceptions.38 The only study that deals with the 
coaling issue in any detail is Robert Wilson’s analysis of the development of the early steam 
fleet, and its subsequent growing dependence on coal. In doing so, it assesses issues of 
supply – both at home and abroad, coal’s influence on naval and imperial strategy, and the 
practical considerations of coaling on fleet operations in the mid-nineteenth century.39 No 
similar thorough examination of the coaling infrastructure beyond 1870 exists, however, 
bar Jonathan Coad’s brief summary of the development of coaling stations in his most 
recent work.40 
Whereas coal and coaling infrastructure have been largely omitted from histories 
of the steam navy, except in strategic and administrative terms, questions of supply have 
been addressed for the periods immediately preceding and following it. Extensive work has 
been done on supplying the sail navy. This includes Coad’s work on dockyards, as well as 
work on naval administration and infrastructure in the age of sail by N.A.M. Rodger and 
Daniel A. Baugh.41 Several studies also exist on the shift from coal to oil. This is perhaps 
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largely due to the two men involved in initiating the change, Fisher and Churchill, and that 
it encompasses the Dreadnought, and the years immediately prior to the First World War.42 
Such histories do point to the gaps and flaws in the existing historiography of the steam 
navy, however. In particular, they draw attention to the key need to address the processes 
involved in locating and securing resources, the importance and maintenance of 
infrastructure, and the non-linear nature of the changes. By exploring these facets, scholars 
such as Nuno Madureira are able to highlight the need to be careful with innovation-centric 
views, instead locating such factors in a wider analysis of state, empire, global tensions, and 
infrastructure.43  
The need for fuel and safe harbours was a vital part of Britain’s ability to remain 
the pre-eminent naval power, and consequently to its ability to protect crucial seaborne 
trade, and it therefore had a significant influence on strategy in the period 1870−1914. To 
ensure the availability of the considerable amounts of coal needed at these strategic 
points, an infrastructure had to exist to facilitate the movements and storage of coal.44 
Indeed, as Erik Dahl has suggested, ‘providing the fleet with coal was the greatest logistical 
headache of the age’.45 Despite this importance, little is currently known about how this 
infrastructure functioned, changed, was maintained, or was defended. This is clearly a void 
in the historiography which needs to be filled. A thorough examination of naval coaling is 
crucial to understanding key facets of how the navy functioned in the period after 1870, 
and how this fitted with government ideas about imperial and trade defence. Indeed, 
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without coal, the technology and strategy, so thoroughly researched, would have been for 
nought, with ships left immobile. 
Analysis of coaling infrastructure also raises questions about the human history of 
navy and empire in the period 1870−1914. We know little about the human connections 
and networks − British, imperial, and international − that existed globally because of the 
needs of the navy. Moreover, barely anything has been written about the sailor’s 
experiences of coaling infrastructure, nor of the imperial stations they frequented.46 Greg 
Dening’s pioneering work on the late eighteenth-century suggests a direction such a history 
might take. By analysing maritime history in the Pacific from the perspective of both the 
ship and the shore, he presents the beach as a cross cultural zone of influence.47 Such an 
approach at coaling stations would reveal much about the shared histories of sailors, locals, 
and other populations present. 
Although tending to focus on the institution of the Royal Navy and/or its sailors, 
the human history of the navy has come under focus more recently, however. There has 
been a noticeable interest in the navy from social and cultural historians, which has opened 
up new avenues for research about nationalism, identity, masculinity, cultural attitudes, 
and representation.48 These studies diverge from the familiar concentration on strategy, 
technology, and finance, and instead point to a greater integration between naval and ‘new 
imperial’ historiographies. Indeed, they see the navy as a powerful cultural symbol and a 
‘genuinely national institution that brought together key sources of identification such as 
monarchy, empire, geography and gender’.49 In Young Men and the Sea, Daniel Vickers and 
                                                                    
46
 McKee, Sober Men and True gives details of the lives of ordinary sailors in general, although offers 
little in the way of analysis.  
47 Greg Dening, Mr Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power, and Theatre on the Bounty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
48
 Leggett, ‘Navy, Nation and Identity in the Long Nineteenth Century’; Mary A. Conley, From Jack 
Tar to Union Jack: Representing Naval Manhood in the British Empire, 1870-1918 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009); D. Redford (ed.), Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and 
Culture in the Modern World (I.B. Tauris, 2014). 
49 J. Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 1, 10. 
41 
 
Vince Walsh challenge the idea of sailors being defined by their sea activities. They argue 
that by focusing on the extraordinary, not the ordinary, histories have skewed the sailor in 
the popular imagination, which ‘distorts the context within most seafaring actually 
unfolded’. In response to this, the study focuses on just one port – Salem – to explore fully 
the relationship between young men and the sea. By doing so, they emphasise the 
relationship between land and sea in maritime worlds in the age of sail by exploring the 
terrestrial lives of seafarers in addition to their time aboard.50 Following this example, Isaac 
Land has called for historians to go beyond their ‘obsession’ with extraordinary voyages, 
and instead investigate the everyday occurrences in ‘the grey area between the cultures of 
sea and shore’.51 These studies therefore have pointed to where social and cultural 
histories of the navy and the sailor may head, but much needs to be done, especially 
concerning the sailor beyond British shores.  
 
Empire and the Sea 
 
The debt that Europe’s empires owed to their growing mastery of the world’s oceans was 
both widely expounded by contemporaries, and has long been acknowledged by historians. 
The development of the study of human interaction with, and upon, the world’s oceans, 
has been slow to emerge, however. More recently, it has been diverse and 
multidisciplinary, but it has often also been marked by a lack of cohesion between works of 
a similar approach and subject matter. Within the field of history, the subject is often 
separated, somewhat artificially, into the disciplines of naval history, concerned solely with 
the history of the navy, and maritime history, which largely concerns itself with the history 
of the merchant fleet. Furthermore, these are often both separated from histories of the 
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imperial networks and cultural exchange. Such distinctions are imagined, however, as 
‘human interaction with the sea is a fundamental factor of world history, not a dissociated 
force of particular concern’.52 
The connection between navy and empire has not been widely explored by naval 
historians, bar histories of naval wars. This is perhaps starting to change, with a recent 
collection analysing The Victorian Empire and Britain’s Maritime World, 1837-1901. Most 
works which look at the empire have tended to concentrate on naval strategy and the 
politics of the Admiralty, however.53 For the late nineteenth century, works by Donald 
Schurman and John Beeler, as well as a chapter by Peter Burroughs, have framed these 
strategic changes in a wider context. By focusing on the navy and its role in imperial 
defence, they point to the fact that the issue of naval spending and investment in 
technology was a multifaceted one, affected by the incumbent government, quality of 
administration, and a lack of certainty in technology. Although Schurman and Beeler in 
particular point to an emerging ‘body of doctrine’ on the ‘connection between Empire, 
trade, coal and defence’, their focus is primarily on the shift from the idea of colonial 
(individual, local) defence towards imperial (collective, global) defence. Even so, the core 
elements of this shift were the defence of trade, sea lanes, naval bases, and coal depots, 
and, thus, even if they do not specifically focus on infrastructure, these works emphasise its 
importance to imperial defence.54 Furthermore, they link these changes with wider events, 
assessing how incidents such as the Eastern Crisis (1875-1878) and other war scares 
precipitated institutional change, at both a departmental and an institutional level.55  
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 Similarly, David Killingray asserts in his assessment of the historiography of imperial 
defence the fact that ‘the navy played a primary role in this system by protecting the 
waters around Britain and the expanding maritime routes vital to Britain’s industrial 
economy’. Thus, he suggests, it is imperative to recognise that because of the value of 
British trade to the imperial economy, the defence of British interests abroad, trade routes, 
and Britain itself are inseparably entwined, and principally executed through the use of the 
Royal Navy. Despite this, studies of imperial defence have mostly focused on the army, land 
defence, the administration and strategy of defence, and the route to India.56 
Imperial history has since largely shifted away from studies of governance and 
defence in more recent years, however, with the advent of ‘new imperial history’ and its 
focus of on imperial cultures and exchange. This has allowed historians to find new ways to 
analyse the way the empire worked. By centring questions on difference, and prioritising 
non-elite and non-western pasts, these histories have attempted to let the ‘subaltern 
speak’.57 They have, as would be expected, covered a huge amount of subjects – including 
race, gender, identity, knowledge, culture, religion, trade and governance, interculture, 
slavery, and Englishness. A focus on ideologies of race, otherness, and civilisation, and the 
effects these had in constructing identities has been important in reassessing the reciprocal 
nature of imperial relationships, but is not something that has been fully explored for those 
naval men who traversed the world.  
New imperial histories have nevertheless been important in that they have 
highlighted the networks of interconnected and interdependent sites of historical 
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significance, both territorial and imaginative.58 Catherine Hall has been particularly 
influential in highlighting how these imperial connections were intrinsically related to 
power. However, causality was not always simply running from centre to periphery, and as 
a result, these connections constituted both coloniser and colonised.59 Similarly, Tony 
Ballantyne has sought to replace the periphery and metropole idea completely, seeing 
empire as a ‘bundle of relationships’ that brought disparate regions, communities and 
individuals into contact through systems of mobility and exchange. By tracing one idea, in 
this case Aryanism, he is able to focus on networks and patterns of cultural exchange, thus 
highlighting the integrative power of empire. As a result of this focus, he reimagines the 
empire as dynamic and diverse communities constantly remade through these 
connections, without dispensing with the nation state framework.60 Like Ballantyne, Zoё 
Laidlaw has examined the links between specific colonial sites. Although following a 
different connection, that of patronage and information, she is able to investigate the 
networks which connect metropolitan and colonial spheres, both through individuals and 
structures.61 
This recent interest in imperial networks has gone a long way to destabilise the 
ideas of metropole and periphery through analysis of the ‘meaningful connections across 
the empire that facilitated the continual reformation of imperial discourses, practices and 
cultures’.62 This has opened up the possibility of bringing both indigenous peoples and rival 
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European influences into the analytical frame.63 Understanding these connections is crucial 
to an imperial history which does not marginalise indigenous peoples to the background, 
nor prioritise metropolitan finance over other concerns.64 By not necessarily privileging 
metropole or periphery when analysing imperial networks, scholars have been able to 
avoid  the problem often seen in more traditional histories, that ‘neither colonial nor British 
places are of interest as configurations of peoples, experiences, things and practices in their 
own right’. Indeed, such an approach shows that it is ‘more useful to try to examine 
multiple meanings, projects, material practices, performances and experiences of colonial 
relations rather than locate their putative root causes, whether they are “economic”, 
“political” or “cultural”’. By doing so, such an approach reveals the entanglement of these 
networks, their disconnections, tensions, and contradictions, and how each node was 
remade by being connected.65  
These concerns have led some imperial historians to attempt to look at movement 
and connections around the empire through networks in the later nineteenth century.66 
Often this has been the study of the movement of people, in the main white Europeans, 
and these have generally taken the form of histories of imperial migration, exploration, and 
missions.67 Studies such as Robert Bickers’ Settlers and Expatriates and David Lambert and 
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Alan Lester’s Colonial Lives have shown the benefits of studying the networks created by 
the mobility of Britons in the empire.68 These networks, whether personal, business, 
official, religious, or friendships, emphasise the transient nature of empires, in turn 
facilitating an understanding of empire as an interconnected space. In this way, it has 
allowed historians to analyse ‘the many, diverse places that constituted the British Empire 
in the same text’.69 
Few of these studies have considered the role of the ocean in containing networks 
which connected these cultures, however. Yet, considering these oceanic connections is 
crucial to understanding the identity of those who existed within these systems, those who 
travelled between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ or, indeed, those who occupied a space in 
between the two. The identity of those existing in or around what has been seen as a 
marginal space, indeed, a space of difference, which held its own unique beliefs, laws and 
culture, often interacting with a multitude of cultures, geographies and networks, offers 
huge scope for scholars of European empires, especially for examining the hybrity of 
oceanic systems.70 Outside of naval histories, the study of empire through the framework 
of seas and oceans is only a relatively recent development. Despite the sea containing the 
very arteries of their burgeoning power, this historiography has yet to provide a balanced 
and complete perspective of the maritime empires of Europe.  
Studies of discrete oceanic basins emerged much earlier, however. The first 
influential work, Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean, published in 1949, altered the way 
in which scholars attempted to make sense of the relationship between human civilisation 
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and the water it borders.71 The study analysed the Mediterranean as a historical space, 
which Braudel claimed contained many juxtaposing and integrated cultural, political and 
economic networks. Although it can be argued that the Mediterranean was the ultimate 
example of a body of water as an interconnected historical space, the model was later 
pioneered in studies of the Indian Ocean by K.N. Chaudhuri.72 
 The influence of these studies has led scholars in other fields to ask: ‘what if seas 
were shifted from the margins to the centre of academic vision?’73 M.N. Pearson has 
highlighted the enormous scope for these studies by suggesting that the material and 
intellectual frameworks of oceans, includes not only the seas, but also informs about 
coastal and land networks that impinge upon the oceans, as well as those within maritime 
communities.74 Steinberg has suggested that the oceans present a unique proposition to 
scholars, as a ‘space of anarchic competition par excellence’, which is unclaimed, and is, 
indeed, unclaimable. Crucially, this space is not neutral, as projected by earlier scholars, but 
a disputed space, with its own political, hierarchical and social constructs, which were 
shaped, and shaped by, those social relations within it.75  
 As well as being a distinct social space for study, focusing on the ocean as a space 
of analysis also gives unique insight into the nature, construction, infrastructure, and 
networks of larger, often global, enterprises; the most notable example being European 
empires. By adopting this approach, scholars are able to unlock the land bias of many 
imperial studies, thus revealing patterns and connections obscured by this narrow 
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terrestrial approach.76 Furthermore, studies using an oceanic framework offer an insight 
into interactions and juxtapositions of different histories, those of regions around the 
basins, those who travelled them, and the empires that disputed them, transcending the 
artificial boundaries of national histories.77 The progression of these enquiries has closely 
mirrored that of other movements in the humanities and social sciences. Thus, although 
many of the first studies of oceanic basins focused on the political, strategic, and economic 
facets of oceanic networks, more modern scholarship had diversified and extended the 
scope of the field to analyse social and cultural exchange.  
 The most influential of these studies of the ocean undoubtedly include the Marxist 
histories of Marcus Rediker. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea attempted a broader 
social approach to histories of the ocean, which focused on ‘Jack Tar’ himself. Rediker 
strongly identified himself as part of a wider historical movement, labour history, and 
argued that previous histories had obscured the important features at sea, by presenting a 
romantic image of seafaring.78 His work with Peter Linebaugh advanced this focus on 
working class history, looking at both resistance and co-operation as part of the hidden 
networks of the Atlantic.79 These themes are prevalent in another landmark text, Paul 
Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic, in which he looks at the black experience of the British 
Atlantic.80 As well as filling an important subaltern void in oceanic analysis, the study also 
reinforced the need to understand resistance and counter-histories of oceans, and 
crucially, the emergence of a hybridity in oceanic culture, politics, and imperial rule. More 
recently, many of the approaches and subjects of the ‘new imperial history’ have been 
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adopted in an oceanic context. The scope of these oceanic studies influenced by the 
cultural turn is diverse and wide-ranging, encompassing such varied subjects as the role of 
imagination, law, gender, sexuality, regional economies, and micro-geographies, amongst 
many others.81 
If any area of study has fulfilled Braudel’s prophecy that ‘history can do more than 
study walled gardens’, however,  it is Atlantic history, which has been claimed to be ‘one of 
the most important historiographical developments’ of the study of European imperial 
history.82 It is within the theatre of the Atlantic that the concept of oceanic analysis has 
been developed furthest, and where much of the scope and possibilities of an oceanic 
framework for scholarship have been explored. The emergence of an ‘Atlantic system’, a 
hemispheric space of interchange, which fundamentally changed the world, is emphasised 
in Atlantic histories. Seen as a primarily European invention, the Atlantic of the early 
modern period contained easily identifiable integrated connections and networks, 
straightforward to study and explore, and comparable to those explored by Braudel in the 
Mediterranean in earlier periods.83 It was through the uniqueness of the Atlantic world, 
these scholars claim, that economic development was pushed, and it was the Atlantic that 
created the mass market trading conditions necessary for globalisation.84 Bernard Bailyn 
has even gone as far as to say it was through the Atlantic system that the very culture of 
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modernity, encompassing economy, enlightenment, and science, emerged.85 Whether such 
statements can be sustained is debateable, but Atlantic history does offer solutions to 
scholars attempting to reconcile the relationships between nation state and empire, and, 
indeed, between rival empires operating within the space of the Atlantic.86  
Studies have concentrated predominantly on the British Atlantic, however, which 
has not only excluded the histories, networks, and interactions of other nations and 
peoples (and perhaps even continents in the case of South America) within the Atlantic, but 
also the connections and infrastructure that branched beyond Atlantic, particularly into the 
Indian Ocean and the Far East. The presence of inter-oceanic networks, some of which 
were highly prominent, negates the argument that different oceans are fundamentally 
discrete places, which are too diverse to compare, as has been contended.87 Indeed, such 
histories suggest such a narrow geographical focus can often produce studies that are 
Eurocentric, essentially depicting, by exclusion, other oceans as passive and unchanging, 
presenting the ‘global world’ as a product of the West.88 This masks the interconnectivity of 
these systems, and isolates the Atlantic as a somehow distinct and disconnected ocean. 
This, in turn, not only exaggerates the role of America in the development of modernity in 
Europe, but also puts a primacy on northwest Europe in the world economic order.89 
In response to this, other oceanic studies of the eighteenth century have 
concentrated on the linkages between oceans, going some way to bridge the gap between 
new imperial and maritime histories. Work on the East India Company in particular has 
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shown interesting ways to investigate the complexity of imperial and maritime networks. 
Miles Ogborne’s Indian Ink, for example, used the concept of writing ‘to understand how 
changing relationships of knowledge and power shaped the encounter between Europe 
and Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’.90 Similarly, ‘The East India Company 
at Home, 1757−1857’, a research project headed by Margot Finn, is using the British 
country house to examine the wider imperial and global contexts and connections of the 
Company.91 Especially important has been a recent collection of essays entitled Britain’s 
Oceanic Empire, which has aimed to connect British imperial, maritime, and global histories 
for the period 1550−1850.92 This collection explicitly seeks to assess whether practices 
were so different in the Atlantic and the Indian oceans that it justifies the discrete way they 
are often treated in histories. By doing so, it shows linkages between oceans through the 
lenses of Britons overseas, the law, government, diplomacy, and the military, convincingly 
showing that, in many ways, Britain had a global oceanic empire in this period. Although 
this book shows useful directions for further study, by ending in 1850, it shows that, as 
Frances Steel suggests, the period of analysis needs to be extended into the later 
nineteenth century, a period which is largely disregarded by many of these studies.93  
The connection between the world’s oceans was far stronger towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, and this is perhaps why very few existing Atlantic histories go much 
beyond 1800, and those that do dedicate little text to such outlying dates.94 For the most 
pre-eminent period of oceanic peace, that of Pax Britannica, concentrating on one ocean is 
less meaningful. Here, it is more useful to analyse the ocean and its surrounding 
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communities and places as examples of what Mary Louise Pratt had termed imperial 
‘contact zones’. This approach ‘treats the relations among colonisers and colonised … not in 
terms of separateness, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking 
understandings and practices, and often within radically asymmetrical relations of 
power’.95 As periods of peace left oceanic networks and infrastructure undisturbed and 
intact, the nineteenth century is particularly important era of high international, 
intercontinental, and intercultural interaction, and where the hybridity of the oceans was 
at its highest.96 
These interactions, and the forms of hybridity produced, show how oceanic history 
can reveal enormously complex relationships, networks, and interactions. To this end it has 
been suggested by Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun that:  
the impact of the ocean on the course of modern history has been as enormous as 
its roles have been contradictory: the sea has served as an agent of colonial 
oppression but also of indigenous resistance and native empowerment, it has 
been a site of loss, dispersal, and enforces migration but also of new forms of 
solidarity and affective kinship, a paradigm of modern capitalism but also of its 
creative reinterpretation, a figure of death but also of life. 97 
Studies exploring this impact have concentrated, in general, on ports and beaches as the 
settings for these encounters.98 Dening has been particularly influential in attempting a 
‘double visioned history’ arguing that ‘natives and strangers have drawn their different 
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cultural identities from the same sea’. In doing so, he argues that beaches are ‘places for 
special historical insights. In-between places, where every present moment is suffused with 
the double past of both sides of the beach and complicated by the creative cultures that 
this mixture makes’.99 In particular, these studies have revealed the cultural interactions, 
tensions, and imperial power in these places, but most do not analyse how these places 
were linked by oceanic connections. 
While the exceptional movement of people has been the focus of studies dealing 
with nineteenth-century oceanic connections, the historiography has largely ignored the 
more routine and commonplace. Moreover, studies have largely concentrated on travel 
between metropole and periphery, with voyages between peripheral places, and sub-
imperial networks being largely omitted.100 Furthermore, even into the twentieth century 
the majority of sea journeys, despite perceptions of a shrunken world, were still often a 
great undertaking, requiring labour, infrastructure, and fuel, yet ‘we still know little about 
transport’s wider impact’.101 Indeed, while theoretical and metaphorical networks have 
been more widely explored, physical infrastructural networks have been largely unstudied. 
These networks, which connected imperial and global spaces, were not only crucial to 
imperial processes, but also had huge political, cultural, and social effects on a global scale.  
Perhaps the most studied imperial infrastructure in general is that used for long-
distance communication, usually the telegraph, which has been explored in many novel 
and informative ways.102 A collection edited by Peter Putnis, Chandrika Kaul, and Jurgen 
                                                                    
99
 Dening, ‘Deep Times, Deep Spaces’, in Klein and Mackenthun (eds), Sea Changes: Historicizing the 
Ocean, 13. 
100
 Examples of studies which have analysed these periphery to periphery mobilities are Lambert and 
Lester (eds), Colonial Lives across the British Empire, and Steel, Oceania under Steam. 
101
 Frances Steel, ‘Uncharted Waters? Cultures of Sea Transport and Mobility in New Zealand 
Colonial History’, Journal of New Zealand Studies, no. 12 (2011), 137-154. 
102 A good example of a traditional style history of telegraphs is Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible 
Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). Its role in literature is discussed in Susan Shelangoskie, ‘Anthony Trollope and the 
Social Discourse of Telegraphy after Nationalisation’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 14, no. 1 (2009), 
72-93. Its juxtaposition with ideas about bodily and social discipline is discussed in Iwan Rhys Morus, 
54 
 
Wilk, for example, sought to understand the flows of communication between centre and 
periphery as well as ‘growing interconnectedness among geographically dispersed and 
diverse communities’. It does not, however, assume such processes were seamless, but 
that they were ‘tempered by the realities of specific local and regional contexts and their 
political and cultural imperatives’. Thus the telegraph system did not, as has been 
imagined, annihilate time and space, but suffered disconnections and issues with reliability, 
connecting some and isolating others.103 Furthermore, Simon Potter has examined how the 
telegraph made possible the emergence of ‘imperial press system’ across Britain and the 
settler colonies, allowing a ‘study in imperial integration’ through the history of the 
telegraph.104 Similar studies have assessed the impact of the railway in the nineteenth 
century.105 Robert Home’s study of ‘the formation of towns and cities as an instrument of 
colonial expansion and control throughout the empire’ is one of few other examples of 
studies of imperial infrastructure that have moved beyond communication.106 
 However, scholars of the history of science are expanding the study of 
infrastructure, and a special edition of the History Workshop Journal looked at ‘the 
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possibilities and problems wrought by technological innovation’.107 In the issue, topics such 
as the telegraph and salt beef are examined in novel ways, looking at how they connect 
different places and communities across oceans.108 Leading the way, however, have been 
historians of Europe.109 In particular, Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser have forwarded 
the agenda in studies of transnational infrastructure, arguing that ‘historians often do 
observe the pivotal role of transnational networks, but fail to follow up this observation 
with actual narrative and analysis ... exactly how these networks developed, and how this 
development process intertwines with … history at large, is not explored, but assumed’. 
Indeed, it is only in studying the development and maintenance of these infrastructures 
that one can see they were not ‘straightforward processes, but were characterised by 
ambiguities and tensions’, and intertwined with many actors, conflictions, and unintended 
consequences.110 A major project, which will produce six volumes by the end of 2014, has 
also sought to address the dearth of infrastructural history. Entitled Making Europe: 
Technology and Transformations, 1850−2000, it seeks to analyse the processes behind 
‘day-to-day practices’, by analysing ‘powerful infrastructures’ and ‘knowledge networks’. 
Although the focus is centred on Europe and technology in general, such a project points 
towards the use of similar approaches for more works with a smaller technological, 
infrastructural, or commodity focus, and wider geographic scope.111  
Despite Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith suggesting that historians should attempt 
‘to penetrate the black boxes’ of ‘steam power, steam ship’, a focus on infrastructure has 
not yet emerged. In fact, little has been written about the need for infrastructure for the 
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navy or other shipping concerns, or its strategic impact, especially after 1879. Yet it is 
imperative, as Marsden and Smith suggest, to ‘see each of those “tools of empire”, not 
simply as a fixed product with a given role’, but to understand the context of such 
technologies. Perhaps the most crucial ‘tool of empire’ was the navy, and arguably its most 
important need was the ability to obtain fuel overseas, yet steam-coal is largely absent 
from imperial histories.112  
 
Global History 
 
Felipe Fernández-Armesto has suggested that in the age of European empires, ‘sea routes 
became the highways of long-range transmissions of culture and the framework on which 
genuinely global history – cultural exchange that is, that encompassed the world – was 
built’.113 By considering empire in this way, a global approach to an analysis of European 
empires has made sense to an increasing number of scholars. Indeed, when one considers 
transnational histories of oceans and empires in the nineteenth century, it is through a 
global scope that they reach their apogee.  
The examination of the past as a global entity, en route to or emerging as an 
interconnected whole, stems from the almost indiscriminate contemporary use of the 
terms ‘globalisation’ and ‘global world’ to describe the post 9/11 and internet age.114 As 
with many new historiographical trends, it is easy to be wary of a global approach to 
history as a development that mirrors contemporary circumstances, but offers little to 
scholarship. However, the promise of such an approach in revealing ‘hidden meta-
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narratives’ should merit some attention.115 Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson assert that 
the British Empire was an ‘interconnected zone constituted by multiple points of contact 
and complex circuits of exchange’ and because of the scale of these interactions, studies of 
empires require all of these circuits to be inside the same analytical frame.116 Furthermore, 
with improvements in technology allowing increasing flows of goods, knowledge and, most 
crucially, people, the interdependency of these networks, and therefore, the world events 
they contributed to, justify a need to analyse imperial history in a broader geographical 
framework. Moreover, a global approach not only allows scholars to see patterns of 
uniformity and hybridity emerging as a result of a growing interdependence, but also how 
such integration led to heightened ideas of difference, disconnections, and occlusions.117 
Certainly, it is a useful tool in the analysis of the role of empires in the emergence of a 
‘global’, ‘modern’, world.118 
Global history, then, has the scope to cover a variety of topics – information, 
enterprise, migration, consumerism, environment, human rights, culture, disease, and 
terrorism.119 By assessing the global nature of these subjects, these histories seek to 
‘decentre analysis’, highlighting the diversity of connections and exchange, thus allowing 
for the discussion of the interdependent nature of both western and non-western 
networks in facilitating the movement of ‘goods, ideas, knowledge, languages and 
people’.120 Thus these interconnected networks are crucial to understanding how empires, 
nations, peoples, cities, and businesses operated, exchanged, and were influenced by 
others in this period. This approach, in theory, therefore, removes the Eurocentric 
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dominance of studies of modernisation and globalisation, which often present both as a 
product of the West, and supplant it with a more complex view, reflecting the multifaceted 
nature of imperial and indigenous network intersections, interdependence, resistance and 
occlusions in the creation of a modern, global world.121 
Much of the global history that has emerged has been concerned with the history 
of globalisation. It has been argued that this is ‘currently the most important single debate 
in the social sciences: analysis of the origins, nature and consequences of globalization’.122 
These scholars argue that global history is interdisciplinary, seeing cultural, political, and 
economic together helping new understandings of conventional subjects such as war and 
politics.123 As a result of this focus, the crucial role of capital in the rise of the modern 
global has been heavily emphasised. Both Bayly and Magee and Thompson have suggested 
that although unfashionable, the economic analysis is vital to an understanding of the huge 
increase in the creation, growth and intersections of global networks, which were created 
by movements of people, technology, capital, commodities, and information.124 Magee and 
Thompson’s further assertion that as well as economics, migration and culture were crucial 
elements in the movement towards a global world suggest that oceanic analysis may have 
yet more to offer the field, with oceanic networks central to migration, and a significant 
place of cultural exchange.125 Studies of how these physical networks functioned, however, 
are largely absent. Furthermore, such studies have thus far suffered from overly specific or 
vague definitions. Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye summarise the problem by analysing such a 
complex process as globalisation, describing it as a ‘changing, many-faceted, historically 
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evolving process, it cannot be captured in a single phrase’.126 Such a focus also runs the risk 
of teleology, promoting the idea of European, or British, exceptionalism.  
Scholars have taken a global approach in other ways, however, particularly in 
analysing flows of commodities, information, and knowledge. The distribution of 
commodities across the globe, via oceans, is a well-documented field of enquiry, and has 
emerged as a field of study in its own right.127 Early examples, such as Lorna Weatherill’s 
analysis of consumer behaviour in the early modern period and Sidney Mintz’s study of 
sugar, both from 1985, have precipitated a wide variety of different histories of 
commodities.128 Commodity histories have allowed scholars a unique insight into the 
networks and connections that existed, often across oceans, to facilitate trade.129 Such 
histories have tended to fit into two fairly narrow and often overlapping categories, 
however. The first deals with luxury trades, such as silk, precious metals, porcelain, and 
jewels. The second analyse trades that involved oppression, slavery, exploitation, and/or 
colonial subjugation, particularly in the Atlantic world, such as the trade in tobacco, cotton, 
sugar, and rice.130 Both tend to focus on the impact of these new products in terms of 
culture and consumption, and their role in the emergence of global markets and trades. As 
such, they are largely focused on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or on the post 
Second World War ‘consumer society’.131  
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Many of these histories have sought to analyse some of the most important and 
influential trades, and cotton has been at the forefront of this. Beverly Lemire argues that 
cotton was ‘the driving force in global change’, and Giorgio Riello subtitled his study ‘the 
fabric that made the modern world’.132 There have, however, been few attempts to assess 
other important cargos that, though bulkier and less controversial, were crucial to trade 
and empire. As such, coal, ‘utterly lacking in glamour’, but perhaps the commodity most 
deserving of the title ‘the driving force in global change’, has largely been ignored, despite 
networks spanning the globe, and being crucial to trade, manufacturing, travel, and 
defence. Its importance cannot be underestimated, Barbara Frees argues that British coal 
‘triggered the industrial revolution, became the most powerful force on the planet, and 
created an industrial society the likes of which the world had never seen’.133 More 
poetically, Ralph Waldo Emerson suggested that ‘every basket is power and civilisation’.134 
Even outside commodity histories, a coal-blindness has been seen more generally 
in the last three decades. Older studies of coal are largely domestically focused, and many 
are economic histories, which centre on the growth of the industry and it markets, or are 
business histories of individual mining companies.135 The remaining studies are largely 
social histories, examining the effect of the industry on local areas, workers, health, urban 
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development, and migration.136 In attempting new histories of coal, commodity histories 
are a useful place to begin. This thesis seeks, for example − to paraphrase Riello’s 
introduction about cotton − to be ‘a history of naval coal, but also a story narrated though 
naval coal’. In this way, it uses the global and interconnected nature of the commodity to 
explore both the local and the global in terms of empire, power, economics, and culture.137 
Many commodity histories have specifically looked at the role of trade in 
globalisation, but while the history of globalisation is, indeed, a global history, global 
history is not simply the history of globalisation.138 Indeed, as Maxine Berg has suggested, 
global history should not always be led by a search for beginnings of globalisation, but also 
as a link with new imperial histories. In this way, it not only decentres Europe in the story of 
empire, allowing ‘subalterns’ greater limelight, but also allows histories of the interaction 
between different empires and peoples.139 Furthermore, such an approach can be used to 
overcome the fact that ‘economic histories of early modern Europe and its colonial empires 
are still separated off from social and cultural histories of consumption and material 
culture’.140 With no agenda to identify the seeds of globalisation, nor, therefore, to 
compare ‘the west and the rest’ this approach is less averse to teleology and to simply 
telling a story of English or British exceptionalism.141 Indeed, moving away from issues of 
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globalisation brings new questions about diasporas, trade, religion, material culture, and 
knowledge.142 This has been especially important in analysis of the movement of goods 
around the globe, allowing historians to make sense of the links between physical and 
conceptual places of production, distribution, purchase, and consumption. A global 
approach in this way dictates that historians have to consider space as well as time, 
avoiding ideas of ‘globally advancing homogeneity’ and ‘local specificity’, instead revealing 
complex and often contradictory connections between disparate places.143 
Other histories have addressed how this movement of commodities facilitated the 
spread of a whole range of ideas. Some were crucial to the physical process of travel, 
through knowledge of navigation, currents, geography, and cosmology, some informed of 
the knowledge of discoveries, through botany, anthropology, and racial beliefs, and some 
informed of politics of settlement and governance.144 These sets of ‘knowledge’, and the 
networks which dispersed them, are crucial to the way contemporaries understood 
empires, travel, and indigenous lands and peoples, and are therefore crucial to 
understanding the politics, governance, culture, and military facets of imperial rule. 
As a result of the role of the oceans in the rise of an integrated world, a global 
approach to history also gives opportunity to reflect upon the role of maritime 
infrastructure and processes in this change. Cannadine has argued it was Britain’s maritime 
control, which was geographically larger and thus more encompassing than its official 
imperial influence, which enabled Britain to have such a great global presence. Therefore it 
was through the oceans that the networks of material and cultural exchange, the catalysts 
of a global world, occurred. Hence using a maritime perspective ‘de-parochialises’ studies 
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of globalisation, by highlighting the hybridity of its manifestations and origins.145 The fact 
that it was through oceanic networks, the arteries of European expansion and empire, that 
a globalised world was able to exist in any tangible way, has led scholars to identify the key 
role of oceans, Johnman and Murphy describing it as the ‘original motor of globalisation’.146 
However, whereas empires have formed a focus for some global histories, few 
have considered their the oceanic nature of their networks, a situation which needs to be 
addressed, not least because as the prominent theatre of imperial infrastructures, they 
lend themselves ideally to a global approach.147 As Peter Coclanis has pointed out, all of the 
leading ‘Atlantic powers’, bar perhaps France, had major economic interests in the East, 
which suggests that an Atlantic centred analysis skews the reality of what was, in fact, a 
series of flows around the globe, which were often integrated or interdependent, which 
especially true in the nineteenth century.148  
Bayly has suggested that a global history of the emergence of a modern world 
should assess ‘how historical trends and sequences of events, which have been treated 
separately in regional and national histories, can be brought together’.149 Much still needs 
to be done to fulfil this vision, however. Although the level of interconnectivity between 
networks across the globe increased during the previous two centuries, perhaps the best 
examples are found in the nineteenth century. In this period, early connections grew and 
strengthened, assisted by an increasingly global trade of commodities, including goods, 
religion, information, tourists, and disease facilitated by increasingly global systems of 
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labour.150 The great technological strides of the nineteenth century, in particular the 
railways, the steamship, and the telegraph, made the scale of the global increasingly more 
manageable, and thus a global framework of analysis an obvious option.151 Yet this is 
perhaps the most omitted period of global history, as scholars have primarily concentrated 
on the nascence of globalism and the consumer age.  
Moreover, little is understood about the very nature of the networks and 
interactions, and the reality of the power structures that created and controlled them.152 
Global history still requires a greater emphasis on the interactions and disconnections 
between oceanic and land networks, and the effect each had on the other. As van der 
Vleuten and Kaijser rightly assert, too often global history tends to assume the integrative 
power networks and infrastructure, without critically examining their development, or 
indeed maintenance, thus omitting their entanglement with wider changes from their 
histories.153 
 
Conclusions 
 
Through assessing the fields of naval, imperial, and global history as they now stand, it is 
apparent that all three have not fully explored their links and connections with each other. 
In particular, there still exists a gap between the historiographies of the empire and navy in 
the nineteenth century, despite the close and fundamental links that exist. 
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As a result of this disconnection, there has been little consideration in studies of 
global flows of how capital, goods, people, and ideas were allowed to pass largely 
unimpeded in the nineteenth century. Thus it is imperative to recognise the importance of 
the Royal Navy in the maintenance of Pax Britannica, and the boom in global flows that 
resulted. Furthermore, both commercial and naval ships relied on key physical 
infrastructure which allowed the processes, flows, and power projections possible. Despite 
this, no studies have truly explored how the huge changes in technology, international 
relations, and volume of trade in this period necessitated the establishment and 
maintenance of huge networks and infrastructure. To assume that these pieces of 
infrastructure merely appeared, remained static, and suffered no disruptions nor had any 
effects, is to exclude key questions about how the nineteenth century navy, empire, and 
world functioned.  
Similarly, even considering its lack of glamour and controversy, that coal is largely 
absent from all three historiographies is surprising, as it is a commodity of utmost 
importance for navy, empire, and global trade and industry. It is, of course, particularly 
important for the navy, as this thesis explores, but was also a key commodity for industry, 
trade, and travel. There is clearly much scope, and much need, for an understanding of how 
networks and infrastructure facilitated the movement and use of this crucial fuel. 
 This thesis, therefore, seeks to fill some of these gaps, and also to point to 
approaches for further study. In this way, it not only illustrates the importance of naval 
coaling in terms of imperial defence, but also highlights the transnational and global 
infrastructure, oceanic flows of people and goods, and knowledge and power networks 
created by naval coaling. By doing so, moreover, it aims to understand how these networks 
and contact zones reconstituted those places and people who were part of, or touched by, 
these webs of connections. 
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Chapter 3: The Rise of Coal Consciousness: Imperial 
Philosophies, Knowledge, and Bureaucracy 
 
The 1870s saw a dawning realisation about the crucial part that the security of coal and 
coaling infrastructure played in the protection of British interests abroad. What might be 
termed a ‘coal consciousness’ grew amongst government officials and naval experts as 
Britain entered the last decades of the nineteenth century, and this was especially 
augmented by the work of the Carnarvon Commission, which sat between 1878 and 1882. 
This was the first instance that an official body had attempted to assess and make 
recommendations for the permanent security of British shipping and naval fuel 
infrastructure. The coal question, as it became known, had consequences that went far 
beyond the navy, however, and this chapter explores how the development of coal 
consciousness and the work of the Carnarvon Commission can be situated in the wider 
context of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In particular, it will assess how the 
coal question was intrinsically connected to and affected by changes in imperial politics, 
knowledge collection, and the state apparatus.  Furthermore, it will assess how these wider 
changes allowed coal consciousness to develop from the writings of a small number of 
naval men into what could be considered a ‘coaling consensus’ by the 1890s and the effects 
this had, both on measures to alleviate the coaling problem, and on wider changes in 
imperial and domestic governance. By assessing these factors, it concludes that coal 
consciousness was more than just a reaction to these changes in politics and the state − it 
also played a part in profoundly changing them. Finally, it shows that the effects of a 
coaling consensus were wide-ranging. Not only were the measures that resulted from it a 
largely successful deterrent to attacks on British naval coal supplies, but the issues it raised 
were key to the establishment of important governmental bodies for imperial defence, 
naval intelligence, and mobilisation in war. 
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In assessing the wider context for the growth of a coaling consciousness, it is 
particularly important to see that it was intrinsically entwined with the effects of the 
decline of a liberal attitude to imperial defence.1 This imperial indifference, almost 
ubiquitous in the mid-Victorian period, was conspicuous by colonial issues being given very 
little attention by politicians, except in times of significant crisis. Crucially, those in the top 
echelons of power, and especially Gladstone, ‘appear[ed] not to have much time for the 
colonies’ at all.2 Instead, governments relied on the ‘soft power’ of diplomacy as a basis for 
imperial defence.3 
The 1870s, however, marked the beginning of a loss of confidence in this liberal 
foreign policy, and the ascendant Disraelian Conservatism built on the issues of ‘the Empire 
and social reform’.4 The development of this pro-imperial rhetoric in the Conservative party 
reflected the emergence of an imperial angle to domestic politics, and looked to exploit a 
heightened imperial sentiment in order to secure Britain’s global pre-eminence. This pro-
imperialism can largely be separated into aggressive foreign policy and a renewed interest 
in imperial defence, both caused by a growing fear of the expansion of Britain’s rivals and a 
feeling that Britain was losing its prestige by neglecting the empire. Although both are 
connected, it is the attitudes towards imperial defence that best explains the rise of coal 
consciousness. 
As well as the perceived strength of potential rivals, the reassessment of imperial 
defence was also influenced by the huge increase in Britain’s merchant marine, which was 
viewed as vulnerable in a potential war. Fears over imperial defence were therefore not 
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just limited to the safety of those areas under direct British rule, but included British and 
imperial interests worldwide, and most notably the maritime spaces used by British 
commercial interests.5 These worries were exacerbated by rapid changes in naval 
technology, which benefited not only Britain, but also its rivals. Improvements in warship 
design and efficiency increased the ability of foreign navies to wage war on an 
unprecedented scale and at a significant distance away from their home bases, escalating 
the risk to the British Empire at large.6  
Such threats led to calls for urgent action to rectify weaknesses in imperial defence. 
The only way to remedy the situation, it was argued, was through an increase in defence 
spending, particularly for the Royal Navy, and the assertion of British power around its 
empire through the show of force.7 It was the navy that was the most important and 
obvious form of British power in the wider world, and thus it ‘was intellectually, physically, 
symbolically and intuitively regarded as the embodiment of the martial nature of imperial 
defence’.8 An increase in defence spending therefore largely meant an increase in naval 
estimates. The most obvious use of this extra funding would be to provide a larger fleet of 
modern warships to perform these functions of defence, but there was also a need to 
ensure that this fleet could be adequately coaled and serviced throughout the British 
Empire. Thus, it was suggested that measures be taken to secure the supply of coal to the 
navy through the defence of Britain’s far-flung naval and coaling stations. 
It was these fears and mooted solutions that allowed coal consciousness to gain 
credence, and, moreover, placed coal at the centre of worries about imperial defence. 
Indeed, when these fears reached a peak during the Russian war scare of 1878, it was a 
perceived vulnerability of naval coal that was the focus of both the resultant bodies: the 
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Colonial Defence Committee and the Carnarvon Commission. The reports of these official 
government enquiries, especially the latter, were key catalysts to changes in imperial 
defence policy in the 1880s. These bodies were able to present a compelling case for an 
increase in funds to address the issue through the collection and organisation of a large 
amount of data about the coaling issue. By organising this data, the Carnarvon Commission 
created a formalised and legitimised coaling knowledge that endured as the basis of coal 
consciousness, and indeed largely as the basis of imperial defence strategy. This data 
included the current status of the defence of coal supplies for the navy, and the 
recommendations of experts. It is testament to the depth of analysis of the Carnarvon 
Commission that it remained the chief source for coaling knowledge, and indeed a much-
cited source in discussions on wider imperial defence. 
The creation of this coaling knowledge has led Peter Burroughs to describe the 
Carnarvon Commission as ‘a turning point in official [imperial defence] policy’, but this 
chapter will argue that although important, it was both a victim of Gladstone’s attitude 
towards imperial defence, and then, in the mid-1880s, a beneficiary of wider support for 
action on imperial defences.9 That is not to say that the work of the Commission, not least 
the key details that were leaked to the press, did not have a significant impact on the shift 
away from Gladstonian attitudes towards imperial defence. However, the slow pace at 
which were measures implemented suggests that it merely acted as a catalyst for change. 
Although it was essential to the rise of coal consciousness, the Commission was not able to 
effect immediate change, and it was only through the presence of a Conservative majority 
after 1886 that a long-term spending strategy approximating its recommendations was 
achieved through the 1888 Imperial Defence Act. 
That the Carnarvon Commission was not a turning point in imperial defence policy 
was largely a result of the return of Gladstone as Prime Minister while it was still producing 
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its reports. While the creation of a coaling knowledge was a powerful tool for those 
advocating coal consciousness, and later in creating a coaling consensus, it was also 
damaging for those exponents of a more Gladstonian, low-spending defence strategy. The 
ability of Gladstone’s Liberals to suppress the Carnarvon Commission reports was crucial in 
the obstruction of any progress on the scale recommended in the findings. The suppression 
was temporary, however, with the leaking of confidential documents to the press severely 
weakening Gladstone’s position. Because of this, it is imperative to note the role of the 
emerging field of investigative journalism, which sought to uncover issues seen to be in the 
public interest, as well as a general upsurge in enthusiasm for both the empire and the 
navy. As a result, there was no widespread press condemnation, even though the 
revelation of these reports represented a serious breach of government confidentiality. 
Indeed, a growing coaling consciousness began to question the idea of who could or should 
control knowledge, what was acceptable to publish, and what was in the public interest. 
This allowed the ‘blue-water school’, advocating huge naval expenditure, to gain the 
ascendency, and, with the fall of Gladstone, spending on imperial defence increased 
accordingly and committees for imperial defence were established in the later 1880s. 
Although these events allowed coal consciousness to develop into an almost 
complete coaling consensus, the coaling knowledge created by the Carnarvon Commission 
was static: a series of reports made by a non-permanent body. If coal consciousness was to 
be transformed into a coherent defence and infrastructural strategy after 1882, more 
permanent bodies were needed to constantly collect, collate and analyse data, which could 
then inform government actions. Thus developments within the state apparatus were 
necessary in order both to inform and carry out the policies of coaling defence. The 
growing need to implement and maintain the infrastructure and defence of coaling 
increasingly necessitated the creation of bodies with specialised roles. This was manifested 
through the Colonial Defence Committee and the Naval Intelligence Department, both 
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permanent standing government organisations which facilitated an ongoing debate about 
the defences and maintenance of coaling infrastructure, amongst other naval and imperial 
defence issues. Furthermore, these bodies allowed improvements in the interactions 
between bodies of government. The emergence of these specialist committees dealing 
with the coal question was not an isolated occurrence but can also be situated in the wider 
development and growth of what might be termed a modern state apparatus in the late 
nineteenth century.10 This was typified by two interrelated phenomena: a growth in 
government bureaucracy and increased specialisation in civil service positions. These 
changes were responses to the challenges faced by Britain as the nineteenth century came 
to a close. For imperial defence, it was the rise of coal consciousness that was a key part of 
the creation of these bodies, and thus we can see increasing concern about the coaling 
issue as a catalyst for the development of a more extensive imperial defence bureaucracy. 
This chapter argues that it is imperative to see the wider context of the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century in order to understand the rise of coal consciousness. The coaling 
consensus that emerged in the later 1880s, and its important effects in terms of imperial 
defence and naval mobilisation, were not a simple result of concern about the safety of 
coaling in war. Instead, the acceptance of coal’s importance in imperial defence was a 
result of a combination of interdependent changes in state, politics, and popular opinion. 
Indeed, the resultant formation of bodies to consider the coaling issue, and the subsequent 
high naval spending that occurred, were profoundly advanced and impeded by party 
politics, economics, and popular views of imperial and naval weakness. 
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Development of Pro-Imperial Politics and Coal Consciousness 
 
The repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s led to around thirty years of British commercial 
success, creating a general confidence in the political-economic orthodoxy of free trade. As 
part of this policy, Britain began to drive down defence costs around the empire.11 As the 
Marquess of Salisbury remarked in 1877, ‘English [foreign] policy is to float lazily 
downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boat-hook to avoid collisions’.12 Britain’s 
imperial position began to change in the 1870s, however, and E.H.H. Green has argued 
that, to reflect this, the Conservative Party under Benjamin Disraeli reinvented itself as the 
‘imperial party’.13 This was epitomised by Disraeli’s Crystal Palace speech of 1872 where he 
announced that one of the aims of his party was ‘for maintaining the greatness of the 
kingdom and the empire’.14 The ‘mid-Victorian liberal consensus’, in which both parties had 
accepted free trade economics and a detached foreign policy, was at an end.  
The popularity of the Conservative reinvention and subsequent pro-imperial 
rhetoric was a result largely of a growing sense of ‘imperial crisis’. Unease had arisen from 
unrest in the formal and informal empires, including major rebellions in Jamaica and New 
Zealand in the 1860s, which had seemingly been exacerbated by concurrent troop 
withdrawals from the self-governing colonies. This acute imperial anxiety was heightened 
by the growth of other powers, both in a commercial and in a military sense. This led to 
what have often been seen as defensive annexations, prompted by fear of a rival power 
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taking control of territories and denying Britain access to its trade.15 There was, therefore, a 
growing discontent towards a Liberal foreign policy that appeared to be based on peace at 
all costs, which Disraeli termed as Gladstone’s ‘strange mania for eating dirt’ and his policy 
of ‘living in a blaze of apology’.16 While extra-European foreign policy had not been an 
electoral issue in the mid-nineteenth century, the development of an ‘imperial angle’ to 
European politics in the 1870s changed this. Disraeli’s ability to exploit this move away 
from eurocentricism in the popular consciousness meant that Gladstone’s imperial policies 
soon became synonymous with ‘penny-pinching commercialism’, and the Conservatives 
were returned to power in the 1874 election with their first absolute majority since the 
1840s.17 
The emerging imperial awareness in Britain, epitomised by the rise of the newly 
pro-imperial Conservative Party, also coincided with the emergence of ‘coal consciousness’, 
which developed steadily in the second half of the 1870s. This was initiated by naval 
thinkers concerned by the defensive and infrastructural problems caused by the 
widespread use of steam battleships from the early 1870s. Unlike sail ships, steamships 
required constant expert maintenance and, most importantly, fuel.18 Those advocating an 
awareness of these issues, emphasised not only the importance of a good supply of coal, 
but also argued that the security of coal supplies in war was of paramount importance, as 
they would undoubtedly be a target for enemy cruisers. John Beeler suggests that because 
of these worries, by the mid-1870s there existed a ‘body of doctrine on the connection 
between Empire, trade, coal and defence’.19 There appeared to be good reason for these 
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fears. The devastating activities of the Confederate SS Alabama in the American Civil War 
showed how effective single cruisers could be even against superior navies, and Britain 
appeared to be vulnerable to this kind of attack, especially in its wider empire. Bar the 
Imperial Fortresses of Halifax, Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Malta, few naval coal depots had 
any defences at all, and thus it was feared that even a few enemy cruisers could cripple the 
ability of the Royal Navy to refuel in large parts of the world.20  
In the mid-1870s only a small minority of navalists, led by Sir J.C.R. Colomb and Sir 
Alexander Milne, fully grasped the implications of the naval coaling problems Britain would 
face in the event of war. Colomb, a prolific writer on naval strategy had, as early as 1867, 
recognised ‘the fact that modern trade movements and modern society depended on the 
constant abundance and availability of coal’. He advocated an organised chain of coaling 
stations with adequate defences. This would ensure the ‘wartime availability of coal 
supplies which would enable the squadron to operate effectively while at the same time 
denying these coaling facilities to enemy cruisers’.21 However prescient his ideas, Colomb 
had no official governmental role, and thus his concerns remained marginal. Milne, 
however, who served as First Naval Lord in 1866-1868, and again in 1872-1876, held much 
more influence as a central figure in the Admiralty.22 Advocating similar ideas to Colomb, 
he suggested that ‘coaling stations would be the great problem in a future war and they 
must be maintained and extended … We could get no coal except from our own colonies, 
where new depots would have to be established’.23  
Despite his position, Milne could do little to promote coal consciousness in higher 
governmental circles, as the Admiralty had limited influence over government policy. This 
was perhaps exacerbated by the fact the Admiralty itself could not present a united front 
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on the issue; the rapid technological change in warships led to a great deal of uncertainty 
and disagreement about the future of the steam fleet. Even Milne himself had advocated a 
return to sail to deal with the coal question.24 This lack of cohesion, Donald Schurman has 
suggested, meant that the Admiralty’s ‘representatives on the Defence Committee lacked 
the wit or interest to advise the fortification experts on naval needs’.25  
The Admiralty’s attitude towards coaling station defence is perhaps best 
summarised by the fact it considered it to be a question of land defence and therefore to 
be outside of its responsibilities, effectively passing the issue to the War Office. Indeed, it 
was the War Office which, through the then Deputy Director of Works, Sir William Jervois, 
published The Defenceless Condition of our Coaling Stations and Naval Establishments 
Abroad in 1875. Jervois had the backing of his immediate superior, the Inspector General 
for Fortifications, Sir J.L.A. Simmons, but the enthusiasm for coaling station defence did not 
extend to the top echelons of the War Office. Indeed, the Defence Committee, headed by 
the Duke of Cambridge, rejected the suggestions he made outright. Cambridge, an army 
man who often ignored the whims of the Cabinet, gave short shrift to anything except 
home defence, and thus the concept of spending funds on the defence of coaling stations 
fell on deaf ears.26 This attitude reflected the accepted governmental imperial policy of the 
mid-Victorian liberal consensus − foreign policy was Eurocentric, and moreover mostly 
concerned with the defence of Britain itself, based on the belief that Britain’s naval 
supremacy was assured, as it had been since 1815.  
This standpoint was understandable, due to the enormous success of an imperial 
indifference in the mid-Victorian period, and this acted as the greatest obstacle against 
implementing hugely expensive recommendations for coaling station defence. Britain had 
successfully avoided large-scale war on the continent since 1856, and with its battleship 
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fleet unchallenged until the 1880s, an unwillingness (especially by the Liberals) to invest in 
the Royal Navy and its infrastructure had allowed Britain to spend little on defence while 
remaining in control of a large empire.27 Andrew Lambert suggests this allowed careful 
control of naval estimates, while developing the ‘core capabilities of a true global 
strategy’.28 Furthermore, by restricting funds given to ‘non-productive activities, like 
defence’, the government could lessen the tax burden on private enterprise, the lifeblood 
of the imperial and British economy.29 Thus, although Jervois’ report was published during 
the first government of Disraeli’s newly imperial Conservatives, there was little enthusiasm 
to address hugely expensive imperial defence issues from them. 
By the late 1870s, however, the growing threat from rival European navies to 
Britain’s hegemony of the oceans was creating cracks within the consensus over liberal 
foreign policy. These tensions came to a head with the Eastern Crisis, which peaked in 
1877-1878, and made a large-scale war involving Britain a real possibility for the first time 
since 1856. The gradual and protracted disintegration of the Ottoman Empire led to a fear 
of Russian aggression towards Britain in the eastern Mediterranean, with the possibility of 
a pincer movement from France. This was a particular worry to Britain, which had huge 
amounts of trade travelling through the Suez Canal, increasing the importance of 
protecting commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, and the potential danger to the trade 
of India made the issue even more fraught. For many, the clear threat to Britain and its 
interests made free trade and minimal military and naval intervention, both at the core of 
liberal economics, seem incompatible. To protect trade, navalists increasingly suggested 
that Britain would have to both escalate defence spending and make its presence felt in the 
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Mediterranean.30 To achieve these aims there was a clear need to continue the naval 
reforms undertaken by the Admiralty in the late 1860s. Although these earlier reforms had 
cut costs and improved efficiency, which had complemented the dominant mid-Victorian 
liberal ideology, those seeking naval reform in the late 1870s were also looking for 
investment in new warships, improvement of docks, and increased naval defences in order 
to maintain Britain’s naval advantage. All three were costly and thus required an escalation 
in defence estimates. Increasingly, naval reform became incompatible with the low defence 
spending at the core of the mid-Victorian liberal consensus. 
Although the Conservative government, and in particular the Defence Committee, 
had consistently rejected War Office plans for the defence of coaling stations, reaction to 
the Eastern Crisis shook their liberal imperial indifference to its core. This was because, as 
Beeler has argued, the crisis ‘caught the Empire woefully unprepared’.31 Even if the Russian 
threat was wholly military, as it had no fleet in the Black Sea or Mediterranean in 1877-78, 
the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was still of grave concern to the British. During 
the crisis the Royal Navy had ‘proved practically useless’ and Britain had been shown to be 
unable to act unilaterally in the defence of its imperial possessions.32 This fear of Russian 
aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean and the perception of British naval weakness 
allowed navalist agendas to come to the fore, and thus pressure built to act on coaling 
station defence.  
This pressure came not only from navalists but also from commercial shipping 
companies, which would suffer immeasurably should Britain lose control of the ocean in a 
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potential war. Sir Donald Currie, the owner of the Castle Mail Packet Company plying the 
route to South Africa, used his 1877 lecture to the Royal United Services Institute entitled 
‘Maritime Warfare: The Importance to the British Empire of a Complete System of 
Telegraphs, Coaling Stations and Graving Docks’ to reiterate the arguments that had been 
put forward by Milne and Colomb in previous years. Currie emphasised the potentially 
crippling possibility of not defending naval coal and asked the question of the government: 
‘in the event of war, will not the enemy be able to step in and help themselves with coal, 
and perhaps destroy the remainder?’33 Currie’s interest in the coaling question reflected 
how naval coaling affected both the navy and the merchant marine. Shipowners were 
particularly concerned about how an inability to coal warships might remove the Royal 
Navy’s protection of British maritime trade, leaving it vulnerable to the predations of rival 
powers. Thus, in order to guarantee access to trade, they generally supported anything that 
would maintain Britain’s maritime hegemony, and consequently were in favour of increases 
in naval power and British territorial expansion.34 
 More importantly, the government’s attitude towards coaling defence was 
increasingly questioned in Whitehall, and a further paper advocating coaling station 
defence was produced by the Secretary of the Duke of Cambridge’s Defence Committee, 
C.H. Nugent.35 The ‘Memorandum on the Relative Importance of Coaling Stations’ was 
particularly noteworthy for developing the speculative writings of Milne and Colomb by 
attempting to assess the importance of individual overseas stations to the navy and British 
interests; and then determining which stations’ defences should take precedence. The 
paper’s use of a logical preferential system, based on a station’s proximity to trade, British 
fleets, and likely sources of enemy attack, was further developed by Sir J.L.A. Simmons, the 
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Inspector General of Fortifications, when he drew up plans for the defence of coaling 
stations in 1877. The resulting report recommended an unprecedented amount be spent 
on permanent defences, some £2,297,412, and was ratified by the Defence Committee, but 
rejected by the Conservative government.36 Despite this rejection, the issue did not 
disappear, but was championed by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, who took a 
lasting interest in the coaling debate.  
Despite failing to convince his government colleagues to increase expenditure for 
naval defences, Carnarvon was able to use his position to push for interdepartmental 
consideration of the coaling question, making significant progress towards a proper 
assessment of the issue. This progress was assisted by a deepening sense of urgency 
surrounding the government‘s foreign policy resulting from the effects of the Eastern Crisis. 
A disagreement with Disraeli over the government’s support of the Ottoman Empire, 
however, forced Carnarvon’s resignation from the Colonial Office. By then, though, his 
influence had ensured that discussions with the War Office about the defence of coaling 
infrastructure had reached such a stage that soon after his replacement, Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach, had been installed the Colonial Defence Committee was formed.37 
 
The Colonial Defence Committee 
 
The Colonial Defence Committee met for the first time on 5 March 1878 and, less than a 
month later, on 4 April, it submitted four short reports, totalling thirty pages, to the Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Despite their brevity, they were geographically wide-
ranging. The first report covered the defences of the Indian Ocean stations of Cape of Good 
Hope, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The second concentrated on the 
Australian colonies, Tasmania, and New Zealand. The third made recommendations for 
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Esquimalt and Victoria, British Columbia. The fourth reported about the defences of 
Heligoland, St Helena, Sierra Leone, Barbados, Jamaica, and Newfoundland. A further 
report, totalling five pages, was published separately in May, and made recommendations 
for the defences of the principal Canadian Atlantic ports.38 
To produce these reports in such a short time required the Committee to use a 
great deal of existing knowledge. Indeed, after it was set up, Milne, who was leading the 
Committee, was quick to meet with the Director of Artillery and Stores, Major-General 
Campbell, to establish what existing armaments could be sent. The Committee then used a 
combination of Colonial Office figures and telegraphic replies from colonial governors to 
establish the numbers of existing militia, armaments, and defensive works at each station. 
Once these facts had been established, the Committee set to work on its 
recommendations.39 It was not just the figures that were gleaned from elsewhere − many 
of the Committee’s recommendations were taken from existing reports on the defence of 
naval stations, in particular those produced for various colonies by Major-General Sir 
William Jervois and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Scratchley.40 
The instigation of the Committee, and the publication of the reports it produced, 
initially appeared to be a key moment of progress for those advocating a better-funded and 
well-managed system of imperial defence. Indeed, it was the first real concerted effort at 
providing recommendations, many at high expense, for a complete system of coaling 
station defence – very different from the apathetic attitude which had been the mid-
century norm. The costs were equally as ambitious: even without accounting for the 
provision of garrisons, the estimation of the Committee for the temporary defence of the 
twelve most important coaling stations came to £2,300,000. This amount was huge, 
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considering total annual naval estimates were around £11,000,000.41 Moreover, the make-
up of the committee suggested its findings would be prescient and far-reaching. 
Particularly significant was the presence of two of the key navalist agitators, Milne, 
representing the Admiralty and leading the commission, and Simmons as the 
representative of the War Office. As the War Office was responsible for the defence of 
coaling stations, it was imperative that a senior and experienced representative was on the 
Committee and Simmons had not only published papers on the defence of coaling stations, 
but also had huge military and diplomatic experience. His presence did, however, 
guarantee that the recommendations would largely be based on physical fortifications, 
rather than naval strategy.42 They were joined by a veteran of the Colonial Office, Henry 
Barkly, ‘one of the most experienced of imperial officials in handling responsibly governed 
colonies’.43 The Committee was thus well versed in the magnitude of the problem they 
faced. Simmons warned:  
In the absence of such positions being provided with adequate means of defence, 
the operations of H.M.’s fleets for the protection of the vast interests of Great 
Britain, commercial as well as political, all over the world, might possibly have been 
greatly embarrassed, if not crippled, even by a few cruisers handled with activity 
and energy.44 
Despite these factors, it would be misleading to suggest that the Colonial Defence 
Committee had a decisive impact, even more so to propose that it marked the end of a 
detached imperial policy. From the outset it faced difficulties that fundamentally lessened 
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its ability to significantly influence governmental policy. The feeling of imminent threat, and 
thus a need for immediate action on coaling station defence, meant the recommendations, 
far from representing a considered and long-term approach to an empire-wide system of 
defence, were short-term, limited, and often farcical. The failure of the Committee to 
provide proposals that measured up to its original purpose was further hampered by only 
having three members, lacking the workforce to consider effectively the complexity and 
depth of the problem. Like the recommendations, the subsequent works, where they were 
carried out, were ad hoc responses. The report highlighted the ‘deplorable state of the 
defences of our principal coaling stations and colonial ports in our colonies’, but years of 
neglect meant there were few armaments actually to send.45  
 It would be wrong to suggest that these factors made the Committee completely 
valueless, however. Perhaps its greatest legacy was a result of its own inadequacy, showing 
that this was not a problem that could be solved with stop-gap measures and low spending, 
which had served Gladstone so well in the mid-Victorian period. Indeed, the Committee 
suggested ‘the question of Colonial defence should be considered as a whole with 
reference not only to the works and their armaments but also to the forces necessary for 
manning them’.46 Thus, although the Colonial Defence Committee did not mark an end to 
the issue of coaling station defence, it laid the foundations for how such a problem might 
be approached. To this end, Schurman has argued that the development and 
implementation of a system of imperial defence in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth 
century ‘owed much to [the] Colonial Defence Committee’, laying down many of the 
principles of imperial defence, in particular the concept of interdepartmental and inter-
colonial co-operation.47 Indeed, the interdepartmental nature of the Committee and the 
recognition of the need for a wider, integrated vision of imperial defence anticipated the 
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committees for imperial defence from the late 1880s onwards, when there was popular 
support for imperial defence, and the imperialist Conservatives dominated government.48 
Furthermore, the co-operation between departments of the British Government and those 
of its self-governing colonies exhibited in the Committee could be seen as the beginnings of 
the movement towards a more integrated empire manifested through defence policy, 
something which gained momentum years later.49 
 The Committee could not achieve an integrated system of imperial defence despite 
establishing these principles, however, as to do so required permanent, dedicated, and 
well-funded bodies that could manage a structure that was expensive and complex to 
implement and maintain. Indeed, without rejecting the liberal philosophy of low imperial 
defence spending, the issue of a permanent defensive system would remain unresolved. 
 
The Establishment of the Carnarvon Commission 
 
Once the Eastern Crisis had passed, the Colonial Defence Committee was dissolved, and no 
more reports were made. Nevertheless, the Committee had made enough of an impression 
that the Colonial Office did not abandon the issue. It suggested that:   
It is now proposed that a new Committee or Commission should be appointed to 
take up the questions left unsettled by the old Committee, and to advise as to the 
means which should be adopted for converting the temporary defences into 
permanent defences, and with respect to the provision of adequate garrisons and 
other accessories for them.50 
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Following this suggestion, the new Conservative Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 
announced the creation of Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and 
Commerce Abroad in early September 1879. The Royal Commission is usually referred to as 
the Carnarvon Commission after its head who had remained interested in the naval coaling 
issue, but was now free of an official position. 
 The lack of impact caused by the Colonial Defence Committee meant that the 
instigation of a new enquiry was by no means a certain development.  Thus its formation 
suggests a level of concern within the government about the coal question.51 Certainly, the 
Commission could be viewed as merely a way to shelve the issue for a few years, but to do 
this it would have been far easier to have simply ignored the findings of the Colonial 
Defence Committee, as there was little public clamour for action. In fact, to instigate such a 
process without genuine concern would certainly have been politically reckless. It was 
highly likely such a commission would make expensive recommendations, and this would 
either force an increase defence spending, or question the effectiveness of the government 
to defend the empire properly. As there was little room to manoeuvre with budgets in the 
late 1870s, as substantial deficits and war caused problems with the Treasury, such an 
increase in defence spending would cause an inevitable increase in taxation, making such a 
commission a real electoral risk.52 The most obvious purpose for instigation of the 
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Commission, therefore, appears to have been to expose and address an issue that the 
government felt could not continue to be ignored.53  
That a Royal Commission was chosen as the means to investigate the defence of 
coaling stations seems to suggest lessons had been learnt from the Colonial Defence 
Committee, which had shown that such an ambitious enquiry required substantial 
resources. Thus, in order for the government to assess the coal question properly, using 
expert opinion, it needed an independent body to investigate the matter, as it felt that the 
Cabinet did not have the time, expertise, or inclination to settle the matter itself.54 This 
reasoning is supported by the fact that Hicks-Beach could not deal with the coal question 
himself, being far too engaged in efforts to restrain the ambitions of Sir Bartle Frere, the 
High Commissioner at the Cape, who was keen to extend British interests in South Africa.55  
The instigation of a Royal Commission to investigate this specific problem was not 
unusual as their use had notably increased in the nineteenth century as a whole.56 The 
Carnarvon Commission was one of 388 Royal Commissions that occurred between 1830 
and 1900, the ‘heyday of the Royal Commission’.57 By their nature, these Commissions 
were transient and ad hoc, responding to a particular problem or policy. Thus it is difficult 
to assess how ‘typical’ the Carnarvon Commission was, as such a thing does not exist, but in 
terms of length it was not particularly long at three years and in terms of personnel it was 
unexceptional with eight members.58 In essence, these details merely reflected what the 
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government deemed appropriate for the purposes of the work in hand, and this allowed 
the Commission to collect a large, but manageable amount of data, without the issue being 
confused by a body which was too unwieldy.59 Even if the make-up or length of the 
Commission were unremarkable, its subject matter and scope were unprecedented. Royal 
Commissions on imperial matters made up less than a tenth of the total that sat between 
1860 and 1935, some thirty from 328, and amongst those, there was only one other 
Commission that dealt with a large proportion of the empire.60 Furthermore, the nascence 
of self-governing colonies, and subsequently dominions, meant that from 1887 topics 
which would have previously come under the auspices of Royal Commissions instead were 
dealt with by Colonial (later Imperial) Conferences, and thus it was the last such 
Commission to deal with imperial defence as a whole.61 
Royal Commissions were particularly important to the state, especially in reacting 
to pressing issues, allowing matters to be examined by those with ‘specialist knowledge 
and consideration’ who could offer ‘trained minds, impartial judgement, and disinterested 
study’.62 They also offered the opportunity to gather raw data and to formalise it into 
‘knowledge’. Tacit knowledge of coaling station defence existed in the 1870s through the 
works of naval thinkers and the various local colonial reports that had been produced, but 
this lacked any real authority.63 Importantly, therefore, we can see that the Carnarvon 
Commission allowed data and tacit knowledge about imperial coaling to be formalised and 
made authoritative.  
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The Recommendations of the Commission 
 
Much more than the Colonial Defence Committee, the Carnarvon Commission represented 
a change in approach for imperial defence policy. A great deal of the importance of the 
Carnarvon Commission lay not in its originality, as it largely built on the foundations laid by 
the Colonial Defence Committee, but in its make-up, depth of research, and, in particular, 
its attempts to make long-term recommendations which could cope with most future 
eventualities. Much of this lay in that fact that importantly, unlike its predecessor, it was 
far larger and therefore more suited to its task.  
Although Milne may have felt aggrieved not to have led the Commission after 
heading the previous Committee, Carnarvon, as a former Cabinet minister, held much more 
political clout, which was imperative if the reports were to be taken seriously. Carnarvon 
was perhaps a risky choice for Disraeli, who had already had serious disagreements with 
the former Colonial secretary that had twice led to Carnarvon’s resignation. A critic of 
Disraeli’s ‘false imperialism’, which he deemed militaristic and continental, Carnarvon 
advocated what he saw as a ‘true’ imperialism which spread the benefits of European 
civilisation, allying him with some Liberals. Indeed, Carnarvon was widely seen as ‘more of 
an aristocratic whig than a party man, attracting enemies among his colleagues for his 
independence of thought’.64 While he may have not always toed the party line, he had 
performed well enough during his two terms as Colonial Secretary for Disraeli to feel 
sufficiently comfortable to leave colonial policy largely to him. Carnarvon’s experience of 
dealing with colonial representatives, having been heavily involved in the federation of 
Canada and an unsuccessful attempt to federate South Africa, was undeniably crucial to a 
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Royal Commission that would have to gather such a large amount of colonial data.65  
Moreover, his stance on the federation of colonies also suggested that he would aim to 
create an integrated and empire-wide defence policy for coaling infrastructure. 
Continuity was assured by the presence of Milne, Simmons, and Barkly. Once again, 
Captain Jekyll served as Secretary. The appointment of Barkly in particular suggests that 
Carnarvon was more concerned about expertise than personal relationships between those 
on the Commission: they had previously shared a fairly hostile relationship when they had 
worked closely together as High Commissioner of South Africa and Colonial Secretary.66 The 
rest of the Commission was largely chosen by Carnarvon.67 As was customary with cross-
party commissions, although headed by the Conservative Carnarvon, the Commission also 
included two Liberals, Hugh Childers and Thomas Brassey, both of whom had a keen 
interest in the modernisation and reform of the Admiralty and Royal Navy. Childers had 
used his time as First Lord of the Admiralty (1868−1871) to improve both the 
administration and the economy of the Admiralty, and to implement a new programme of 
ironclad production.68 Brassey was instrumental in the transformation from a sail to a 
steam navy and had written widely on the navy, especially over his concern about its size 
and strength.69 While both were members of the Liberal party, neither had much time for 
party politics, and rarely involved themselves in anything but naval matters in Parliament. It 
is particularly important, therefore, to highlight that not all Liberals adhered to the 
orthodoxy of the mid-Victorian liberal foreign policy, based on decreasing naval budgets 
and a concentration on home waters, while keeping foreign intervention to a minimum. 
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Indeed, growing worries about Britain’s naval strength and the emerging threat of Britain’s 
maritime rivals increasingly led some Liberals to question Gladstone’s stance on foreign 
policy and imperial defence. The final politician on the Commission, Henry Holland, was 
another Conservative MP, but was probably more notable in this context for serving as a 
legal adviser at the Colonial Office, and Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies while 
Carnarvon was in office.   
There were, therefore, two notable features of those Commissioners with political 
ties. The first, and most important for the success of the Commission, was that they had 
experience of the three most relevant offices of government: the Admiralty, War Office, 
and Colonial Office. Secondly, none appeared to have much interest in toeing the party 
line, but held their own views on either foreign policy or the navy, reducing potential 
tensions. In fact, the Commission shared a largely similar colonial and naval vision for 
Britain, one of increased naval spending and a worldwide defence strategy, which certainly 
shaped the Commission’s reports. In fact, little changed in terms of the Commission’s 
outlook even when both Brassey and Childers returned as part of the newly elected Liberal 
government in 1880 as Civil Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for War 
respectively. Their replacements − the Earl of Camperdown and Samuel Whitbread − again 
Liberals, had both served as Civil Lord of the Admiralty. Although perhaps less high profile, 
they were, again, both men with considerable experience in naval matters, and thus the 
dynamic of the Commission was changed little. 
The only member of the Commission who would potentially be opposed to this 
vision was Sir Robert Hamilton, who represented the Treasury as a financial expert, and 
whose job was largely to limit spending estimates as much as possible. He was well suited 
to this task, widely being seen as one of the most able civil servants of his era, and had 
already had experience serving on the Playfair Commission.70 Furthermore, as Accountant-
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General of the navy, he had gained great credit for simplifying naval estimates into an 
intelligible form, and thus had considerable experience in naval financial matters.71 
Although an able civil servant, his close connection with the Admiralty (he would return as 
Permanent Secretary after the Commission), may still have given him some sympathy to 
views of the other commissioners. 
Although the Commission included both sides of domestic politics, the Commission 
did not include, at Carnarvon’s insistence, any representatives from the Colonies, perhaps 
because the Commission already had eight members and risked overcrowding.72 
Furthermore, the problem of a lack of Colonial presence was negated to some extent by 
the Commission stating very early on that Colonies should be asked to send delegates to 
communicate with them, adding to the multitude of Colonial sources used as evidence.73 
This does not, however, alter the fact that the Commission lacked any colonial 
representative actually involved in assessing the evidence and compiling the report. While 
it can be accurately described as ‘the first comprehensive study of Imperial defence’, it is 
important to recognise it was not an imperial body as, for instance, the Colonial 
Conferences were from 1887.74 
The Commission sat for three years, from 1879 to 1882, in which time it produced 
three reports. The Commission, therefore, had far more time to assess the issues 
surrounding coaling than the Colonial Defence Committee, as the urgency of a war scare 
had now passed. Thus, there was no pressing need to solve the issues immediately and it 
was able to make recommendations that were both permanent and well informed. Before 
the Commission had been instigated, however, Carnarvon had ensured several demands 
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were met in the scope of the work. First and foremost, especially in the course of events 
which followed, was an insistence of secrecy for the reports. Second was the removal of 
India from the remit of the Commission, and third the need for access to full details of 
current works and defences, including highly sensitive documents.75 This last point was 
especially directed at the Australian Colonies, who had employed Sir William Jervois to 
compile reports on their port defences, and had consequently begun some works under 
their own initiative.76 As the imperial fortresses of Malta, Gibraltar, Halifax, and Bermuda 
were already well defended and usually grouped with the home fortresses, they were not 
considered in the enquiry at all.77 
The Commission gathered information in a variety of ways. Like the Colonial 
Defence Committee, it made use of existing figures by requesting existing statistics from 
the War Office and Colonial Office. It used telegraphic communication with colonial 
governors to establish the defensive situation in their respective ports, and, where 
telegraphs did not exist (in Diego Garcia, for example) ships were sent to gather the 
required information.78 In many colonies sub-committees were established to provide the 
Commission with as detailed and up-to-date data as possible.79 These sources provided a 
large amount of data, but the bulk of the Commission’s evidence was gleaned by 
interviewing a variety of witnesses. In total, between 25 November 1879 and 19 May 1882, 
the Commission interviewed thirty-nine witnesses, and in asking 5749 questions it 
produced 255 pages of evidence.80 
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 The reason for the removal of India from the enquiry is never explained. It  may reflect the fact 
that Bombay, the main open coastal port  was already very well defended by two ironclads and gun 
batteries. Furthermore, there was only a small naval presence there, and the India Office was quasi-
independent. 
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 ‘Letter from Carnarvon to Hicks-Beech’, 19 August 1879, CO 323/356. 
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 Schurman and Beeler, Imperial Defence, 14. 
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The Commission was given free rein over whom it could call upon for evidence and 
over any plans and designs it wished to see. Prominent figures among those giving 
evidence were shipping interests such as Donald Currie (Castle Mail Packets Company), 
Alfred Holt (Blue Funnel Line), Charles McIver (Cunard) and T.H. Ismay (White Star), colonial 
representatives such as Thomas George Baring (politician and Viceroy of India), Henry 
Bartle Frere (High Commissioner for Southern Africa), and Sir John Alexander Macdonald 
(Prime Minister of Canada), and high-ranking members of the armed forces such as the 
Duke of Cambridge (Commander-in-Chief of the British Army), and Admiral Sir Astley 
Cooper Key (First Naval Lord). Just as important was the evidence of technical experts such 
as Thomas Gallwey (Inspector General of Fortifications), Sir Charles Tilston Bright 
(telegraph engineer), Sir Peter Scratchley (military engineer and colonial administrator) and 
the chief engineers of various colonial ports.  
The Commission asked each witness a series of questions in order to gain evidence 
for their recommendations. While each interview was different, the questions asked by the 
Commission can be broadly grouped by type of witness. Colonial representatives were 
asked about the current status of the colony, including its trade and revenue, the location 
of ports and docks, and what defences and garrisons were currently in situ. Furthermore, 
they were asked their recommendations for the improvement of defences, the 
apportionment of costs, and the proposals for locations for new stations where 
appropriate. Ship magnates were asked about the speed and endurance of their ships, the 
risk to them from hostile cruisers and consequently what protection was needed, the 
location of coal depots used by their ships and where that coal was supplied from, the main 
trade routes, and where stations were connected to telegraph and railway networks. Those 
high-ranking military officers interviewed were asked about global strategy, including plans 
for the supply of coal for warships and the protection of commerce in war. Engineers and 
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other fortification experts were asked for recommendations on the needs of particular 
ports and stations for armaments, defensive works, and garrisons. 
Clearly many of these witnesses would have their own agendas: shipping line 
owners would want as much protection for their ships as possible; governors would always 
argue for more defences but fewer contributions; and government officials would wish to 
avoid expenditure as much as possible. Even so, the use of these men’s statements, along 
with those with who had technical knowledge of both fortifications and communications, 
allowed the Commission to analyse a wide variety of evidence in order to form a global 
strategy for the defence of coaling stations, and therefore British interests and commerce. 
The depth of evidence allowed them to look beyond solely installing permanent defences 
at coaling sites, but to consider this alongside provisions for garrisons, gunships, torpedo 
boats, and mines, as well as protection from nearby fleets.  
The Committee was charged with making recommendations for ‘the best means ... 
of providing for the defence and protection of Our Colonial Possessions and commerce ... 
special attention being given to necessity of providing safe coaling, refitting and repairing 
stations ... in time of war’.81 The majority of the recommendations were, therefore, for 
defensive works at British coaling stations. Interestingly, there are few specific mentions in 
the reports relating to any defence of the ships supplying the coaling stations, although, as 
slow cargo ships, the Commission would have considered them along with any shipping 
likely to be attacked or captured by enemy cruisers. Thus by properly defending coaling 
stations, it was supposed that they would be adequately protected by those naval warships 
that could safely coal around the empire.82 Furthermore, in an appendix, Milne briefly 
addressed the question of supply, arguing that there was a need for screw colliers and local 
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 London Gazette, 12 September 1879. 
82 In the appendix to the Third Report, Milne does suggest that unless all coaling stations listed were 
fully stocked, the navy would be paralysed, ‘Coal being as essential to Her Majesty’s service as 
ammunition’. He argued that warships should not be withdrawn from their stations to go to a 
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sources of supply in order to supply coaling stations in war.83 Even so, it is noticeable how 
infrequently coal supply was mentioned in the reports, especially considering how much 
the Commission stressed the importance of coal to imperial security.  
While it is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss in forensic detail all the 
data that the Commission collected for each of the twenty-eight sites discussed in the three 
reports, it is worth exploring the nature of the data the Commission gathered, and the 
methods used to analyse it.84 As well as interviews, the Commission used a wide range of 
current statistical data, including empire-wide figures such as trade statistics, fleet 
positions and numbers, and the positioning of telegraph networks, to give an overall 
picture of the global implications of the coaling problem. The Commission also recognised 
that each station needed unique recommendations and took great care in assessing specific 
data for the requirements of each station. The importance attributed to a station, and thus 
the amount of money the Commission would recommend for it, was largely determined by 
its strategic significance, both to the Royal Navy and trade, and its proximity to rival naval 
stations and other British stations. The depth of these considerations is remarkable: despite 
the fact that only France could hope to challenge Britain on a global scale, the reports used 
War Office intelligence to consider the relative strengths and locations of all rival foreign 
stations, including those of France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Italy, China, Japan, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Argentina, Honduras, Netherlands, United States, and Denmark.85 In addition to 
strategic importance, the distinctive nature of each station − its climate, the size of the 
surrounding settlements and colony, the geography of the station, and especially what 
already existed at the station − also had huge implications for the costs and scale of the 
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recommendations. The reports are thus recognition of the fact that in order to create a 
worldwide system of imperial defence, the local had to be considered along with the 
global. 
As well as tables and written recommendations, the Commission made ample use 
of mapping. Although it represents just one medium with which the Commission presented 
its findings, exploring the use of maps goes some way to show the range and amount of 
data collected and of the recommendations contained in the reports. By utilising existing 
and gathered data, they were able to produce maps which illustrated the global, regional, 
and local nature of naval coaling infrastructure. Through these maps, the Commission was 
able to ‘reduce the world to order’, and thus assume power over it.86 The Commission 
produced several global maps (see Figure 3.1) which plotted variously the location of 
British naval coaling stations, commercial coaling stations, foreign naval stations, trade 
routes, and telegraphic connections. Together these allowed the Commission to 
substantiate why they considered certain sites invaluable, and furthermore illustrate how 
recommendations for each station translated into a global strategy. Similarly, the 
Commission produced several smaller scale regional maps, of oceans, naval patrol areas, 
and other discrete maritime spaces. These maps allowed the Commissioners to examine 
and illustrate these connections and strategies clearly and in more detail, and to connect 
the global and local more easily (see Figure 3.2).   
 
                                                                    
86 Lambert, ‘The Royal Navy and the Defence of Empire 1856-1918’, in Kennedy (ed.), Imperial 
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Figure 3.1: ‘Track Chart of the World Showing Naval Stations, 1879’. TNA, PRO 30/6/131. The map also shows 
telegraph lines and stations, as well as dry docks. 
 
 Figure 3.2: Map showing European possessions and distances between stations in the Pacific. Produced for the 
Carnarvon Commission, 1879−1882. TNA, PRO 30/6/131. 
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The third main type of map included in the Commission’s reports, the local (see 
Figure 3.3), allowed the Commissioners to represent information gathered from local 
administrators, military and fortification experts, and commercial shipping agents. Not only 
do the plans show in some detail the locale of the coaling station, but also include details of 
the proposed armaments and defensive works, and even the expected range of the guns 
once installed, demonstrating the level of protection that implementation would bring to 
coaling infrastructure. It was this breadth and depth of data and analysis that made the 
Commission’s reports so ground-breaking. As a result, W.C.B. Tunstall has argued that the 
recommendations were ‘of special importance because they lay down the general 
principles of imperial defence’.87  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Map showing Commission recommendations for Port Louis, Mauritius. Produced for the Carnarvon 
Commission, 1879−1882. TNA, 30/6/131. 
                                                                    
87 W.C.B. Tunstall, ‘Imperial Defence, 1870-1897’, in J.H. Rose, A.P. Newton, E.A. Benians, and H. 
Dodwell (eds), The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959), 232-234.  
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The recommendations themselves were divided into three separate reports. The 
first dealt with trade and shipping, the second made recommendations on the duties and 
strength of the navy as well as Australian defences, and the third looked to proposals for 
the defences of the remaining coaling stations and commercial harbours. These reports 
might well be described as a blueprint for an imperial defence policy, and thus 
demonstrate the centrality of coal and coaling infrastructure played in the wider defence of 
empire. The subjects covered by the reports also show the crucial importance of 
commercial markets and trade routes, both inside and outside the empire, emphasising 
that imperial defence was not necessarily about land and people, but trade and markets.88 
Thus, the reports of the Commission extend the idea of imperial defence beyond those 
areas under direct British rule, and in fact beyond those land areas under British influence 
as part of an ‘informal empire’, to include the vast maritime spaces used by British 
commercial interests. The Commission therefore recognised imperial defence as a global, 
oceanic construct, rather than a collection of local defences.89 
As the Commission was charged with ‘the defence of commerce abroad’, it began 
by investigating imperial trade routes.  The value of British maritime trade was enormous: 
the Commission estimated that it was worth £900,000,000 annually, with around 
£144,000,000 afloat at any one time. Furthermore, as Britain imported essential food and 
raw materials from abroad, a lack of protection would be ruinous not only to the economy, 
but also to the populace.90 It illustrated these figures with a map (Figure 3.4), which 
highlighted key trade routes, and the strategic points on them. Although this knowledge 
was not new, the Commission warned of the growing threat to British trade. France in 
particular, it cautioned, was ‘making rapid strides towards placing herself on a dangerous 
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equality with Great Britain, whether we consider the far smaller and more concentrated 
duties which her navy has to discharge, or whether we look to the greater rate at which her 
ship-building is now carried on’.91 A policy of guerre de course, the deliberate targeting of 
maritime trade, from French naval vessels was the greatest fear, but it was not necessarily 
the capture or destruction of first-class steamers that was the biggest danger. In fact, much 
of the evidence the Commission collected suggested that the trade carried in first-class 
steamers had little need for naval protection, as those vessels could outrun nearly all naval 
ships and had little need for coaling en route.92 They were still reliant on Britain 
commanding the ocean and possession of protected refuge ports, however, and this 
necessitated a secure chain of coaling stations for the navy. Furthermore, slower cargo 
ships, including those carrying coal, were still liable to capture.93 Although perhaps worth 
less in terms of trade, these ships were essential to the British imperial economy, as they 
carried many of the key resources for British and colonial industry. Of course, coal was 
especially important to the defence of oceanic trade, for without coal, the merchant 
marine and navy would be left stranded. 
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92 ‘Evidence of T.H. Ismay, Minutes of Evidence, Third Report of the Carnarvon Commission’, TNA, 
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The Commission suggested that ‘looking to the action of other countries, the 
strength of the navy should be increased with as little delay as possible’.94 Its 
recommendation to build more ships was based on the fact that although it would be 
expensive, it would be more effective and less costly than increasing garrisons and fixed 
defences. Furthermore, it stated that all the recommendations in the reports for defences 
at major ports were based on the assumption that the ‘navy will hold the seas’, something 
that would not be possible without an increase in warships.95 Importantly, their 
recommendations also included the crucial caveat that ‘no addition to the number and 
fighting power of your Majesty’s ships will make up for the want of coaling-stations’. This 
point was so fundamental, in fact, that ‘the Commission state[d] their belief that the 
command of the sea resolves itself very much into a question of coal supply − how to 
deprive and enemy of his supplies, while securing ample supplies for our own ships’. 96  
To this end, the Commission listed the four ways it considered that an enemy might 
obtain coal for its navy in war. First, and most obvious, was in its own ports, or in those of 
an ally. Second was in the ports of a neutral state. Third was by seizing coal from British 
ports or from captured vessels, and fourth by rendezvousing with colliers at sea. It is worth 
exploring these final three ways. For the second, using ports of a neutral state, the report 
states that, because of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, ‘the supply of coal to belligerents in the 
ports of neutral states is regulated by the laws of those states subject only to the condition 
that a neutral state must give equal facilities to all belligerents’. This was generally 
understood to be a maximum of twenty-four hours in port. It went on to say, however, that 
‘rules ... would not prevent a belligerent ship from obtaining a full supply of coal in a 
neutral port’. This was because the Commission predicted that it would be ‘difficult to 
enforce the rules; and it is doubtful whether the ships of a strong naval power would 
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submit to their operations being crippled for want of coal by the regulations of a small state 
in a distant port’.97  
The Commission’s report then assessed what the agreement might mean for British 
warships, concluding that the ramifications could be disastrous. Of the forty-seven stations 
now in use by Royal Navy ships, twenty-six were in foreign territory. For Britain, which not 
only had a huge overseas empire scattered across the globe, but also relied heavily on 
neutral ports, coaling in war could therefore be a particular problem. In some parts of the 
world, foreign stations were habitually used by the Royal Navy as no British possession 
existed in the vicinity. For example, on the route to the Cape, Portuguese stations plugged 
the gaps between British stations. As most ships could only steam for 3,000 miles, at least 
in the 1870s, earlier reports had suggested a war would present extreme difficulties for 
coaling the fleet, and thus protecting British interests in some key places.98 As coal was 
readily available in the foreign commercial stations which occupied the gaps between 
British stations, the Admiralty had made little attempt to rectify this situation with a 
coherent strategic plan. Thus, that coaling in neutral stations might not be possible in times 
of war was part of the Commission’s argument for the defence of existing coaling stations 
and the acquisition of new ones.99 The Commission’s fears were founded on convincing 
evidence, not least that in the Franco-Prussian war, one of a few steam navy engagements 
to occur since the Crimean War, the neutral power of Denmark had denied the French navy 
the option of coaling in its stations.100 Its findings somewhat contradicted its previous 
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argument about foreign vessels, however. It seems highly unlikely that if an enemy were to 
breach the Treaty, Britain would not respond in kind. Perhaps the Commissioners were 
looking to a worst case scenario, but it is hard to imagine that Britain would not coal at 
neutral ports if its enemy did. Although it was not the sole reason used to promote the 
defence of coaling stations, this does suggest that the Commission’s recommendations had 
a clear agenda, which sometimes bordered on alarmism.  
Whereas there was little, bar exerting economic pressure, that Britain could do to 
prevent an enemy coaling at its own or neutral ports, the third and fourth ways for an 
enemy to obtain coal were those which the Commission could hope to recommend 
measures against.101 The third, seizing coal in British ports or in captured trading vessels, 
and the fourth, by supply from colliers at sea sent on a prearranged rendezvous, could both 
be prevented with proper defensive works and armaments at British ports and naval 
control of the oceans. The Carnarvon Commission, like the Colonial Defence Committee, 
acknowledged that imperial funds would not stretch to the defence of commercial coaling 
stations, but recognised that coal left undefended at British stations would be at the mercy 
of foreign ships. To counteract this, it suggested that it might be necessary in some 
circumstances to destroy coal stocks or move it away from wharves.102 
Although fortifying commercial stations was not viable, far more pressing, and 
achievable, the Commission argued, was the need to defend British naval coaling stations 
properly. These stations, due to their strategic importance, were crucial to the ability of the 
Royal Navy to protect British interests. Of the twenty-one foreign stations in British 
territories, just four were defended (and all of these Imperial Fortresses were outside the 
remit of the Commission), five were partially but inadequately defended and the remainder 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Political and Military History, trans. J.L. Needham, vol. III (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 
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were undefended entirely. The Commissioners divided the stations into two discrete 
categories based largely on those put forward by Milne’s Committee: primary or principal, 
and secondary or minor.103 The primary stations were considered to be the four Imperial 
Fortresses, Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax, and Bermuda, as well as Sierra Leone, Ascension, St 
Helena, Simon’s Bay, Mauritius, Aden, Bombay, Singapore, Hong Kong, Barbados, Jamaica, 
Esquimalt (Vancouver) and, more generally, Australia.104 Simmons suggests that these were 
stations which kept large coal stores, as well as means for swift coaling of vessels. In 
addition, they often possessed dry docks for refitting and repairing warships, as well as safe 
refuge points for large ships. Because of this strategic importance, they would require 
heavy expenditure to defend.105  
The secondary stations listed by Milne were the Seychelles, Labuan, Fiji, Antigua, 
and Trincomalee (Ceylon).106 Simmons suggested that these stations would stock coal, but 
not in such large amounts. This did not diminish their importance, however. He suggested 
that the navy would be ‘crippled in its operations without them’ and ‘if undefended [they] 
might be used or destroyed by any enemy, and thus be productive of serious mischief by 
supplying the wants of the enemy and leading our own ships to depend upon an 
uncertainty’.107 As with the primary stations, these could not depend on the direct 
protection of the navy, and thus they needed to be secured by land defences and garrisons 
to man and protect them.108 They were, however, less strategically important, so less 
expenditure was justified. 
The cost estimates for the defensive works came to £2,507,386, of which 
£1,988,018 would come from the imperial purse. The cost divisions reiterated the 
importance that the Commission placed on the primary stations, which were assigned 
                                                                    
103
  The document written by Milne is included in the report’s appendix.  
104 ‘Third Report Appendix’, TNA, PRO 30/6/125. 
105 ‘Report by Sir L. Simmons June 21, 1882’, TNA, PRO 30/6/125. 
106 ‘Third Report Appendix’, TNA, PRO 30/6/125. 
107 ‘Report by Sir L. Simmons June 21, 1882’, TNA, PRO 30/6/125. 
108 Ibid. 
105 
 
£2,307,386 with just £200,000 for secondary stations. The Commission also recommended 
a troops increase of over 8,000, bringing numbers to 18,652 in total at primary coaling 
station garrisons.109 The amount of money the Commission was willing to spend is 
significant in itself, but the idea of spending it on imperial, rather than European, defence is 
particularly important, and suggests a change of direction on imperial defence spending. 
The global scope and vision of the recommendations are also important. Rather than 
merely improving defences for reasons of a local nature, the recommendations were for 
places of a wider imperial importance, which together would form an integrated imperial 
defence scheme. 
The Commission placed particular emphasis on the defence of Simon’s Town, the 
naval station at the Cape of Good Hope. This shows how the Commission was constantly 
assessing all levels of scale in their recommendations, from local strategic importance to a 
station’s place in global flows of trade. Just as the Colonial Defence Committee had done, 
the Commission concluded that the Cape was as important as Malta or Gibraltar. The 
reports argued that the Cape would be ‘the key to our Indian Empire and our extensive 
trade to China and Japan, and our Australian Colonies, in the event of any accident to, or 
stoppage of, the passage through the Suez Canal’, thus it was ‘the opinion of the 
Commissioners that no delay should take place in the construction of the permanent 
defences of this most important station’.110 The importance of Simon’s Town rested on the 
huge amounts of British trade that passed it, its strategic position for both the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans, and that it was isolated from other British stations.111 Furthermore, ‘in the 
not improbable contingency of the Mediterranean and Suez Canal being closed to British 
ships’, trade would increase markedly past the Cape and its importance as a line of 
communication would be paramount. Thus, there was a need for a fleet to be based there 
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and, consequently a need for the infrastructure to support it.112 As it was not making 
recommendations for the imperial fortresses, it was Simon’s Bay which ‘in the opinion of 
the commission [is] the most important of all the stations required for the support of Her 
Majesty’s ships’.113 The Commission recommended that the metropole cover the entire 
cost of the works, as they were of imperial benefit, and the colony was comparatively poor.  
Great importance was also attached to Hong Kong as a key trading centre and the 
only place from which Chinese commerce could be protected. Similar cases were presented 
for Colombo and Singapore, both being key trading posts in crucial strategic positions. 
Sierra Leone, as the only British station on the 6,000 mile route between Gibraltar and the 
Cape, and Mauritius, occupying a similar position between the Cape and Ceylon, were also 
marked for special attention. Both were also near to large French stations, and would be 
prime targets in an Anglo-French war. Aden needed to be defended for its proximity to 
Suez and other foreign stations in the Red Sea, and Jamaica required works and armaments 
as the major British possession in the Caribbean as well as for its strategic position with 
reference to the proposed Panama Canal.114 
Interestingly, the Commission’s recommendations for defence of coaling stations 
did not exactly match those suggested by the Colonial Defence Committee. Less 
importance was attributed to St Helena and it recommended the abandonment of 
Ascension completely. Similarly, Port Castries, St Lucia was chosen for its proximity to the 
French station at Martinique, and thus was preferred to Antigua and Barbados. The station 
at Esquimalt, Vancouver, was the cause of some disagreement. The most isolated of all 
stations, the nearest British naval establishments (at Fiji and Hong Kong) were too far 
distant to offer any support in times of war. Acquisition of an intermediate island would 
cause tension with the USA, and as trade was minimal around it, the naval station would 
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have been the only logical target in a war. The decision to recommend the removal of the 
fleet from Esquimalt to China to protect Pacific trade highlights the way that the Carnarvon 
Commission’s focus on a global strategy for coaling station defence superseded all other 
considerations. Indeed, focusing on how the stations would function as a chain of imperial 
defences was of more importance to the Commission than simply defending current British 
stations. That this view was disputed by Milne and Barkley, however, who strongly 
disagreed about the transference of the fleet and any plans to abandon Esquimalt, shows 
that such an approach was not uncontested.115 
As with Simon’s Town, costs for Sierra Leone, St Helena, Mauritius, Port Royal 
(Jamaica), and Port Castries (St Lucia), were to be covered by the British government. 
Furthermore, in Colombo and Table Bay (Cape Town), only a small colonial expenditure was 
expected.116 This reflected an awareness from the Commissioners that, in order to 
guarantee the navy the fuel to protect Britain’s maritime trade worldwide, there was a 
need to protect coaling stations abroad as soon as possible. To do this, Britain had to take 
responsibility for the funding of those colonies lacking in finances, where the defences 
were for the good of the empire as a whole. Where there was shared benefit from the 
recommendations, and the colony was rich enough, there was an expectation that the 
costs would be divided. This had already occurred in the Australian Colonies, whose 
defence had, ‘in great measure [been] accomplished by the Colonies themselves’, even 
during, and in spite of, the diminishing naval estimates and troop withdrawals of the mid-
Victorian period.117 In these cases, the Commission did not seek to undermine colonies’ 
own efforts, but their recommendations were designed to assist the colonies in their 
ongoing defensive improvements.118 The offer of British expertise and planning, plus, in 
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many cases, finance and materials, suggested the Commission recognised that imperial 
defence should be attempted with the colonies in a co-operative environment.  
The acknowledgment in the reports that both Britain and its self-governing colonies 
held responsibilities for imperial defence, where funds allowed, showed an understanding 
on the behalf of the Commission that in order to compete with the burgeoning economic, 
industrial and military power of Germany and the USA in particular, Britain would have to 
involve the self-governing colonies more in imperial defence. While not quite to the extent 
suggested by Charles Dilke in Greater Britain, it certainly showed a more united approach 
to imperial defence, representing a shift away from the detached attitude of mid-Victorian 
governments towards the empire.119 Indeed, in advocating closer ties, but not full 
federation, the reports reflected the ideas of the less radical elements found under the 
loose umbrella of the ‘imperial federation’ movement.120 It was only with the suggestion of 
imperial co-operation, in terms both of funding and of garrisons, that the Carnarvon 
Commission was able to recommend the end of a stop-gap approach to coaling station 
defence, and instead offer a complete and permanent system of empire-wide security that 
accounted for a number of likely future defence eventualities. 
 The reports that the Commission produced were exhaustive − Carnarvon would 
later state in the House of Lords that they had ‘looked at the scheme as a whole’. Although 
comprehensive, they were also designed to be realistic, and thus they had ‘framed their 
estimates upon the lowest possible scale’.121 The fact that the cost estimates for the 
defensive works still came to £2,507,386 says much about the Commission’s worries about 
the defence of naval coaling stations, and, moreover, how far attitudes towards the coal 
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question, and indeed imperial defence in general, had changed.122 Furthermore, it was 
testament to the importance of coal that this simple fuel had instigated the first 
comprehensive assessment and recommendations for a complete system of imperial 
defence.123 
In contrast to the Colonial Defence Committee, the Carnarvon Commission was not 
hampered by a lack of resources, time, or information, and was able, therefore, to produce 
a comprehensive account. Furthermore, because it was able to present a huge amount of 
data that had been analysed and organised by a government authority, the knowledge it 
created was pervasive and enduring.124 We can, therefore, see the Carnarvon Commission 
as an attempt to create coaling knowledge in order to ensure British power over naval 
fuelling and mobility. The knowledge created by the Commission was, of course, influenced 
by the interests of those who sat on it. As it largely contained those sympathetic to the 
defence of coaling stations, we must see the reports as representing the political interests 
of navalists. Moreover, the lack of colonial presence on the committee also meant that it 
also was skewed by the interests of the metropole. Despite this, especially after 1884, the 
reports were still widely seen as the authoritative coaling knowledge. 
 
The Last Hurrah of Gladstonian Liberalism 
 
However significant the reports of the Carnarvon Commission were, any immediate 
progress on their recommendations was halted before they were even completed, when a 
change of government brought Gladstone back as Prime Minister in 1880. The humiliating 
defeats suffered by the British in the course of the Anglo-Zulu and Second Afghan wars had 
allowed Disraeli to be cast as ‘un-English’ by the Liberals, who accused him of having 
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endangered the empire by overextension, and seeking glory as Napoleon and ancient Rome 
had done.125 These accusations tainted the nascent imperial foreign policy of the 
Conservative Party as aggressive, vain and reckless. Furthermore the defeats were coupled 
with an economic depression and high taxation, and with Disraeli’s popularity waning, 
Gladstone returned with a large majority.126 
As well as a setback to the Conservative Party and its pro-imperial foreign policy, it 
was also a blow for the development of long-term policy on coal supply and coaling station 
defence. Many politicians, including Liberals, distinguished between Disraeli’s aggressive 
‘false imperialism’, which was seen to be seeking territorial acquisitions for material gain, 
and a ‘true’ imperialism which promoted the ideals of European enlightenment, but both 
were largely tarred with the same brush by the new government. As defensive measures, 
the recommendations of Carnarvon could hardly be categorised as an aggressive form of 
imperialism, but with Gladstone − who had as little time for imperial defence as he did for 
extending the empire − returning as Prime Minister, the measures lost political support 
and were largely quashed.127 From the very beginning of its term in office, there is little to 
suggest that the Liberal government intended even to contemplate any of Carnarvon’s 
recommendations, yet, despite being less than a year old when the change of government 
occurred, the Commission continued to work at the government’s request. It could be 
argued that the recommendations took the Liberal government by surprise, being 
unexpectedly wide ranging and expensive, but it seems unlikely that with the make-up of 
the Commission, which included several men who had already spoken out about coaling 
defence, anything else could have been expected. The reasons for the new government 
continuing the enquiry would, therefore, appear to be more cynical. Firstly, by continuing 
the Commission the new government was able to avoid any immediate criticism and, 
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secondly, it was effectively able remove the issue from political debate until the reports 
were released.128 
These motives were perhaps betrayed when the Colonial Office wrote to the 
Commission to inform it that the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, ‘desires ... to 
assure them that their recommendations will not fail to receive that attention which the 
importance of the subject demands’, yet in the same memorandum the Commission was 
reminded that ‘the reports are very confidential and it is therefore important that they 
should not be communicated to anyone except in strict confidence’.129 Whatever 
statements Kimberley had made about the seriousness of the findings, the confidentiality 
clause inserted by Carnarvon himself allowed the government to ignore the report’s 
recommendations, without censure, by blocking its publication. Kimberley’s response was 
measured, however, compared to some of his Cabinet colleagues. The radical John Bright 
suggested that ‘the whole of this insane scheme be given up’ and Gladstone recommended 
it should be given ‘its tether’ and ‘perhaps it [would] make itself useless’, only supporting 
its continuance to avoid costly political fallout.130 The level of government apathy is 
perhaps best summarised by a memorandum from the Colonial Office after the second 
report was published in 1882, asking ‘has anything been done respecting the Royal 
Commission? ... I don’t know whether it rests with us or the War Office’.131  
In 1883, however, the responsibility for issues of imperial defence was transferred 
from the Colonial Office to the War Office, and the reports were passed to Lieutenant-
General Sir Andrew Clarke, the incumbent Inspector General of Fortifications, who was 
asked to provide a memorandum with his recommendations on the issue. A staunch Liberal 
who shared similar views to Gladstone on defence spending, he had been a surprise 
appointment to the role. Contemporary opinion suggested that his appointment was made 
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because of his political views and friends in high places.132 It is, therefore, unsurprising that 
his proposals vastly reduced the estimates Carnarvon and the other Commissioners had 
recommended. Instead of allowing £1,396,527 for the defences of first-class stations, the 
report offered £846,870 and garrison numbers were reduced from 19,557 to 10,259.133 
While the Carnarvon reports were by no means flawless, they were certainly a ‘reasonable 
approximation of what was necessary’ to secure Britain’s imperial interests and contained 
enough appendices to allow alterations to the flawed elements of the recommendations.134 
It seems sensible to assume therefore that such a drastic reduction of funding for works 
and armaments, as well as garrison numbers, could not be achieved without severely 
reducing the effectiveness of the scheme. Despite this, Clarke’s report was still 
recommended by the Defence Committee, and ‘generally approved’ by the Secretary of 
State for War, the Marquess of Hartington. Even if these amendments lessened the effect 
of Carnarvon’s recommendations, the Commissioners could at least be satisfied that the 
issue still appeared to be receiving some government attention. The state machinery soon 
slowed its progress, however, and it took some five months for communications about the 
reports to pass between the War Office, Colonial Office, India Office, and Treasury. 
Moreover, the reply from the Treasury, when it eventually came, contained many errors 
including incorrect cost divisions, little mention of armaments, and no mention of the Cape, 
which was so prominent in the reports.135  
The confidentiality agreement allowing the Liberal government suppress the 
reports meant that there was little Carnarvon could do while the issue was passed between 
departments and slowly disappeared from public sight. While he had never intended them 
to become public, the secrecy of the reports was designed to allow the situation to be 
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rectified without another naval scare, rather than allow the issue to be shelved completely. 
The government suggested that its reluctance to make the findings public was a matter of 
national security, but critics argued that any naval power could see for themselves the 
strength of British coaling station defences. There was clearly an ulterior political motive 
for the suppression of the reports, the circulation of which was limited even amongst 
ministers and colonial governors. To this end, W.C.B. Tunstall suggested that ‘so serious 
were the conclusions and evidence’ contained in the reports that censorship was the only 
way to protect the stance against defence spending that Gladstone had so stubbornly stuck 
to.136  
Carnarvon may have been bound by official secrecy, but when details of the 
reports, as well as other naval dossiers, were anonymously leaked in 1884 to W.T. Stead, 
editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, the government’s stance on the issue came under 
scrutiny.137 These were subsequently released as part of The Truth About the Navy and Its 
Coaling Stations, a series of editions which used the evidence of an anonymous insider 
(‘one who knows the facts’) to argue that British naval power had been so depleted that its 
supremacy was at stake. Stead, whose ‘journalistic innovations [such] as bold headlines, 
pictorial illustrations, special interviews, provocative leading articles’ had made the Pall 
Mall Gazette ‘a force to be reckoned with in British politics’, was already infamous for his 
campaigns and sensationalist scoops.138 The series was remarkably detailed and totalled 
some sixty-four pages, including maps, tables and figures. Using these to illustrate Britain’s 
naval weakness, the articles demanded a better fleet and more protection for naval 
infrastructure, and argued that this was ‘the first and most pressing duty that lies before 
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the Government of the Empire’.139 Beeler suggests that ‘Stead succeeded in creating a 
public furore, not based on substantive evidence, but on scandal-mongering alarmism. This 
should come as no surprise; his business was to sell newspapers’.140 Despite this, its 
argument was broadly accepted, and as The Pall Mall Gazette was widely seen as a leading 
Liberal newspaper, the criticism of Gladstone’s naval policy was especially damaging.141 
While the findings presented in The Truth About the Navy have been questioned, 
The Truth About Our Coaling Stations, published as part of the series, has not been so well 
scrutinised by historians.142 It berated the government’s attitude to the Carnarvon 
Commission, and suggested that the sole reason it was being suppressed was that the 
‘publication might alarm the public and awaken them to a sense of the fool’s paradise in 
which they live’. If the reports were published, it was argued ‘no Ministry would be allowed 
to exist that assented to the continuance of our peril’.143 Despite suggesting that he was 
unable to cite the Carnarvon Commission’s reports, Stead clearly had access to many of its 
suggestions, even if his recommendations were not identical to those of the Commission. It 
is perhaps telling that he states that ‘no Englishman, unless he be a member of the Cabinet 
is supposed to have access to its sombre pages’, suggesting that it was leaked from the 
highest office. As a result of this access, Stead’s article, which covers thirteen pages, cited 
many of the same points as Carnarvon, suggesting the figures had not been as manipulated 
as those in other parts of The Truth About the Navy. The edition did not merely provide 
statistics and warnings, but Stead also gave a succinct account of ‘what should be done’, 
setting out an agenda to reverse what he saw as a dangerous level of apathy towards 
defence. This agenda was split into four parts: the extension of the telegraph network to 
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protect colonies against loss of communication in war, the defence of all first-class coaling 
stations, the co-operation of the self-governing colonies for defence and manpower, and 
decisions to be made regarding whether second-class coaling stations should be fortified or 
abandoned in the event of war.144  
While the articles contained many of the same statistics, maps and 
recommendations as Carnarvon’s reports, their presence in the public domain meant their 
effect was very different. Even though many of the conclusions about British naval 
deficiency in terms of ship numbers were based on very questionable data, they ‘ripped 
complacent reassurance ... to shreds’, and established the idea of naval weakness firmly in 
the public mind.145 The sheer weight of facts, figures, and revelations, as well as the claim 
that they had been informed by ‘one who knows the facts’ lent great credibility to the 
articles, and they appear to have been widely accepted at face value. Although 
sensationalist propaganda, Stead’s campaign to expand the navy and implement a 
worldwide system of imperial defence was soon backed by other newspapers, notably The 
Times. The story was covered by both London and local newspapers, and found broad 
agreement in both the Liberal and the Conservative press.146 The Morning Post analysed 
the claims by referring them to an unnamed insider in the Admiralty, as well as comparing 
the statistics with official naval estimates, and found that in both cases they ‘agreed 
entirely’.147 The next day, it ran a piece by Admiral Sir John Hay MP which again 
corroborated the facts.148 Pressure continued to mount on the Liberal government: on 22 
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October, a request from the Queen to Gladstone further forced the issue, and in December 
J.C.R. Colomb wrote to The Times to urge more progress on the coaling question.149 It is 
particularly significant that, despite the controversy he caused, Stead claimed in a later 
compilation of the articles that even after two months there had been ‘no refutation, 
official or otherwise’.150 
 
The Resurgence of the Coal and Imperial Defence Question  
  
Although these disclosures were tantamount to a breach of government secrecy, there 
seems to have been little popular clamour for reprisals against those involved. In fact, on 
the contrary, The Times, despite questioning the method of releasing details of the 
Commission’s conclusions, justified the publication with a damning article on the 
government’s handling of the Commission’s reports. It suggested that  
the end may have justified the means, and, if ... we can bring home certain plain 
facts to the mind of the country, disclosures otherwise impolitic may be condoned. 
Something at least has been gained. The question of increasing the Navy is to be 
considered; we are a promised a measure of defence for certain coaling stations.151 
The case of The Truth About the Navy shows how the advent of investigative journalism, 
pioneered by Stead, had begun to challenge the notion of government secrecy. It gave 
those who were trusted with confidential knowledge the opportunity to release 
information into the public sphere should they feel it in the public interest, or perhaps 
more cynically, the interests of the groups they represented. As a result of this, it was now 
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possible to challenge more effectively what Martin Daunton has described as the ‘gate 
keepers’ of knowledge.152 This ability to bypass the confines of secrecy was acceptable if it 
was for a just cause, some argued, and it is perhaps telling that several significant 
politicians and high-ranking naval officers had anonymously contributed information to 
Stead’s article.153  
The clamour in the press over the revelations forced Gladstone’s hand, and he 
announced to Parliament in late October that he would shortly divulge the government’s 
plans as a response to the Commission’s reports. Perhaps sensing another delay, Carnarvon 
announced he would ask a question about these measures in Parliament on 13 November 
and thus the issue was not allowed to disappear.154 The government’s response was a 
hastily prepared alternative policy based on the report of Clarke. Although this policy was  
progress of sorts, the suppression of the original reports meant that they could not be 
directly compared with the new policy in Parliament; and Gladstone was able to offer a 
piecemeal alternative to Carnarvon’s recommendations, yet still appear to be taking the 
issue seriously.155 Carnarvon unsurprisingly rejected the proposals completely, saying  he 
‘disclaim[ed] all responsibility for the proposals now made in this Treasury paper;  and … in 
my humble opinion the estimate of work to be done is really wholly below the needs of the 
case and, in one word, illusory’. It is perhaps telling that this was greeted by cheers in the 
House, showing how far opinion had shifted on imperial defence. Moreover, he asserted 
that ‘whatever the expenses of the Government in this matter may be on paper, in 
practice, they will be found to be nil’.156 In his mind, the Commission’s recommendations 
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had been at the minimum cost to be effective, and thus, this Liberal alternative could not 
solve the problem.  
Although he could register his disapproval to the scheme, Carnarvon found himself 
frustrated by the bounds of secrecy, suggesting that ‘in arguing this case, I am greatly 
fettered and restrained’. He further explained the nature of the constraints suggesting he 
found  
it extremely difficult to discuss a Parliamentary paper such as this without alluding 
to the view which the Commission held. It seems to me that it would have been 
very fair had I been allowed to give simply what I may call the corresponding and 
comparative figures to those given by the Government ... but the First Lord of the 
Admiralty appealed to me ... not to use one single figure out of that report, and to 
treat the report from first to last as an absolute secret.157  
Clearly, although he remained polite and respectful in tone, Carnarvon felt that the secrecy 
surrounding the reports was merely a gag on those able to criticise the government’s 
position on the coaling issue. Unable to change the stance of the government over the 
secrecy of the reports, Carnarvon then issued a stark warning to the government about the 
confidentiality of the reports:  
I earnestly hope that my noble friend and other Cabinet Ministers are themselves 
as careful as they can be in their custody of these confidential papers, for it has 
been my fortune several times to become aware of papers of the highest 
importance ... having found their way into the possession of foreign 
Governments.158 
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This concern was perhaps genuine, but Carnarvon was also suggesting that the 
confidentiality of the reports − no matter what precautions were taken − could not be 
guaranteed, as had been seen in the case of Stead’s revelations. Thus it would be more 
beneficial to address the problems directly than to risk a potential catastrophe if the details 
found their way into the public domain. 
While Gladstonian liberalism had won the battle, it could not win the war. 
Gladstone had managed to avoid ignominy in the debate after Carnarvon’s speech, but 
there were already signs that the Liberal party was diverging in its vision of imperial policy. 
The ageing Prime Minister could therefore only halt the emergence of a coal consciousness 
for so long. Although it was the Irish question that eventually split the Party, the ‘coming 
men’, such as Dilke, Chamberlain, and Hartington, were already advocating a ‘liberal 
imperialism’ that was at odds with Gladstone’s stance on imperial matters. Promoting a 
closer unity with the colonies, Parry suggests that these younger Liberals were increasingly 
‘happy to play the imperial card’.159 Importantly, unlike Disraeli’s ‘false imperialism’, 
Carnarvon’s recommendations for coaling station defence were not only compatible but 
beneficiary to this idea of this liberal, or ‘true’, imperialism. Indeed, a closer imperial union 
was a necessity if Britain was to achieve a safe coal supply in war; and there was an obvious 
need for co-operation with the self-governing colonies in planning and implementing 
imperial defence.160 Furthermore, imperial defence as prescribed by the Commission 
largely avoided the moral issues associated with pro-imperialism, unlike the concurrent 
‘scramble for Africa’. Indeed, figures like Joseph Chamberlain were keen to highlight the 
difference between imperialism and colonialism, and therefore show that it was possible to 
oppose imperial expansion, but still support improvements in imperial defence.161  
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Even if it was becoming increasingly feasible to be an imperial Liberal, this vision 
was at odds with the views of older members of the party. Thus, although parts of the 
Liberal party were increasingly in favour of increases in naval defence, a large-scale 
scheme, as seen under the Conservatives in the later 1880s, was prevented by Gladstone 
who by now − even Kimberley suggested − was ‘really the sole obstacle’.162 Indeed, 
although this type of imperialism had originated with the Conservative Party, over time, 
and in light of a changing world and empire, it began to be accepted by many of those in 
the Liberal party. In fact, it was Gladstone’s attacks on ‘imperialism’ and general 
ambivalence towards the empire that led to the association of the Liberals with anti-
imperialism, an association that was ‘highly misleading’.163 In fact, ‘by the final quarter of 
the nineteenth century, the complex and contested relationship between liberalism and 
imperialism had become all but unmanageable, exposing as never before the 
contradictions that cut through the Victorian empire’.164 Increasingly, older Liberals such as 
Derby, Granville, and particularly Gladstone, were becoming what Parry describes as 
‘busted flushes’, and because of their dwindling influence in imperial matters there were 
small but significant measures taken for coaling station defence after 1884.165 These were 
based on the recommendations of Clarke, rather than Carnarvon, but Votes of Credit had 
finally allowed defensive works at coaling stations to begin.166 Perhaps prematurely, Funny 
Folks, an early satirical comic, celebrated the change in attitude towards naval matters that 
had occurred since The Truth About the Navy was published in late 1884. In a poem named 
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in honour of Stead’s article, it suggested that the effects of the leak would lead Britain to 
have no need to fear Russia: 
If Russia dare 
To war declare, 
Then you may take your davy, 
When we’re her foe 
We’ll let her know 
The ‘Truth about the Navy.’ 
 
With forts surrounded, 
Shipping pounded, 
Russia’s trade contracts, 
The Czar will be, 
Spite PMG 
The ‘One Who Knows the Facts.’167 
 
Although his revelations were certainly key, the cementing of the idea of naval and imperial 
weakness in the public consciousness was not solely the work of Stead. Indeed, it is 
imperative to see the ideological change visible in the Liberal party and the election of the 
imperialist Conservative party under Salisbury in the late 1880s as a reflection that popular 
opinion was changing. After all, it was an increasingly pro-imperial electorate, expanded by 
the Reform Act of 1884 to include the largely imperialist working class, which decided their 
political futures. This pro-imperialism was not limited to politics and elections, but was 
increasingly visible in popular culture, which both augmented and reflected pro-imperial 
politics. This was especially through an enthusiasm for the armed forces and, in particular, 
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popular navalism as illustrated by events such as the inauguration of a Royal Tournament in 
1880.168 Moreover, the music hall became more ‘jingoistic’ and by the mid-1880s the 
appeal of pro-imperial adventure novels was well established.169 The presence of an 
increasingly imperialistic ideology is further exemplified by the foundation of the Imperial 
Federation League in 1884 and the first Colonial Conference in 1887.  
 This pro-imperialism was a reaction to the growing public perception of the fragility 
of the empire, which had resulted from a number of events, fears, crises, and propaganda. 
This was, of course, in no small part due to the scandal caused by Stead, but this was 
worsened by the fragility of the wider international political situation, and Britain’s 
perceived inability to impose itself upon it. This was most evident in the disintegrating 
Ottoman Empire, and in particular Egypt. Britain, it was felt, needed to assert its authority 
by force, as a statement to both France and to rest of the world. The situation had become 
so serious that even Gladstone had felt compelled to intervene in Egypt in 1882, but in 
general his detached foreign policy was becoming increasingly tarnished by attacks from 
not only the opposition, but also from his own party.170 Not only was there criticism of the 
Liberal attitude to addressing defence worries, but existing British defence commitments, 
particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, were taking an increasing toll on the treasury.171 
By 1885, income tax was a third higher than it had been under Disraeli in 1880, and faith in 
the ability of liberal economic values to provide international and commercial security was 
waning.172 There were also signs that significant imperial tensions were appearing 
throughout the world, not least in the ensuing scramble for Africa, which precipitated a 
growing feeling that Britain needed to assert itself as a world power in order to keep its 
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dominant position.173 Particularly damaging was the feeling that British prestige had been 
harmed by events such as the death of General Gordon in Khartoum in 1885, which was 
laid squarely at the feet of Gladstone by Salisbury and the Conservatives.174 These events 
had the cumulative effect of cementing an idea of imperial weakness in the public mind, 
and led the media to become full of suspicion of other European powers’ imperial 
intentions, which shifted the focus away from Europe and into the wider empire.175   
It was not just a belief in the fragility of Britain’s land-based empire that increased 
coal consciousness, but also a fear of foreign maritime threats. In particular, the adoption 
of Jeune École by the French navy, which explicitly looked to attack British commercial 
shipping, caused panic in the popular press.176 This was exacerbated by rumours of a 
Franco-German naval alliance.177 What appeared to be a direct and transparent threat to 
British trade gave more momentum to those advocating spending on coaling station 
defences, as well as those of the blue-water school arguing for a general increase in naval 
spending. Indeed, such threats, they argued, showed that adequate protection for 
commerce from the Royal Navy could only be achieved with the proper defence of coaling 
stations, as outlined in the Carnarvon Commission. 
As well as public outcry, there was also pressure on the government to act on 
coaling station defence from the City and other commercial interests. Britain’s economy 
had been strengthened by a large increase in maritime trade in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, making the need to control the sea for the purposes of trade, and 
therefore the navy, increasingly important.178 Not only was it imperative that seaborne 
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trade remained open and undisturbed to sustain Britain’s economy but, because it relied 
on imported food, Britain’s very existence appeared to hinge on this.179 With a huge value 
of trade resting on the strength of the navy, commercial and shipping interests such as 
Donald Currie had grave concerns about the coal question as has been seen.180 
Furthermore, the opening of the African interior to trade in the 1870s and 1880s meant 
there was ever more demand from commercial interests for naval protection for those 
looking to exploit the riches of the continent.181 While the coaling question was not 
completely commercially driven, it would be naive to suggest that ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
did not have personal interest in the defence of coaling infrastructure. The closeness of 
business and government, at the top of the gentlemanly order, meant that not only did 
they often have ‘a common view of the world’, but that business interests were often 
closely intertwined with political ones.182 Moreover, by 1880 around half of the 
Conservative party had links with the military establishment, and thus even many of those 
without links to commercial shipping held concerns about deficiencies in imperial 
defence.183 
As a result of these factors, a coal consciousness had largely grown into a ‘coaling 
consensus’ from the middle of the 1880s. Such a change in attitude could do little on its 
own to strengthen imperial defence, however. This required government action, and thus 
the results of this are seen in ‘the silent metamorphosis taking place in long established 
arms of government’ as the coal question was ‘placed under or; we might say, grew into 
their jurisdiction’.184 As a result of this, we see, really for the first time, serious and 
prolonged discussions about coaling stations, home ports, dockyard works, and 
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shipbuilding in Admiralty board meetings during November 1884, which had for so long 
been conspicuous by their absence.185 In fact, these discussions were completely at odds 
with the Admiralty’s attitude to coaling defence previously, which was largely to leave the 
issue to the War Office, despite its importance to the navy’s ability to function 
effectively.186 The growing coal consciousness of the Admiralty can also be seen beyond the 
issue of defence when, in the early 1880s, the shipment of coal to stations was formalised, 
with a proper structure that required formal audits and requests to be sent and stored.187  
Despite this agitation, pro-imperialism, and growing coaling consensus, only small 
changes had occurred in the year after Stead’s article, even when Lord Salisbury and the 
Conservative party came to power in 1885, largely because they were hamstrung by a 
minority government. Indeed, it was not until 1886 that the defining moment for imperial 
defence, and indeed the coal question, occurred when the Liberal party split over the Irish 
question, and the Conservatives came to power with a majority. They were able to develop 
imperial and naval sentiment into an imperial defence policy that prioritised naval security 
over budgetary control.188 Furthermore, the Liberals in opposition were more imperial 
minded, and with Gladstone finally coming to the end of a hugely influential career, the 
Liberal party was rid of the main element of resistance to increased spending on imperial 
defence.189 
The fall of Gladstone, who was ‘always ready to reduce service expenditure’, 
allowed, in particular, more rapid changes in the Admiralty.190 With the determination of 
the Conservative government to address the naval and imperial needs of Britain, Lord 
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George Hamilton was installed as First Lord of the Admiralty. Tasked with reforming the 
Admiralty after 1886, he looked to address what Paul Smith has described as the ‘chaos’ 
left by the previous Gladstone ministry.191 These reforms had several significant effects. 
The most important was a policy of prioritising imperial need over budgetary control, which 
not only allowed for a more efficient bureaucracy,  but also the ability to plan and execute 
ambitious and expensive naval building projects, both in terms of ships and naval works.192 
To facilitate these, the last two decades of the nineteenth century saw the growth of 
permanent naval committees in general: in 1879 there were just three, but by 1899 there 
were ten, giving the Admiralty greater capacity to deal with specialist issues such as 
coaling.193 Furthermore, Hamilton brought a growing professionalism to the Admiralty, 
allowing it to deal more efficiently and effectively with the challenges of a changing world. 
He spoke of conducting Admiralty affairs ‘along business lines’, and there were regular 
references to ‘general principles’, ‘continuous policy’, and ‘forethought’, highlighting an 
increased professionalism and purpose to Admiralty business.194 
While developments in the Admiralty were important, its ability to communicate 
these concerns to other government departments allowed real progress to be made. This 
increase in efficiency and minimising of confusion was achieved by the effects of a growing 
appreciation of the importance of the centralisation of government bodies in the late 
nineteenth century. This was particularly important for addressing the coal question, which 
was always complicated by the delays and inactivity caused by its interdepartmental 
nature. In order for the issue to be effectively dealt with, the Admiralty needed to be able 
to communicate its concerns directly to the other relevant offices of government, in 
particular the War Office, which was responsible for the fortification and armament of 
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coaling stations. The formation of the Colonial Defence Committee during the Russian scare 
of 1885, which was subsequently expanded and made permanent, largely provided this 
centralised structure for intra-governmental dialogue.195 The effectiveness of this body was 
also further improved by inviting men with special colonial experience to give information 
on discussions, allowing the Committee to consider matters with expert opinion.196 The 
system put in place meant that these issues could be discussed by representatives of the 
Treasury, the Admiralty, the War Office and the Colonial Office together, ensuring ‘a 
harmony of action and continuity of policy’.197 The presence of the Colonial Defence 
Committee was consequently of particular importance in the instigation of defence 
construction. Its permanent status allowed the committee to look beyond coaling station 
defences as a temporary measure, and to examine how those built in the wake of Clarke’s 
report of 1883 could be expanded and improved.  
Although the Colonial Defence Committee has been seen as a ‘pale forerunner’ of 
the later Committee of Imperial Defence formed at the start of the twentieth century, it 
was still an important, if small, step towards improving the co-operation between 
governmental departments and between Whitehall and the self-governing colonies.198 
Schurman argues that the Committee failed to ‘place naval functions in their proper 
relationship with imperial defence’, but while a heavy War Office majority did skew the 
focus of the body, it was still crucial to the completion of defences at both coaling stations 
and colonial ports.199 An 1894 report concluded that: 
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[the Committee] has dealt with the garrisons of all the defended ports abroad, and 
with the schemes prepared by local committees for placing these ports in a state to 
resist attack, by carrying out provisional defences, and by drawing up the necessary 
directions and orders, to insure, on the outbreak of war, a completely organised 
system of defence with the means actually at the disposal of the military 
authorities.200 
The work of the Committee was both extensive and geographically diverse, considering 
defences, telegraphic communications, garrisons, armament and a whole host of other 
facets of defences at imperial coaling stations as diverse as Simon’s Town and Esquimalt.201 
Although it was reliant on a change in government to provide extensive funding for works, 
and its work was less comprehensive and immediate than Carnarvon had recommended, it 
was the Colonial Defence Committee which was largely responsible for both the planning 
and the completion of coaling station defence before the end of the nineteenth century.  
The security of coaling stations was not the only facet of the coal question, 
however, and, as well as witnessing the beginning of policies to address the defence of 
coaling stations, the mid-1880s also saw a reassessment of the situation regarding Britain’s 
readiness for war. Although progress was being made on their defences, secure coaling 
stations would be useless if they were not amply supplied in war. The ability to mobilise the 
Royal Navy at full strength required knowledge of the status and security of Britain’s naval 
infrastructure, as well as information on shipping and foreign navies.202 Thus, there was a 
need to collect, collate, and analyse both British and foreign naval intelligence. There were 
therefore calls for a specialised naval intelligence department that would supply 
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intelligence on foreign navies and ensure Britain was able to mobilise effectively at short 
notice.  
The want of an efficient and effective naval intelligence division was not new in the 
mid-1880s, but previous attempts to address the issue had largely failed. Before 1882, it 
was an ad hoc affair, relying on a couple of naval attachés and the reports of Royal Navy 
officers on hostile shipping. The Admiralty was slow to organise an intelligence division, 
with the first proposal for a specialist staff made in 1879, some five years after the War 
Office had done the same.203 The problems caused by this lack of a specialised department 
were particularly shown during the Carnarvon Commission, which had to rely on 
intelligence from the War Office, as the Admiralty was unable to provide any. Thus, along 
with recommendations for defensive works, the Commission explicitly recommended the 
formation of a new, larger body to gather naval intelligence.204  
As a response to this, the Foreign Intelligence Committee (FIC) was formed in 1882, 
although it largely failed to alleviate the paucity of data collected by the Admiralty.205 This 
was principally because the effectiveness of government bodies relied not only on the 
specialisation of roles, but also on a growth of a specialist staff. Thus, when the FIC was 
formed in 1882, despite being part of the specialisation of roles within the Admiralty, the 
lack of funding, which necessitated an attaché be withdrawn to run the body in London, 
meant that the naval intelligence situation arguably worsened.206 As a result, it did little to 
help solve the problems that had been highlighted by Carnarvon. In fact, because of 
resources, the FIC had a very limited role, which in general consisted of reporting on the 
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activities of other nations’ fleets.207 While it did not necessarily improve naval intelligence, 
its development was typical of the growing professionalisation of parts of the late-
nineteenth-century British government, and represented, at least, an attempt to formalise 
the collection of naval intelligence.  
As a result of these difficulties, there was a growing unease with the lack of 
intelligence available within the Admiralty, as it severely limited its ability to effectively 
plan for a naval war. This issue was particularly acute during the Panjdeh Incident, in which 
Russia invaded part of Afghanistan, precipitating another war scare in 1885 at the height of 
the ‘great game’. More pressure grew when Russia launched a new class of armoured 
cruiser, ideal for commerce raiding in the same year.208 This created a ‘changing strategic 
environment which demanded new, more complex solutions’.209 That this Russian scare 
caused the reappearance of the mobilisation issue in 1885 says much about the shambolic 
and confused situation the Royal Navy found itself in.210 Although peace was eventually 
kept successfully, the Admiralty had to resort to ad hoc measures to mobilise the navy. This 
included the purchase of coal from the local vicinity of the coaling stations, which in nearly 
all cases would have been of inferior quality to its usual supply, causing increased 
consumption and decreased performance of the fleet.211   
The same year, Junior Naval Lord Charles Beresford, undoubtedly alarmed by the 
chaotic response to the war scare, wrote to the Admiralty Board to register his concerns 
about this issue. His intention was to warn of ‘the perilous absence of any plan or 
preparation for war, and the gravity and imminence of the danger which may result to this 
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country from such a state of affairs’. In response to this he suggested the formation of a 
new Naval Intelligence Branch.212 Once again, it was Stead and the Pall Mall Gazette that 
acted as a catalyst to change, when the memorandum was leaked in October 1885.213 It has 
been strongly suggested that the memorandum was, in fact, leaked by Beresford himself, 
although the Admiralty could not, or perhaps more accurately would not, find enough 
evidence to substantiate any claim against him.214 Although, again, the leak represented a 
serious breach of government security, it did not seem to bring any recriminations, with 
Beresford continuing in his role. Instead, as intended, it sped up the process of the 
establishment of a more complete branch for naval intelligence. 
Many of the ideas and recommendations contained in Beresford’s memorandum 
were not new at all. A similar memorandum had been produced in 1880 by Evan 
Macgregor, who at that time was serving as Head of the Military Branch in the Admiralty. 
This earlier paper concentrated on issues surrounding the protection of coaling and, in 
particular, whether gunboats should be sent in war to protect coaling stations. Pertinently, 
it also questioned the arrangements in place for the protection of commercial coal in the 
event of war.215 Little seems to have come of this memorandum, however, and the fact it is 
included with Beresford’s memorandum suggests it was shelved and ignored, along with 
the similarly timed Carnarvon Commission reports.  
Beresford’s memorandum somewhat alarmingly suggested that the scare had 
shown ‘what we should actually require … in a war with a second-rate maritime power, [is] 
over and above what is now is now at our disposal’.216 He suggested, however, that the 
problem went further than merely a question of supply. It was ‘incredible’, he argued, that 
unlike France, Germany, Russia, Austria and Italy ‘no steps [had] been taken to organise or 
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prepare any method or plan for showing how or where these absolutely necessary 
requirements are to be obtained [in war]’.217 A body needed to be set up, he argued, to 
ensure up-to-date preparations were in place for men, ammunition, coals, and provisions, 
especially as Britain, more than any other power, had such scattered and extensive 
possessions and trade routes to protect. 
The memorandum identified key issues that currently existed with war 
mobilisation. Out of these, several relate to the problems associated with coaling warships. 
In terms of personnel, there was a great need for more stokers, who would be crucial if 
warships were to be successfully and swiftly deployed worldwide. In terms of organisation 
for war, there was no plan as to how Royal Navy ships might obtain coal in war, or from 
where they could obtain it. Furthermore, there were no detailed lists of how much coal was 
stored at each station, both for use and as spare, or any details of where each station was 
supplied from, or who the supplier was. To resolve these issues, and therefore allow Britain 
to be fully ready to mobilise efficiently in the case of war, Beresford suggested a need for 
‘framing a plan of naval campaign suitable for each station in the event of war with 
different countries’.218  
To deal effectively with such an increased workload, Beresford recognised there 
would need to be an increase in personnel specialising in intelligence at the Admiralty. Of 
course, there was already an intelligence body, the FIC, but he suggested it be greatly 
expanded to a staff of thirteen. In effect, it was a completely new body, and therefore 
perhaps justifiably he suggested it be renamed the Naval Intelligence Division (NID).219 With 
the pressure resulting from the leak of the memorandum, Beresford’s suggestion became a 
reality, and the FIC became the NID in 1887. The new body was able, with the new 
specialist positions, to diversify its scope, and as part of this it was split into two divisions: 
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Foreign intelligence and Mobilisation. This was of course only possible due to another 
significant change in British government policy, the ability for the Admiralty to access more 
governmental funds. 
The NID did not have the immediate effect that Beresford had envisaged, however. 
A lack of delegation from the Senior Naval Lords, combined with a concentration on routine 
tasks, rather than wider strategic issues, meant that when, in 1888, a dispute between 
France and Italy threatened war, Britain still relied on foreign governments for 
intelligence.220 As a result of this, Matthew Allen suggests that ‘a decade of reform had 
failed to address the basic intelligence gathering problem’.221 Even if foreign intelligence 
was slow to improve, plans for mobilisation, and therefore coaling in war, showed more 
obvious signs of improvement. The Jubilee Review of 1887 was followed by annual naval 
manoeuvres, which not only provided the navy with valuable mobilisation experience, but 
also highlighted any flaws in Britain’s potential ability to wage a major maritime war 
effectively.222 Furthermore, monthly naval intelligence meetings between the Naval Lords 
and the NID facilitated the communication of specialist knowledge, allowing issues of 
coaling in war to receive greater consideration by the later 1880s. This meant the concerns 
of the NID could be heard by the Admiralty Board, and if necessary, the Colonial Defence 
Committee, and moreover allowed those bodies to receive assurances from the NID on 
Britain’s readiness for war.223  
It was, however, the restructuring of the national debt by the Conservative 
government in 1888 that enabled the most significant measures resulting from the rise of 
coal consciousness, as this allowed the government to spend heavily without having to 
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raise taxes.224 This made it much more difficult for the Treasury to justify curtailing defence 
expenditure as it had done in the 1870s, and as a result, in the 1880s and 1890s, naval 
estimates could increase markedly.225 Although there had been some progress in the 
building of coaling defences through Votes of Credit, the ability of the government to 
increase spending allowed it to pass the Imperial Defence Act in 1888, which stipulated a 
permanent source of funds for such works.226  
The Act sought ‘to provide for the completion without delay of the defence of the 
coaling stations abroad required for the use of Your Majesty’s navy, and the speedy 
completion of the armament necessary for the above purposes’.227 To accomplish this, it 
set aside £2,600,000 for wide-ranging defence measures, which were largely completed by 
1896. The following year saw the more famous Naval Defence Act passed, which put into 
law that the Royal Navy must maintain a number of battleships at least equal to the 
combined strength of the next two largest navies, the so-called ‘two power standard’. 
While this has been seen as the defining naval act of the late nineteenth century, the 
protection of coaling stations through the Imperial Defence Act was a crucial partner, 
because, as Carnarvon had stated in 1882, ‘no addition to the number and fighting power 
of your Majesty’s ships will make up for the want of coaling-stations’.228 That these Acts 
were both implemented reflects that, by the late 1880s, naval strength had become 
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inescapably connected with worries about imperial security. Moreover, coal had been 
recognised as an integral part of the ability of the navy to protect British interests. Thus we 
can conclude that by the last decade of the nineteenth century, coal security was so 
entrenched within imperial defence rhetoric that it had largely become a ‘coaling 
consensus’.  
In the late 1880s, therefore, an emerging coaling consensus had helped to bring 
about measures to safeguard naval coaling by distinct changes in state bodies. While the 
leaking of many of the details of the Carnarvon reports had accelerated the growth of coal 
consciousness, there still needed to be changes to the state in order to address its 
recommendations. A combination of the formation of two new bodies, the Colonial 
Defence Committee and the NID, and the discussion of wider naval issues by the Admiralty 
Board allowed questions of coal to receive more attention from the government. 
Furthermore, the ability to analyse data efficiently and produce coaling knowledge allowed 
legislative bodies to implement schemes of defence, maintenance and mobilisation. 
This coaling consensus lasted beyond the end of the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth century, with the presence of Salisbury as Prime Minister for over thirteen of the 
next seventeen years guaranteeing a concerted imperial policy. As a Prime Minister, he was 
almost the complete opposite of Gladstone, dominating foreign policy and profoundly 
absorbed by imperial matters. As a result of the wider ideological shift, there was a policy 
of continuity even with the return of the Liberal party between 1892 and 1894, with 
Rosebery as Foreign Secretary, marking the end of party politics in foreign policy in the 
nineteenth century.229 The final abandonment of Gladstonian low defence spending by the 
Liberal party was shown by the adoption of a new £31 million naval building programme in 
1894, the so-called Spencer programme, which largely led to Gladstone’s resignation, and 
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Rosebery’s appointment as Prime Minister.230 The Spencer programme was followed by the 
Naval Works Act in 1895, which looked to defend and extend principal ports, for which £8.8 
million was initially put aside, although by 1901 the scope of the work had brought 
spending to £27.5 million.231 
 
Legacy of a Coaling Consensus 
 
With a coal consciousness becoming a coaling consensus and established bodies with which 
to solve the coal question in place by the 1890s, it is pertinent to ask what its legacy was. 
The effect of the Naval Defence Act is well known: it caused spiralling building costs and a 
naval arms race. In fact, despite being a victory for the blue-water school of navalists at the 
time, it actually diminished Britain’s relative numerical supremacy.232 It is more difficult to 
assess the legacy of the Imperial Defence Act, and thus the Carnarvon Commission and coal 
consciousness, however. Even before the defences had been completed, the New York 
Times praised British coaling station defence in 1892 as ‘amply garrisoned and defended’ 
and as places of ‘actual political and strategically importance’.233 By 1894, after several 
further revisions which incrementally increased the costs, a report on the progress of the 
defences concluded that the works on the ‘coaling stations approved for execution [were], 
with one exception, practically completed as regards defence’, yet the report still ‘urge[d] 
the construction, in time of peace, of the more important and necessary of the land 
defences for each coaling station’.234 Nevertheless, even after such continual expenditure, 
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with the benefit of hindsight, opinion had somewhat shifted. Although he supported the 
defence of principal stations and stressed a need for better steam and telegraph 
communication, C.H. Crofts suggested in 1902 that to have too many coaling stations was a 
weakness. Indeed, he proposed that the assertion of Captain Stone in 1889 that ‘the 
possession of naval arsenals, dockyards, and coaling stations must practically decide the 
question of naval supremacy’, had overstated their importance, and instead ‘their real 
defence is the existence of a supreme British navy’.235 The 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica 
echoed a similar sentiment when it asserted that ‘it is probable that they will play a 
somewhat less important part than has been assumed. A fleet which is able to assert and 
to maintain the command of the sea, will not find great difficulty in its coal supply’.236 
Although this seems damning, it is perhaps worth considering that by the 1900s, Germany, 
whose threat was entirely from the North Sea, had replaced France as the main rival to 
Britain, explaining why British overseas bases had lost some of their importance. Indeed, 
Germany’s inability to challenge Britain overseas, and its subsequent concentration in 
Northern European waters, meant that Britain’s strategic priorities had to alter too. This 
change necessitated that ships were withdrawn from the empire to bolster the home fleet. 
Thus, although coaling and docking facilities allowed Britain the potential to be hugely 
powerful globally, a lack of ship numbers in the wider world actually made Britain fairly 
vulnerable to surface raiders such as the Emden and the Scharnhorst. Yet, even with this 
weakness, Germany did not possess the infrastructure to sustain enough cruisers outside of 
European waters to cause Britain major problems. Indeed, Britain’s control over naval 
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coaling infrastructure, and its ability to deny the same to its enemies, still made it a 
formidable opponent in the wider empire.237 
As Britain avoided a major naval war in the period up to 1914, and even in war 
coaling stations faced few acts of aggression, it is difficult to assess how effective the 
defences might have been against concerted attacks from foreign cruisers. This is not 
because Britain’s enemies failed to ascribe the same importance to these stations as Britain 
did, but because Britain’s infrastructure allowed it to mobilise far more effectively overseas 
on a large scale. With the works installed at these stations allowing the navy enough time 
to return and engage enemy ships, they were effective deterrents to raiding attacks. The 
legacy of these fortifications is more complex than just a case of examining enemy 
attempts to attack them, therefore, and they should not therefore be seen as a later 
version of Palmerston’s Follies.238 As British imperial defence strategy rested on the 
avoidance of a major naval war, that only one of Britain’s overseas stations, the Falkland 
Islands, was attacked in such a lengthy period would suggest that they were somewhat 
successful as deterrents.239 While questions may be asked about the wisdom of several 
local defences in general − many of which were unimportant − Britain could not rely on the 
Royal Navy to defend these stations, and in order to maintain control of the ocean, Britain 
needed a chain of bases to sustain the capability to mobilise worldwide.240 Although the 
Franco-Russian cruiser threat was negligible, the perceived vulnerability of undefended 
coal, crucial to the functioning of the Royal Navy, meant that important considerations 
about an empire wide strategy for defence were made for the first time. Furthermore, it is 
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only with the decline of France and Russia as threats in the first decade of the twentieth 
century (both subsequently signed alliances with Britain) that the focus of a potential war 
shifted almost wholly to European waters.241 
This legacy of a coaling consensus was relatively short term, however, limited by 
the decline of coal use in warships in the twentieth century. Just as a coaling consensus was 
reaching a high point, Britain had begun to experiment with oil as a fuel for the Navy: by 
the 1890s, Britain was both conducting its own experiments and observing the results of 
those carried out by other navies. By 1905, most destroyers were exclusively oil fuelled, 
and, although it was not an overnight process, it was clear that the future of the Royal Navy 
lay with oil.242  
The rise of coal consciousness did have less tangible but arguably more important 
and enduring results, however. The permanent Colonial Defence Committee, appointed in 
1885 by a government under growing pressure, has widely been seen to be the beginning 
of genuine imperial defence planning. It was an interdepartmental committee which relied 
on expert opinion, even if it was dominated by the War Office.243 Further to this, the 
Carnarvon Commission largely contributed to the formation of an effective Naval 
Intelligence Division in 1887.244 Thus, it can be argued that the rise of coal consciousness 
not only helped to initiate proper communication between the Admiralty and other 
government offices with responsibility for imperial defence, but also that it raised 
questions that would lead to the establishment of a more effective administration for the 
management of imperial defence and intelligence.245 Although progress was variable, by 
1892 the New York Times declared that ‘with this enormous system under such splendid 
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control, and with new stations that are constantly being equipped and manned, the British 
Navy can never be reduced to [a] humiliating and embarrassing position’.246 Even if some 
Admiralty officials and political figures remained convinced of British naval weakness, 
international opinion suggested that in terms of coaling infrastructure ‘as in all other 
matters of naval importance, Great Britain stands at the head’.247 After 1900, moreover, 
the bodies of government which largely dealt with coaling issues had further expanded. By 
1902 the NID had doubled in terms of number of departments, adding divisions for War 
and Trade, and the Colonial Defence Committee was replaced by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence in 1902, which gained more importance in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  
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Chapter 4: The Development of a Coaling Infrastructure 
 
The emergence of the steam navy did not only precipitate a reassessment of Britain’s 
geopolitical vision and defence strategy, but also required the Royal Navy to invest 
significantly in coaling infrastructure, test potential fuels, and formalise the distribution of 
coal. Naval steam engines required coal, and lots of it. More specifically, they required 
quality steam-coal, which could provide the maximum amount of energy per ton, would 
not deteriorate badly when stored, and burnt cleanly to avoid clogging up warship engines. 
Further to this, as naval steamships require a degree of stealth in battle, they needed a fuel 
that did not produce black smoke, making them visible for miles around. Thus, selecting the 
correct coals for the navy was crucial to the effectiveness of warships in carrying out their 
duties. That this quality coal was required to be available around the empire in ever-
increasing quantities exacerbated the difficulties experienced by the Admiralty, and 
responses to this created networks and infrastructures that became progressively more 
complex and robust. 
This chapter is structured as a journey from coal face to imperial coaling station, 
and explores how Britain chose, acquired, transported, and monitored levels of this 
precious commodity for its navy. In doing so, it identifies the complexities, geographical 
differences, and changes over time evident across the coaling infrastructure, and how 
these threatened the robustness and efficiency of British naval coaling. The journey begins 
in coal fields around the world and examines how the Admiralty sourced its fuel by 
performing extensive coal trials, produced lists of coal of sufficient quality to supply the 
Royal Navy, and drew up the contracts to purchase this coal.  
Although the Royal Navy was highly fortunate that Britain possessed vast quantities 
of coal, not all was suitable for naval use, and it was only through the Admiralty testing 
various British coals from the 1850s that the best fuels could be acquired. To catalogue 
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those collieries that provided what it deemed to be high-enough quality steam-coal for its 
warships, the Admiralty List was created. Although the trials suggested that the coal of 
South Wales was the most suited to naval usage, and was in fact the best steam-coal in the 
world, pressure from northern collieries dragged the trials into the 1870s. Indeed, despite 
Welsh coal dominating the Admiralty List, northern coal was still used in mixtures until the 
1880s. In the wider empire, coaling arrangements were even more ad hoc. Although Welsh 
coal was used in all Britain’s Atlantic naval coaling stations, including as far away as the 
Cape, into the 1880s a multitude of coals of differing quality were used at British naval 
stations.    
It was only with the rise of coal consciousness, as discussed in the last chapter, and 
advances in steamship technology that this situation changed. Demand for coal increased 
with the enlargement of the navy after the Naval Defence Act in 1889, and this was 
accentuated by the increased size, speed, and therefore consumption of warships. The 
Admiralty had held almost constant trials of coal local to foreign stations throughout this 
period, but this surge in demand led to a more serious consideration of sourcing coal from 
local sites. It was not just the increased quantity of fuel consumed that led to concerns 
about the coal used around the empire, but also a growing appreciation of the importance 
of quality coal for the effectiveness of the navy. Even so, such were the stringent standards 
of the Royal Navy for steam-coal after 1880 that, despite the exertions of the Admiralty to 
find new sources, there was little success. In fact, the amount of local coal used decreased 
amid fears about quality, and Welsh and Westport (New Zealand) coal dominated even 
though shipments often had to be transported enormous distances. As a result of the 
dominance of Welsh and Westport coal, it is possible to see coaling infrastructure after 
1882 largely as two sub-imperial networks that overlapped around the Cape, although it is 
important to recognise that Welsh coal still represented the majority of naval coal used.  
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The chapter then explores how contracts for naval coal were agreed, both with 
domestic suppliers and those abroad, and how the Admiralty relied heavily upon the 
commercial sector in the purchasing and transporting of coal. As a result of this, even if the 
focus of this thesis is naval coaling, it is imperative to recognise the scale of commercial 
coaling, which massively outweighed its naval equivalent. Not only did naval ships 
frequently use commercial stations − indeed many coaling stations acted as both − but the 
Admiralty also relied on the commercial sector in other parts of its infrastructure. 
Commercial collieries provided the coal, commercial agents arranged and managed 
contracts to supply and transport coal around the world, and commercial tramp ships 
delivered the coal to the stations. As was the case with victualling, the Admiralty utilised 
existing commercial infrastructure, acting largely as an overseer.1 
Finally, the chapter analyses the development of supply-management processes 
between the final destination of the coal − the foreign naval station − and the Admiralty. 
As the use of steamships increased, and they became larger and more coal-hungry, British 
coaling infrastructure needed to be able to cope with extra demand. This strain 
necessitated changes not only in the way that naval coaling infrastructure functioned, but 
also to the infrastructure itself. Furthermore, this increasing demand for coal put pressure 
on the coaling infrastructure of South Wales and New Zealand and Australia, which, by the 
mid-1880s, were the only sources of coal in use by the Royal Navy. Although, due to 
commercial demand for coal far outstripping the needs of the navy, this was not a 
particular problem in peace, the Admiralty had to guarantee that naval coaling stations 
would be fully stocked and able to provide coal to naval ships in war. Worries about 
mobilisation in war extended beyond securing a supply though, as the Admiralty also 
needed to know which stations required fuel and how much. As a result of this, the 1880s 
saw the introduction of a formalised system for ordering and reporting stock levels at 
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coaling stations.2 This allowed the Admiralty, through the Commanders-in-Chief of each 
station, to oversee the coaling infrastructure, and in particular stock levels, as a way of 
managing the risk to the Royal Navy in war. No infrastructural system is perfect, and thus 
this chapter will analyse the problems that Britain encountered. Finally, in an attempt to 
illustrate the remarkable strength of British coaling, it will examine the enormous 
problems, disasters, and tragedies, suffered by its rivals because of weaknesses in their 
infrastructure.  
 
Sourcing Coal for the Navy at Home 
 
The early steam navy was fuelled largely by coal from the north east of England and, in 
particular, from Northumberland. This arrangement was far from ideal, however, as 
northern coal produced thick black smoke, enabling a naval warship to be seen from some 
distance by an enemy, as well as making navigation treacherous.3 In response to this 
situation the Admiralty sponsored trials on British coal from the 1840s to test its suitability 
for naval use.4 It was imperative for the Admiralty to select the best fuel for the sake of 
performance. They would later state that: 
A ship of war must be supplied, and must be kept supplied with a coal which will 
ensure the highest rate of speed and maintain the required radius of action. If you 
use a coal that burns quicker, without producing the same calorific effects and 
power, you would burn out the coal sooner than you otherwise would, and the 
                                                                    
2 Wilson, ‘Fuelling the Steam Navy’, 41.  
3 Ibid., 29.  
4 An excellent account of these trials can be found in Morris and Williams, The South Wales Coal 
Industry, 34-41. 
145 
 
consequence would be that a ship instead of running her 10,000 knots at a certain 
speed, would be reduced probably to 8,000 or 9,000 knots.5 
As well as calorific efficiency, the Admiralty also stated a need for a coal that had the 
qualities of ‘smokelessness, cleanness, hardness, free burning, minimum of ash and clinker, 
and that the coals will not cake or give trouble in stoking’.6 
The trials found Welsh coal to be the best steam-coal for naval use as it produced 
‘an exceedingly hot and smokeless fire rendering raking unnecessary, thereby economizing 
on labour for stoking’, took up less bunker space per unit of energy output, was less 
susceptible to oxidising, even in warm climates, and was also less susceptible to 
spontaneous combustion.7 Coal from northern England not only proved less satisfactory, 
but Wales also had superior port facilities and more direct rail access between pit and port, 
making Welsh coal more economically viable for the navy.8 South Wales had been 
providing small but important amounts of coal as early as the 1830s, in particular for 
government steam packets, but after these trials, it was in general preferred from the 
1850s for Admiralty use.9  
While the ideal properties of Welsh steam-coal as a fuel for the steam navy have 
been explored above, it is worth considering why, chemically, Welsh coal was so suitable. 
Steam-coal was highly prized because of its high calorific value, which contemporaries 
measured in British Thermal Unit (BTU) per lb. BTU was defined as the amount of heat 
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needed to raise the temperature of one pound of water from 60oF to 61oF. The calorific 
value of a fuel is dependent on its chemical make up, and is calculated using the following 
chemical equations: 
C+O2  CO2 + 387.5 BTU 
H2 + O  H2O+ 274 BTU 
By knowing the percentage of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen in a specified amount of fuel, 
one is able to establish its calorific value. In general, fuels with a high calorific value have a 
high carbon percentage. Thus, Welsh steam with, on average, 92.5% carbon, was the pre-
eminent solid fuel.  
 
Solid Fuel C (%) H (%) O (%) BTU per lb. 
Cellulose 44.5 6.1 49.3 7500 
Dry Wood 50 6 44 8600 
Peat 60 5.9 34.1 9000 
Lignite (Brown Coal) 67 5.2 27.8 11700 
Bituminous coal 88.4 5.6 6 14950 
Welsh steam-coal 92.5 4.7 2.7 15720 
 
Where oxygen exists in a fuel in combination, a small amount is used in combustion, thus 
reducing overall heat produced in proportion. Welsh steam-coal has a lower oxygen 
percentage, which again increases its calorific value in comparison with other fuels. Unlike 
other solid fuels, it also contains minimal amounts of other elements such as nitrogen and 
sulphur, or moisture. This not only increases its calorific value, but also allows it to burn 
cleanly and consistently.10 
Despite the clear evidence of these early trials, the 1850s did not represent the end 
to the supply question, and there were at least twenty-one trials of domestic coal between 
1847 and 1879.11 Wilson has argued that the ‘almost continuous review of coals 
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throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century’ shows that the ‘perfect [naval steam] 
coal was difficult to obtain’, but nearly all statistics produced show that Welsh coal was 
superior for naval use.12 Not only did the trials suggest this, but the fact that Welsh coal 
was preferred by almost all foreign navies indicates that the constant trials were a result of 
something more than dissatisfaction with the quality of naval coal from Wales. More 
convincing reasons for the continuing trials are significant commercial pressure and a 
Liberal government looking to cut naval estimates, as well as sound strategic concerns for 
avoiding reliance on one source of coal. The Admiralty was the largest single purchaser of 
steam-coal so it was understandable that the owners of northern collieries were not willing 
to lose business without a fight, and continued to demand trials of their coal against 
Welsh.13 The nature of coal mining itself also provided some reasoning for continual trials. 
New collieries and deeper excavations at existing sites could produce better coal, and it 
was in the Admiralty’s interests to source as much high-quality coal as possible. This 
allowed them to ensure a long-term supply of coal for an ever-expanding fleet and to 
negotiate lower prices for fuel. Finally, the idea of adding the cheaper northern coal to the 
dearer Welsh variety appealed to the Liberal government, which was looking to cut 
Admiralty spending. Thus they preferred what became known as a ‘Baxter’ mixture of 
coals, championed by William Baxter, the Secretary of the Admiralty appointed by 
Gladstone.  
Despite its cost-effectiveness and the pressure from northern collieries, the use of 
such mixtures for the navy was short lived. Complaints from overseas stations about its 
poor efficiency and dirty burning meant that the Admiralty swiftly returned to using Welsh 
coal alone.14 As well as guaranteeing quality, using largely Welsh coal also was also better 
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for the maintenance of ships’ engines, as no furnace existed that could use all types of coal, 
and mixing fuels could damage the mechanisms.15 Although cost was clearly a 
consideration for the Admiralty when selecting coal, it did not usurp suitability as the 
primary criterion, and thus by the 1880s Welsh coal was the sole British coal in use for the 
warships of the Royal Navy under normal circumstances.16  
Of course, coal found across vast areas is not homogenous, and thus not all South 
Wales collieries produced coal that was suitable for naval use. To differentiate those 
collieries deemed to produce coal of a sufficient quality there was an Admiralty List, which 
was in place by the 1840s.17 No official Admiralty List appears to have ever been published, 
but from parliamentary papers, various newspaper articles, and adverts in trade journals, it 
is possible to ascertain that it was more than just a collection of collieries that supplied the 
navy with coal.18 Firstly, not all of the collieries on the list actually supplied much or any 
coal, but were merely recognised as having that capability should the need arise. Secondly, 
it was as much a marketing device for the collieries as it was a useful tool for the Admiralty. 
For a colliery to advertise as being ‘on the Admiralty List’, showed that its coal had been 
deemed of sufficient quality to supply the Royal Navy, the highest accolade possible for a 
steam-coal colliery.19 This could, and did, have huge effects for the success of these 
companies.20 Conversely, the failure of northern collieries to gain significant contracts from 
the navy not only impacted them directly through the lack of Admiralty sales, but also had 
a detrimental effect on commercial sales.21 
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Surviving reports of Admiralty Lists, which are all from the 1880s onwards, confirm 
that Welsh Coal dominated supply to the Royal Navy. For example, records of coal 
purchased in 1887−1889 shows that the majority of Admiralty coal came from the Merthyr 
collieries such as Dowlais, Hood’s, Tyler’s, and Standard. There were other notable 
collieries on the Admiralty List. Powell Duffryn was renowned for the quality of its coal, 
coming top of the coals trialled in 1876, and was on the Admiralty List from that time 
forward.22 Other early collieries which supplied the Admiralty include Ferndale, which was 
used in both foreign and home stations, Cambrian Collieries, and the Glamorgan Coal 
Company.23 Surviving records of naval coal orders also show that the Admiralty List was 
constantly being updated, noting that there were continuing trials of new coals, which, if 
found to be suitable, would be ordered the following year.24 Thus, newer collieries founded 
after 1880, such as Celtic Collieries, North’s colliery, Naval Colliery, and Britannic Merthyr 
were all included on the Admiralty List in 1913.25  
For a colliery to be added to the Admiralty List, its coal had to go through several 
exhausting stages of testing (see Figure 4.1). Although these contained many specific 
measurements, equally important were the remarks of the testers about the suitability of 
the fuel. Firstly, its coal was sent to Portsmouth for burning in a specially constructed 
boiler. From this, engineers assessed its general suitability for naval purposes, and made a 
recommendation to the Engineer-in-Chief as to whether further tests should be undertaken 
with a warship. If found to be satisfactory after further testing with ships in the wider fleet, 
the colliery was added to list. As the Admiralty was constantly trialling new coals, this 
process was carried out on many coals, including mixtures.26 Even so, the list did not grow 
as quickly as might be expected, which is especially significant as it was rare to take 
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collieries off the list unless there was a fall in quality.27 In 1905, there were twenty-four 
Welsh collieries from which the Admiralty obtained coal directly, and a further two from 
which it did so indirectly, yet, despite demand growing, by 1913 only five collieries had 
been added, with thirty-one types of Welsh coal on the Admiralty List.28 This lack of growth 
in collieries on the list not only illustrated how demanding Admiralty standards were, but 
also reflected the fact that colliery ownership was being consolidated, with 80% of steam-
coal produced by twenty collieries by 1900. In fact, the South Wales coal industry, which 
dominated naval supply, was virtually closed to newcomers in the period 1870−1914.29  
 
Figure 4.1: Reports from testing on coals for the navy, 1899. TNA, ADM 116/573. 
 
Despite a huge growth in naval coal use in this period the Admiralty did not deem it 
sensible to purchase collieries itself. This can be explained by several factors. To mine coal 
required considerable initial capital, which would have made any future savings on 
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purchasing coal less significant. Furthermore, collieries were an inherently risky 
investment, and could be immensely costly for little reward if only limited amounts of 
quality coal could be found. By purchasing from multiple collieries, the Admiralty avoided 
this risk, as it could discontinue the supplies from any colliery providing sub-standard coal. 
It is also worth considering that, despite being the largest purchaser of steam-coal, 
Admiralty demands for coal were relatively small, with fuel for the navy representing only 
one-thirtieth of total Welsh production.30 Furthermore, because of its regular demand and 
shipments, the Admiralty could gain discounted rates from many of the collieries. Indeed, 
purchasing from existing collieries held many benefits for the Admiralty, not least that they 
could pass on any significant financial risk to the company, as well as utilise their existing 
infrastructure and expertise.  
The accepted place of Welsh coal as the world’s best for naval use was shown not 
just by its domination of the Admiralty List, but also from how widely it was used outside of 
Britain’s domestic coaling stations, and indeed outside of Europe. Welsh coal could be 
bought at commercial stations as far away as Buenos Aires, Mauritius, and Port Said, as 
well as most stations in between.31 Although commercial lines would often use the cheaper 
local fuel at some of these stations, as cost was more important than clean emissions and 
speed, Welsh coal was the preferred fuel of the majority of the world’s navies. Indeed, it 
was often highlighted during war scares that Wales was providing the coal for the navies of 
France, Russia, and Germany.32 The widespread naval use of Welsh coal was promoted by 
the collieries, and adverts in coal journals of the 1890s show that they were as keen to 
emphasise the use of their coal in foreign navies as they were about being on the Admiralty 
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List. Nixon’s Navigation coal, ‘supplied to the Russian, German, Austrian, Italian, Swedish, 
Dutch and Egyptian governments for royal yachts and special naval purposes’, A. Tylor & 
Co. supplied the Italian government, and Hill’s Plymouth Merthyr was on ‘the English, 
French, Italian, and Spanish Governments’ lists’.33  
Despite the suitability of Welsh coal for naval use, the deterioration of the coal, 
while not as drastic as other varieties, was still a concern, particularly at tropical stations. 
There were therefore attempts by the Admiralty to tackle this problem, in particular 
through the development of patent fuel. Named for the fact it was under patent in the late 
nineteenth century, it was formed by binding together coal fines (which were often Welsh 
in origin) to produce regular briquettes. It was trialled from 1877, and by 1881 was deemed 
to be of sufficient quality to be brought into standard circulation.34 The process was one 
that had been widely used for railways for some time, and its use for naval vessels had 
been established by the French Navy.35 As it was specifically designed to deteriorate more 
slowly than coal, even in the tropical climate of many of Britain’s overseas stations, it was 
much more suitable for long-term storage, even in the open. The use of regular briquettes 
also improved the efficiency of loading fuel, allowed more fuel to be taken on board, and 
was cleaner to work with than standard coal, as it produced far less dust. Furthermore, coal 
too small to be used as steam-coal could be used to make patent fuel, thus making use of 
what was otherwise a waste product.36  
Recognising these potential advantages, the Admiralty pushed to have patent fuel 
widely used in the navy, and it was tested on the West African Station. Multiple different 
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complaints came from many of those who used the fuel, however.37 In particular, there 
were problems with the way the fuel burnt, as it produced large amounts of clinker. More 
seriously, it caused blisters and severe eye irritation to those who worked with it. 
Furthermore, although it did not deteriorate as Welsh coal did in tropical climates, it was 
still seen as producing inferior power even compared with deteriorated coal. Thus, by 1888 
it was largely abandoned. Despite this failure, the potential advantages of an improved 
patent fuel were enough for the Admiralty to continue testing. This persistence brought 
reward, and by the turn of the century the patent fuel mix had been improved 
considerably. Claims that it no longer adversely affected stokers may have been 
overplayed, however, as those handling the fuel were supplied with goggles, Vaseline, and 
gloves to protect their eyes and skin. Production costs made it more expensive than Welsh 
coal, however, and thus figures from the turn of the century show that shipments to naval 
stations were still a fraction of the amount of total patent fuel being exported from South 
Wales.38 As a result, it was produced not to supersede the use of Welsh or other coal, but 
as a reserve fuel at foreign stations, where it could easily be used in war or emergency 
should suitable coal supplies be difficult to come by.39 Thus, those stations at a 
considerable distance from Britain kept between six and nine months’ worth of patent fuel 
in store.40 This fuel was marked with a Broad Arrow pressed into it, to signify it was naval 
property.41 
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Figure 4.2:  Contract for patent fuel for St Paul de Loana (Angola), 1885. TNA, ADM 123/110. 
 
155 
 
With patent fuel restricted to being kept for reserve, there were further attempts 
by owners of northern collieries to gain access South Wales’s monopoly on supply to the 
Royal Navy. Three factors encouraged these collieries to act. Firstly, the price of Welsh 
steam-coal had risen significantly above others in the late nineteenth century. Secondly, 
the passing of the Naval Defence Act at the end of 1889 not only greatly increased ship 
numbers, but also greatly increase steam-coal consumption, and thus the northern colliery 
owners were eager to gain a share of the expanding demand. Finally, although northern 
coal was only used by the navy for stationary and land engines, lines such as P&O and the 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company had begun to use northern coal more habitually on their 
ships to cut fuel costs. As a result of these factors, a delegation of northern coal interests 
was sent to the Admiralty in 1889 to push for more sourcing from their region.42 Despite 
their protestations, however, their appeal was rebutted by the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Lord George Hamilton, who suggested that practical experience had proven that Welsh 
coal alone was the only suitable domestic fuel for the navy. This was due to the ‘special 
duty and work which the Navy is called upon to perform’.43 This point of view reflected 
earlier reports from Admirals on foreign stations. Writing from the Baltic, Admiral Napier 
had commented: ‘Send me out Welsh coal, or I cannot be responsible for the safety of the 
fleet’.44 
Worries about Britain’s overreliance on Welsh coal did, however, lead to continued 
Admiralty experiments with different coals, mixtures of coal, and coal and oil. Despite 
these tests, the Admiralty found no fuel which they considered to be equal to Welsh coal. 
Such conclusions highlight the difference between the fuel needs of the navy and of most 
other steamship companies. By 1905, commercial shipping companies, with the advance of 
engine technology, could use cheaper, lower quality coal to reduce costs, and still reach 
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adequate performance. The Royal Navy, which needed its vessels to always be able to 
perform at optimum levels and with minimum black smoke, did not have this luxury, and 
was therefore largely wedded to Welsh steam-coal. The use of oil was seen as a promising 
alternative, but without a secure supply, it was too unreliable to act as a substitute.45 To 
this end, in 1896, it was stated that ‘oil may be used, perhaps, beneficially in small craft in 
times of peace, but it will be a long time before good Welsh coal is superseded in the 
British navy’.46 By 1903, oil was still only being tested.47 Thus, although there was a general 
decline in the use of Welsh coal at foreign commercial coaling stations, the Admiralty, 
along with liner companies, continued to rely on it beyond the First World War.48   
 
Sourcing Coal for the Navy Abroad 
 
Throughout the period 1870−1914, Welsh coal was widely accepted as the best steam-coal 
in the world and, as a result, it dominated Royal Navy supplies. Wilson asserts that ‘coal 
sent to Foreign Stations [was] almost predominantly Welsh’ in the period up to 1878.49 
Welsh coal did not provide all the overseas stations used by British naval ships, however, 
especially before the 1880s. Indeed, where ‘the hinterland of the station had its own 
deposits of coal with which the station could be supplied’, it was often used by the navy.50 
To varying extents local coal was used abroad, often in mixtures with Welsh or northern 
coal. Indeed, coal existed throughout the empire with reserves existing in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada (particularly in Nova Scotia and Vancouver), South Africa (Natal), Borneo 
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(Labuan), and Bengal.51 Furthermore, countries where the navy habitually coaled, such as 
China and Japan, had their own sources of coal. Not all was suitable for naval use, however 
(see Figure 4.3). In the period before 1880, the Admiralty does not seem to have had an 
overarching coal sourcing strategy at foreign stations. For each individual station the 
Admiralty appeared to rely on the relevant Commander–in-Chief to source and assess local 
coal for naval use. Where coal was deemed to be suitable, such as in Australia, this led to 
the use of local coal alone, and at others, a mixture of local and Welsh or northern coal was 
used. Those stations with wholly unsuitable coal were shipped the same Welsh and 
northern mixture used at home stations.52 At the commercial stations used by warships, 
the navy appears to have used the best coal that was available at the time. This situation 
changed slightly in the 1870s, where a reassessment of the coaling situation led to a short-
lived switch to Australian, rather than British, coal at the China Station. This change was 
merely driven by economy, however, as it was far cheaper to use the adequate coal supply 
from Australia than the more expensive Welsh coal.  
Real change to the sourcing of coal abroad only happened with the growing coal 
consciousness of the 1880s, however, when worries about coal quality came to the fore. 
Just as it had done at home ports, the Admiralty looked to using only high-quality coal on 
foreign stations. Coal from Westport, New Zealand was found to be sufficiently good to 
supply the Royal Navy, but no other was deemed adequate for naval use. Although not 
quite the same quality of Welsh steam-coal, Westport was widely used in Australasia, the 
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, South East Asia, and the Far East. The effect of this was that from 
the middle of the 1880s onwards it is largely possible to divide the foreign stations into two 
groups by the predominant type of coal, Welsh or New Zealand Westport. Thus, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, what existed were two sub-imperial networks of coaling, one 
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centred on Cardiff and the other centred on the coaling infrastructure of New South Wales, 
where the Westport coal was distributed from.  
As a result of the Royal Navy’s reliance on Welsh coal worldwide, worries emerged 
at the turn of the century as to how much steam-coal of sufficient quality remained in 
South Wales.53 In 1903, during the Royal Commission on the Coal Resources of the United 
Kingdom, Sir Gordon Millar, the Director of Navy Contracts, pointed to the limited amount 
of collieries capable of producing coal of a high enough quality to be used by Royal Navy, 
and therefore suggested that ‘the best coal was already becoming exhausted, and that the 
coalfield now had to depend more and more upon its second and its third class seams’.54 
Subsequently the Admiralty increasingly looked to source coal elsewhere, and senior naval 
officers on foreign stations were instructed to not only monitor local coaling, but to alert 
the Admiralty to any suitable fuel for the Royal Navy in the vicinity. That this search was 
ultimately unsuccessful was largely because, as the Admiralty stated in 1903, that 
‘irrespective of expense, [Britain] could not go below the minimum standard of 
requirements special to the Naval Service’.55 As a result, even in 1914 Welsh coal 
dominated coal at naval stations to the extent it was being transported as far as Vancouver, 
some 14,300 nautical miles away.56 
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Station 
Local Coals (non British) 
available 
Remarks Coals used 
Mediterranean 
Heraclea coal − near 
Constantinople 
Used in Crimean war – too 
much sulphur and produces 
a lot of ash 
Solely Welsh at Malta, 
2/3 Welsh, 1/3 North 
Country elsewhere 
Cape Steelpoint valley, Transvaal Too much ash  
East Indies Zanzibar Too much ash  
China 
Labuan 
Contract to supply for 42 
years, but mines flooded and 
in financial difficulties 
2/3 Welsh, 1/3 Takasima 
Takasima 
1882-3 Used in preference of 
Northern or Australian 1/3 to 
2/3 Welsh 
Formosa 
Could be used in 
emergencies 
Australian 
Bulli used until 1876, 1/3 
Newcastle used with 2/3 
Welsh coal 1876-1879 
North America 
Baltimore 
Used 1873-1875, liable to 
self combust At Halifax 2/3 Welsh 1/3 
Pictou. Elsewhere 2/3 
Welsh, 1/3 North 
country 
Pictou 
Used for three years at all 
stations, mixed with 2/3 
Welsh, only used at Halifax 
after 1876 
Pacific Nanaimo No Welsh coal sent for years 
Solely Nanaimo used at 
Esquimalt 
Australia Newcastle/Illawara 
Only station Australian coal 
is used 
Australian 
 
Figure 4.3: Table showing native coals found local to British naval stations, and which coals were actually used 
by the Royal Navy in the years 1882−1883.
 
Data compiled from ‘Steam Vessels at home and abroad 1881-82 
and Steam Vessels at home and abroad 1882-83’, NMM, MLN/163/4 [10] and [11]. The majority of these were 
abandoned in the 1880s. Station divisions are taken from these documents. 
 
Australasian Coal 
 
Even before the Australia Station was founded in 1859, Australasian coal had undergone 
naval trials, some as early as 1847.57 Trials against English and Welsh coal in 1858−59 gave 
underwhelming results, but by 1867 more trials by the War Office had suggested that it 
was equal to the best Newcastle coal. As a result, when the station was founded it was 
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agreed that it was to be self-sufficient in war, unlike most other stations.58 This use in 
Australia was also enough to convince the Liberal government that Australian coal was of 
high enough quality to supply the fleet more generally. Thus in 1873, seeking to reduce 
naval estimates, the Admiralty ceased the expensive export of Welsh and Northern coal to 
China, and replaced it with Australian, which was seen as far superior to the coal available 
in Japan and China. The Admiralty contracted the Australian coaling agents Messrs. Parbury 
Lamb & Co. to supply Australian coal to the China and East India Station to send 11,000 
tons of New South Wales coal on a set timetable.59 The Admiralty justified this action by 
stating that ‘no supplies of fuel have been sent from England for [the Australia Station’s] 
use, and it seems reasonable to infer that coal which would efficiently serve them in 
Australian waters, could also serve them in Chinese and Indian waters’.60 
In order to avoid the criticism of putting economy ahead of all else, the Admiralty 
perhaps intentionally overstated the quality of Australian coal. Indeed, coal sourced from 
Australia was not without its problems. Newcastle, in New South Wales (NSW), emerged as 
the main coaling port, but its local coal was dirty, and burnt too quickly and at too high a 
temperature for naval use. Its main local rival was coal from south of Sydney, known as 
Wollongong, Bulli, or Illawara, which to an extent resembled the coal of South Wales, being 
slow and cleaner burning. Although it was used by the American and Australasian Company 
for its Sydney to San Francisco non-stop services, it did not burn at a high enough 
temperature to produce the requisite power for ships to attain high speeds, a necessity for 
a naval ship. As a result of this flaw, some steamship companies, such as P&O and the 
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Australasian Steam Navigation Company, avoided southern Australian coal, and instead use 
Newcastle NSW coal mixed with Welsh. 
For as long as Australia remained a fairly unimportant station, distant as it was 
from Britain and potential danger, the lower quality of the coals received little attention. 
After 1873, however, the quality of Australian coal became an important issue, as it then 
affected the performance of the fleet of the China Station. Not only was this one of the 
most important fleets strategically, but ships there also had to deal with the difficult 
conditions caused by the annual monsoon. Complaints about the change from Welsh to 
Australian coal were instantaneous, and the Newcastle coal sent in the first shipment to 
the China Station came in for particular criticism. Consumption was reported to be a third 
higher than Welsh, it coked the ships’ tubes with soot, and deteriorated badly in storage.61 
Perhaps because of these complaints, later shipments were not of Newcastle coal, but of 
Bulli and Wollongong, from the south of Sydney, which the Admiralty insisted was far 
superior.62 Despite this change, complaints continued from the China Station, and the 
Admiralty eventually conceded that a mixture between a high-power and a slow-burning 
coal would be preferable to the existing arrangement. The two coals were combined in a 
one third northern-NSW to two thirds southern-NSW ratio, in the hope that it would 
combine the qualities of the two types to make an adequate naval fuel.  The instructions 
sent with the coal as to what mixture was preferable were confused, however, and results 
proved unsatisfactory.63  
The Admiralty eventually admitted that Australian coal was significantly inferior to 
Welsh. In view of the difficulty of supplying Welsh coal to the station in war, however, 
there appeared to be little option for the China Station but to use Australian coal, as 
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indigenous coal had proven unsatisfactory.64 Indeed, despite exhaustive trials no other 
local coal had been found that could compare even to Australian coal. Japanese coal was 
deemed not suitable for export to Chinese or Indian stations, and Chinese coal was seen as 
even more inferior, while the Indian coal industry was underdeveloped.65 Similarly, Victoria 
and New Zealand were not producing enough quality coal to be considered for naval use.66  
By 1876, after three years of complaints, the coal situation on the China Station 
was considered so unsatisfactory that the Admiralty returned to shipping Welsh coal to the 
China Station despite reservations about its availability in war. This was mixed with that of 
Newcastle NSW in a ratio of two to one. The complex logistics and expense were 
prohibitive to this being a permanent solution, however, and thus trials of both Australian 
and Asian coal continued.67 These tests identified coal of increasing quality from the mines 
of Borneo and Japan, which was used on local stations instead of the much maligned 
Australian coal.68 General dissatisfaction continued though, and in Manila, for example, the 
navy made arrangements with the Spanish navy to use their Welsh coal, rather than use 
the Australian coal stored there.69    
It only was in 1882, with the discovery of the steaming qualities of Westport coal 
from the north of New Zealand’s south island, that a coal with the necessary naval qualities 
was available from the region. This coal appears to have been introduced into naval usage 
in 1883 and the coal was widely celebrated as equal to the best Welsh, such was its 
quality.70 A Royal Commission in 1903 stated: ‘except for the New Zealand coal I do not 
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think we have heard of any coal that answers our requirements. Australian coal is used on 
the Australia Station, but is not so suitable as Welsh and New Zealand coals’.71 The use of 
Westport coal was crucial to the ability of warships to perform at peak levels, and after it 
escaped a cyclone in Samoa, the captain of H.M.S. Calliope, in a letter to the Admiralty, 
praised the fuel for its integral part in avoiding the tragedy. He stated that ‘we were 
fortunate in having Westport coal; it burnt splendidly, and reduced the labour of stoking to 
a minimum. I do not think that we could have kept steam enough to go out with any other 
coal which we have used on the Australia Station’.72 The proven quality of Westport coal 
meant that by 1898 regular shipments, often transported by the Union Steam Ship 
Company of New Zealand, were being made to Sydney, Hobart, and, presumably, to the 
other Australian Naval stations.73 It was also supplying the China Station with coal.74  
Towards the turn of the century there began to be intermittent concerns about the 
quality of the Westport coal sent to the China Station, however.75 In response, the 
Admiralty reassured the Commander-in-Chief that although Westport coal had never been 
as highly prized as Welsh, it was still exceedingly likely that an enemy’s coal would be 
‘decidedly inferior to that which would be at the disposal of [the China] Squadron’. 
Although this was undoubtedly true, the Admiralty had little choice in war. Indeed, the NID 
concluded that it would be impossible to send Welsh coal to China in war, and thus 
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Westport represented the best coal available.76 Thus, it was wed to Westport coal for the 
supply of the Australian and China Stations. Furthermore, the Admiralty needed to relieve 
stress on Cardiff in war, in order to allow it to serve nearer stations effectively. Stockpiling 
Welsh coal was not an option either, as there was not enough space to keep enough coal 
for a war and, even if there was, it would deteriorate.77  
Although the quality of some individual deliveries of coal was questioned, by the 
late nineteenth century it was widely accepted that Westport and Welsh coal were the two 
most suitable fuels for naval use. In 1900, the Secretary to the Admiralty, William Ellison-
Macartney, clarified that ‘although Australian coal is being used by Her Majesty's ships in 
Australian waters for ordinary passages, reports from that station describe it as unsuitable 
for continuous steaming at high speeds’.78 Despite this, high coal prices at the turn of the 
century led to a serious reassessment of coal supply for the navy in Chinese and 
Australasian waters, which precipitated further trials of local coals on the Australia Station. 
The Admiralty also began considering offers for Australian coal ‘which approximate more 
closely to present prices, owing to the high rates now prevailing both for Welsh coal and 
freight from England’.79 In 1900, the Agent General of New South Wales attempted to 
secure an Admiralty contract to stock all stations east of Suez with Australian coal, but to 
no avail.80 Concerns continued to grow, however, as it became clear that the price situation 
was not short term. Indeed, it had still not improved by 1909, when the coal bill had been 
increased by £284,000 in just one year due to price inflation.81 Encouraged by the fact that 
the American Navy had used use Australian coal during the Spanish–American War of 1898, 
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and had in 1908 taken an order for Queensland coal for its naval base at Manila, the 
Admiralty stepped up attempts to find an alternative Australasian coal.82 There were 
numerous tests, both in Australia and in Britain, but despite concerted efforts to find a 
suitable naval coal in Australia, none was found that came close to equalling the suitability 
of Westport coal for naval use.83 Much of the complaints about the trialled Australian coal 
were that it did not produce enough power and produced too much ash. More concerning 
were suggestions that its use corroded pipes, and was not usable in some naval vessels, 
such as the cruiser H.M.A.S. Encounter. As a result of these factors, no Australian coal 
obtained a naval fuel contract from the Admiralty.84 The last pre-1914 use of Australian 
coal on record appears to be in 1893, the when the flagship of the Australia Station, H.M.S. 
Orlando, was using coal from the Metropolitan Company, but by this point the use of 
Australian coal was declining, and this was an exception.85 Indeed, trials had confirmed 
once more to the Admiralty that although Australian coal was adequate for the needs of 
commercial shipping, it was unsuitable for the warships of the Royal Navy. Thus, in 1913 
Westport was practically the only coal used by Royal Navy warships other than Welsh. It 
was only when war broke out that H.M.A.S. Melbourne, a light cruiser, took on 500 tons of 
coal from Newcastle Coal Limited, but even this seems to have been an anomaly.86  
Although the Australia Station relied on Westport coal, Welsh coal still dominated 
the Royal Navy’s fuel supply (see Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5). As late as 1903, 1,000,000 tons 
of Welsh coal was sent to foreign stations and only 100,000 tons from other collieries, 
mostly from Westport. This dominance does not seem to have been a question of quality 
because, as the Agent General for New Zealand, W.P. Reeves, suggested, tests had shown 
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Westport coal to be suitable naval fuel, being nearly as smokeless as Welsh, and was equal 
to it at generating steam. Instead, much of this lay in the quality of export infrastructure. 
Whereas the port facilities of South Wales were world leading, Westport harbour had been 
slow to develop, being for a long time only able to allow only small vessels inside, which 
had not only limited supply, but also created high prices. By 1900, however, several 
hundred thousand pounds had been spent on harbour improvements, on the designs of Sir 
John Coode. The port was therefore bigger, making the price of its high-grade steam-coal 
cheaper then Cardiff.87 Not only was it of extremely high quality, but also plentiful enough 
that by 1900 it was declared that would be enough in war to supply both the Australian and 
Chinese stations.88 When assessing relative export figures, it must also be remembered that 
Welsh coal had been well established as the best steam-coal for over thirty years before 
Westport had been discovered, and was also closer to the major fleets of the Royal Navy, 
whereas Westport coal supplied relatively small fleets. 
 
Figure 4.4: Total coal exported to British naval stations, 1891−1904. Data from: British Parliamentary Papers, 
1904 [Cd. 1991], Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Second report of the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. 
Vol. II. Minutes of evidence and appendices, 143-155. 
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Figure 4.5: Actual consumption by H.M. ships, 1891−1904. Data from British Parliamentary Papers, 1904 [Cd. 
1991], Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Second report of the Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Vol. II. 
Minutes of evidence and appendices, 143-155. 
 
At the turn of the century, the use of Westport coal was increasing, and Hong Kong 
in particular was using considerable stocks from New Zealand.89 This was largely because 
naval coal consumption was increasing more generally due to a greater number of ships, 
more fleet movements, and increased power in naval engines. These factors meant that 
Westport had to take its share of the growing demand, and coal exported for naval use 
rose from 450,000 tons in 1893-4, to 710,000 in 1898-9, and to over 1,000,000 in 1900. In 
1903 it was estimated consumption would reach 1,250,000 tons. Although the dominance 
of Welsh and Westport coal was challenged in the commercial sector at the turn of the 
century by the emergence of German, Japanese, Indian, and Chinese coal, none appear to 
have been used as a fuel on its own for the navy, and only Japanese appears to have been 
used regularly, in mixture.90 An anecdote from Edward Charrington, a midshipman, at the 
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turn of the century illustrates this: ‘the authorities were very keen to sell us Formosa coal, 
which is very poor stuff and makes dense smoke. We declined!’91 At the turn of the 
century, Westport's output was greater than ever, and it was being used in Ceylon, Fiji, 
Hong Kong, India, Mauritius, Mozambique, China, North and South America, and various 
Pacific Islands.92 The dominance of Westport coal in Australia is further shown by the fact 
that although South Wales was exporting some 14.4 million tons of steam and bituminous 
coal for naval use in 1903, only 7,366 tons was sent to Australia.93 It is important to note 
that this dominance refers to fuel for the warships of the navy, and figures reveal that a 
large amount of local coal, usually Japanese and Australian, were used on stations, 
presumably for auxiliary purposes.94 
There was also an increasing demand on this infrastructure, and at the turn of the 
century three-fifths of total output of Westport coal was set aside for the navy. Some 
68,000 tons was being shipped to the China Station annually, and by 1903, the large growth 
over the previous two years necessitated more storage to be built at Sydney, which 
remained the centre of the coaling network. Such was the importance of Westport coal to 
the China and East Indies stations, as well as the Cape and Australia, that it increased the 
importance of Australia Station itself, and the need to protect coaling ships became part of 
the argument for an Australian force naval force. Westport coal would be indispensable in 
war, where exports were expected to increase tenfold, with the rest made up by inferior 
Australian coal.95 
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 Journal kept by Edward Charrington, 1899-1902, Royal Naval Museum, Manuscript Collection, 
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Contracts 
 
Coal supply contracts were originally arranged and supervised by the Storekeeper General 
of the Navy, but this was later transferred to the Director of Naval Contracts after the 
Admiralty reforms under Hugh Childers in 1868.96 In 1896, responsibility for coal purchase 
came under the auspices of the Superintendent of Contracts as part of the new Purchase 
Department. Although theoretical control remained in London, supervision of the exports 
of coal, which were arranged by agents, was carried out by a naval captain and his deputy 
stationed in the Admiralty office in Cardiff, the main coal export port (see Figure 4.6). 
Further supervision was provided by the Admiralty buyer of coals, who, once an agreement 
had been made, assessed whether the coal was fit for purpose.97   
 
 
Figure 4.6: Tons of coal exported from selected British Ports 1873−1895. Compiled from British Parliamentary 
Papers, Coals, cinders, &c. An account of the quantities of coals, cinders, and patent fuel, shipped coastways 
from the ports of England, Scotland, and Ireland severally; of the quantities exported. 
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In the 1870s contracts to buy coal were generally arranged in March due to the 
financial year, but no agreements were made for a price should the Admiralty need coal in 
an emergency. To lower the risk of emergency purchases, the Admiralty bought reserves of 
coal, which it kept at Portland under cover. To avoid the problem of deterioration, it was 
used within a twelve-month period. These contracts varied, sometimes being for one-off 
deliveries, and sometimes for regular deliveries over two or three years.98 It was more 
usual to have annual contracts, which stipulated multiple deliveries to the station in 
question, however.99 In the period after 1870, collieries attempted to manage the risk of 
price and demand fluctuations by increasing the amount of coal sold on contract, rather 
than on the open market − something they were largely successful in doing.100 It was only 
at the turn of the century that there were more deliberate steps towards the 
standardisation of contracts, though, both from the Cardiff coal export trade and the 
Admiralty. As part of this, in 1896 the Chamber of Shipping in Cardiff produced a Welsh 
Coal Charter. This was a document drawn up specifically for the South Wales coal trade, 
which standardised the contracts for coal export. This appears to be the first printed 
charter, which suggests that those involved in the coal export trade as a whole were 
creating a more homogenised system.101  
Soon after, the Admiralty began to consider making its own coaling arrangements 
more regularised. This culminated on 27 August 1900, when it called a conference to 
discuss arrangements for the placing of Admiralty contracts for coal. The immediate cause, 
according to the Cardiff correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, was Britain’s overseas 
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coaling stations being ‘in short supply’. This was something that had been rumoured by 
those ‘in well informed coal circles’, presumably as a result of the major strike of 1898.102 It 
was, however, also part of a general shift towards the standardised and regular coal 
contracts, which before this point appear to have been arranged on a more ad hoc basis.103 
It was proposed that the procedure for arranging coaling contracts should be standardised 
by inviting all tenders for coaling contracts in the autumn for the year ahead. These tenders 
would be for the supply of coal for all ordinary circumstances, with all other coal supplied 
under what was termed emergency conditions. Such an arrangement, it was argued, would 
allow the Admiralty to avoid fluctuations in coal prices. If implemented, collieries would 
know the requirements for twelve months with advance warning, and could thus make 
arrangements accordingly, as was the case with the majority of their exports, allowing the 
Admiralty to negotiate a lower price. Furthermore, fixing annual contracts for non-
emergency coal supply brought the Admiralty into line with ‘the practice of all other large 
consumers’.104 This was especially important, as the coal industry was particularly 
susceptible to variations in price.  
The conference, held at the Cardiff Chamber of Commerce, was attended by the 
Admiralty’s Cardiff representatives, as well as the colliery owners and managers and the 
London-based Naval Lord of the Admiralty, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, and Director of 
Naval Contracts. While these prominent figures attended the conference in 1900, this was 
a reflection of the importance of the subject of the meeting, rather than an indication of 
how negotiations for contracts usually worked. The conference gave rise to a structured 
method of arranging naval coaling contracts. The Admiralty invited tenders in November, in 
both the domestic and the colonial press, for coal under ordinary conditions, and also for 
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the possible supply in an emergency, for a total of 1,000,000 tons.105 The system still seems 
to have been fairly flexible, however. In 1903 the Admiralty invited exceptional tenders for 
1,000,000 tons of steam-coal for last four months of the year, to send to Gibraltar, Malta, 
and other stations, and then in November signed agreements with twenty Welsh collieries 
for a further 500,000 tons of coal.106  
Throughout the period 1870−1914, Admiralty contracts were arranged by tender. 
In general, the Admiralty advertised for tenders in the press, and later in the Cardiff Coal 
Exchange, or by circular letters. No documentation appears to exist for these tenders and 
agreements at any station, except for St John’s, Newfoundland in 1906. With warships sent 
to protecting the fisheries, coal was needed at this naval station, and thus all the 
documentation used in the tendering process survives with this correspondence (see Figure 
4.7).107 It is therefore possible to sketch out how the tendering process worked, at least in 
1906. After the advertisements were released in the local press, agents could apply for 
forms from the Admiralty. Included with this form was the Admiralty List, showing which 
collieries were approved to supply the Royal Navy, and therefore which coals could be 
included in tenders. The agents would then send sealed tenders to the senior naval officer 
of the relevant station, who would decide on the best offer. The officer would then send 
the proposal, along with the reasoning for the decisions made, on another form, 
presumably to the Admiralty in London. Once the agreement was made, the successful 
agent would report monthly to the Commander-in Chief of the station to inform them of 
deliveries and amounts of coal in stock.108  
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Figure 4.7: Coal tendering form, 1906. TNA, ADM 128/146. 
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The Admiralty used ‘Free on Board’ contracts along with the majority of major 
steam-coal buyers such as the major liner companies. This meant that colliery companies 
were responsible for all processes up to and including delivering the coal on board the 
cargo ship. They were, therefore, accountable for the costs of transporting the coal from 
the colliery to the docks, in addition to the loading and handling fees incurred at the port, 
but nothing else. The Admiralty was then liable for arranging the ships in which the cargo 
was to be carried and all other costs incurred in transporting the shipment from the port of 
loading to the port of delivery. As with the vast majority of the process, this was left in the 
hands of the Cardiff agents employed by the Admiralty. These were therefore employed in 
securing coal deliveries, arranging the loading at the port, and the shipping to the final 
destination, using the established links between collieries, shipowners, and depot owners. 
Agents were even responsible for using Admiralty funds to purchase the coals. Once 
shipping had been arranged, the agents were then required to telegraph timings to both 
the Commander-in-Chief and the coaling officers of the relevant station.109 There was some 
Admiralty involvement, however. Inspectors based in Cardiff verified the quality of the coal 
on shipment, and the agents were expected to ‘generally keep the Department advised on 
all points touching freights, prices, and shipment of coal, and kindred subjects connected 
with this business’.110 While in general this was regulation work for these agents, the 
occasional need for coal at short notice could cause difficulties, as ‘several would have to 
be surveyed before a vessel could be found suitable for fleet purposes’.111 The Admiralty 
relied on the expertise of the agents to negotiate these difficulties, and to deliver efficiency 
and value even during war or strikes. Thus, very much like the Victualling Board of the age 
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of sail, the Admiralty relied on complex merchant networks to supply navy with fuel in the 
age of steam.112 
In general, the agents employed by the Admiralty in Cardiff endeavoured to buy 
direct from colliery agents, face to face, rather than through middlemen.113 These colliery 
agents were often not directly associated with the collieries themselves, but were 
independent companies, and often acted on behalf of several collieries. For example, D.R. 
Llewellyn, Merrett and Price Ltd acted as a sales agency for the Cwmaman, Graigola, 
Ynisarwed, Ynysfiao, Aberpergwm, Llwynhelig, Windber, Blaengwawr, and Dyllus collieries 
as well as several others.114 The other most prominent colliery agents by the turn of the 
century were Thomas and Davey Ltd, L. Gueret and Co., and Messrs. Lysberg Limited.115 Not 
all collieries used agents, though, and increasingly some, such as Powell Duffryn, 
negotiated contracts though their own commercial or sales departments.116  
In comparing surviving naval coaling contracts with the standard contracts for coal, 
it is particularly noticeable that naval contracts put more expense and risk on the agent. As 
the Admiralty’s reliance on its agents has been well established, this is hardly surprising. 
The contracts were also simpler, and merely demanded that the contractor had a depot at 
the desired location which would be kept fully stocked with coal from the Admiralty List. 
Unlike commercial contracts, it does not specify the precise type of coal to be supplied, 
reflecting the Admiralty’s faith in the agents they employed.117 
Contracts arranged with colliery agents or sales departments only ensured the 
supply of coal and its delivery to domestic naval stations or to the docks of South Wales for 
export, and not the multitude of other processes involved in shipping the coal to a foreign 
depot. Thus, as well as colliers being invited to apply for Admiralty contracts, the navy also 
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invited applications from shipping companies, at least for some shipments abroad. These 
coal ships were mostly chartered, and engaged by the Admiralty’s agents.118 Although there 
was a growing connection between shipbrokers and coal factors, the businesses of coal and 
shipping were generally distinct, and after 1880s shipowners often chartered vessels but 
rarely got involved in trade themselves.119 As a result, agents were required to engage in 
contracts with several different companies.  
Based on the records of Cory’s, these Admiralty contracts appear to have been 
tendered for on a quarterly basis between 1890 and 1914, and were usually for about 
45,000 tons of coal, which was to be delivered at a specified monthly rate. As well as 
standard deliveries, on occasion contracts would be agreed for ‘emergency supplies’. 
Precise figures are again difficult to obtain as Admiralty contracts were comparatively small 
compared to those with other customers − European and South American railways and 
governments, whose orders of between 1.5 million and 2 million tons per year, dwarfed 
those of the navy. Similarly, where the navy coaled at foreign bunkers for commercial 
shipping, agents working on behalf of the Admiralty had to arrange for suitable coal to be 
available. This was done with contracts arranged through parties based in Britain, who 
acted on behalf of the depot owners, although increasingly many depot owners had British 
offices.120 
Even though the Admiralty did not use middlemen, the sourcing and movement of 
naval coal was often complicated by the number of different bodies involved, as 
agreements had to be reached with colliery agents, shippers, and bunker owners. To 
confuse matters further, due to the huge amount of coal required by the Admiralty, as well 
as the multitude of destinations that it needed to be sent to, naval coal was often 
purchased from several collieries in one year, and thus coal supply could involve several 
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companies.121 There were, however, existing arrangements in place between some of these 
bodies. In fact, especially after 1900, there was a growing amount of amalgamation 
between companies involved in all aspects of the coal export trade.122 For instance, 
collieries often had established links with shipowning firms to export their coal abroad.123 
Some of the coal export companies also owned many of the depots they shipped to. By the 
turn of the century Lambert Brothers was one of largest, and owned coal depots in Port 
Said, Gibraltar, Suez, Perim, Huelva, Fayal, Las Palmas, and Barbados, all of which were 
used by the Royal Navy.124 Cory’s, another major export company, had 118 agencies and 
depots supplying coal on all major shipping routes by 1908.125 There are also some cases of 
colliery companies owning their own ships for export. Ocean Company, for instance, 
merged with Wilson’s coal shippers and foreign depot owners in 1908, allowing them to 
control as much of the process as possible, so-called vertical integration. Harrison’s, in 
1906, went a step further, by combining coal mining, shipping, and coal exportation.126  
The coal export business relied almost entirely on tramp ships, with no fixed route, 
but went wherever the charterer wished.127 As coal was a low-value, bulk cargo, it was 
generally exported as part of wider trade patterns to bring greater profit, whether in 
Europe or further afield. With no great import trade to Cardiff, shipping agents looked to 
subsidise the cost of exporting coal by involving the ships in wider trade movements.128 
There were two major trade patterns for Cardiff tramp-steamers, described as coal out, 
grain home routes, which the Admiralty agents could utilise for naval coal. The first took 
Welsh coal to the Mediterranean, either to naval bunkers or for the use of foreign railways, 
and then returned from the Black Sea ports with grain. The second pattern was to send 
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coal out to South America’s east coast to ports in Brazil, Uruguay, or Argentina, and which 
would then return with Argentinian grain. Other routes were subsidised by alternative 
cargoes: coal to Aden or Perim may have returned with Indian rice; exports to the 
Caribbean could return with copper ore from Cuba, or cotton or timber from the US gulf 
ports; and North American exports could return with general cargo from US east coast 
ports.129 Welsh export companies rarely owned depots any further afield than the Red Sea 
and Caribbean, as beyond these stations Welsh coal could not compete with more local 
coal. The navy still required high-quality Welsh coal further afield, however (see Figure 
4.8).130 In the case of these stations, therefore, the ability to subsidise the cost of coal 
exportation was especially important. Thus, coal ships sent to the west coast of North 
America again returned with grain, and those sent to western South America returned with 
nitrates.131 Although at the end of the century there was a general decline of the export of 
Welsh coal to eastern Asia due to competition from local coals, such as that from India, 
China, and Japan, the need for best-quality steam-coal meant that this was not the case for 
the Admiralty, or steam packet and liner companies.132 In fact, increased demand due to 
more powerful steamships probably meant that exports for these purposes actually 
increased.  
Somewhat ironically, even in the twentieth century, the coal for most naval stations 
was shipped by sail, as it was cheaper and speed was less important for low-value trade.133 
The government stated in 1896 that ‘for cheapness it is desirable to send it in sailing 
vessels’, even if, in extreme cases, it had to use foreign ships if no British ones were 
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available.134 Even as late as 1901, sailing ships were habitually used to send coal to naval 
stores at to Esquimalt, Coquimbo, South Africa, and Trincomalee.135  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Map showing coal markets in 1903. The area within the dashed lines indicates where Great Britain 
held a virtual monopoly for export. Even though it was usually cheaper to buy local coal outside this area, the 
Admiralty still shipped Welsh coal throughout the world. Taken from D.A Thomas, The Growth and Direction of 
Our Foreign Trade in Coal During the Last Half Century (London: Royal Statistical Society), 1903, 490. 
 
Contracts Abroad 
 
Although the Admiralty theoretically oversaw naval coaling worldwide, in reality it left 
much of the responsibility for coaling infrastructure in the hands of agents it employed, as 
has already been described, and this was even more pronounced abroad. As was the case 
in South Wales, in Australasia − where a largely separate coaling network existed − these 
agents employed by the Admiralty were responsible for the majority of tasks involved in 
both buying coal and transporting it to the various stations. Again, they were obliged to 
send documentation, including the bills of loading, charter party and advice of shipment, to 
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both the Australia Station and the superintendent of contracts of the Admiralty in London. 
They would also liaise with those responsible for coaling at each station to arrange 
shipments.136 Although the agents were chosen and employed from London, it seems 
highly likely that the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station had a large say in their 
appointment.  
As with the contracts for Welsh coal, contracts for supplying Australia, New 
Zealand, and Fiji’s naval coaling stations were by tender, invitations for which were printed 
in the Sydney Morning Herald (See Figure 4.9).137 The applications were submitted to the 
naval depot at Sydney, but before 1911 it is unclear whether the Commander-in-Chief or 
the Admiralty in London decided which tender offered the best option in terms of quality 
and price. It does seem, however, that naval officials in Australia were responsible for 
overseeing the monthly shipments.138 After 1911, the Australian Commonwealth Naval 
Board, the governing authority over the newly formed Royal Australian Navy, invited 
tenders for naval coal contracts.139 These were presumably then managed by the Director 
of Naval Contracts, based in Melbourne.140 Conversely, the contract for Westport coal to 
Hong Kong was negotiated by the London-based agents Messrs. Weddell, Turner and Co.141 
The switch to mainly Westport coal in the 1880s seems to have affected little in the way 
that the Australian coaling network functioned, however, with the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Australia Station being based in Sydney, and remaining as overseer of the naval coaling 
infrastructure. 
                                                                    
136
 Those responsible differed from station to station. On the China Station, for instance, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Shanghai had naval representatives, but Nagasaki and Hiogo were represented by 
agents. See Letter from Admiralty to Australia Station 10 January 1873, TNA, ADM 122/22. 
137
 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1887. They also appear in Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 
1883; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1879; Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1881. 
138 Letter from Admiralty to China Station, 6 December 1901, TNA, ADM 125/56. 
139 Rockhampton Morning Bulletin (Queensland), 19 September 1913. 
140 Brisbane Courier, 13 July 1914. 
141 Adelaide Advertiser, 6 May 1903. 
181 
 
  
Figure 4.9: Advert for tenders for coaling contracts for the Australasian Stations. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 
February 1887. 
 
The shipping of Australasian coal to naval stations and those commercial stations 
used by the navy again utilised commercial coal trade networks. With so few stations in the 
Pacific, and only Esquimalt along the entire western seaboard of North and South America, 
commercial stations were especially important to the Royal Navy in these waters, and thus 
existing trades, with coal as the return cargo, were integrated with the shipping of naval 
coal. The need for coal worldwide for commercial purposes before 1870 had led to the 
development of a Pacific coal trade centred on Australia. This took coal as far as the 
western coasts of North and South America as part of a triangular trade. Taking general 
cargo to Australia, ships then took coal from Newcastle NSW to South America, where they 
took copper ore, nitrates and guano back to Britain, or to California, where they returned 
with grain. Aided by prevailing winds and currents, as well low cargo rates, the coal was 
transported as ‘backhaul’ in wooden ships. This trade was slow to develop, but expanded 
massively after 1860, and Australian coal became the dominant supplier to key mercantile 
coaling stations such as Valparaiso and San Francisco. It also supplied coal for commercial 
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steamships to Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as Pacific Islands. This trade further 
expanded after 1880, with decreasing freight rates, large iron sail ships designed with 
increased carrying capacity, and improvements in the docking infrastructure in Newcastle. 
The dominance of Newcastle as a coaling port for Australasia, South Eastern Asia, and the 
western seaboard of the American continent led to it was such that it earned the nickname 
‘Coalopolis’. It was the busiest port in Australia, and by the 1880s it was the largest coal 
exporting city in the southern hemisphere.142 Although the Royal Navy did not ordinarily 
use Australian coal in normal circumstances after 1882, it seems likely that the Admiralty 
continued to utilise the superior shipping facilities of Australia. Although evidence exists of 
Westport coal being transported to Australian ports, it is not well documented how 
Westport coal was sent further afield − for instance to the China Station − although it is 
highly likely that it utilised the infrastructure centred on Newcastle.143  
 
At the Station 
 
Irrespective of where the coal was sourced from, the navy had to utilise the communication 
infrastructure that existed between the foreign stations and the Admiralty in order to 
ensure an adequate supply of quality coal worldwide. It was imperative that this 
communication was effective so that foreign stations had enough coal to support the navy 
whatever the situation, but not having vast quantities of expensive coal deteriorating in 
storage. Understanding how this part of the coaling infrastructure worked at an individual 
station level is difficult, however. Import statistics for naval coal to overseas stations are 
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rare, incomplete, and inconsistent, making long-term analysis unfeasible. It is possible, 
however, to assess the steps taken by the Admiralty to improve the efficiency of coaling 
infrastructure. This was achieved through better accuracy in coal estimates for each 
station, and, by collecting large amounts of data, creating a knowledge of foreign stations 
used by naval ships. Such processes were inherently prone to miscalculations, however, 
and even with extensive and detailed communications, fluctuations in supply and stocks at 
stations occurred throughout the period.  
The supply situation at an individual level is complicated by the navy using three 
distinct types of coaling stations: those which were overseen by naval personnel, those 
which the navy had commercial contracts for coal and/or agents at, and those stations 
where naval ships bought from the open market. Those stations overseen by naval 
personnel were predominantly naval stations, such as Gibraltar, Malta, or Singapore, but 
also included major colonial port cities not listed under Admiralty coaling stations, such as 
Sydney and Melbourne.144 Stations where the Admiralty employed commercial agents or 
held contracts for supply were generally foreign commercial ports, often, but not 
exclusively, owned by allies. These included ports such as Shanghai and Madeira. Ships’ 
captains appear to have largely been allowed free rein on where they coaled, but coaling at 
the third type of station, where no contracts stood, was discouraged. Despite this policy, a 
memorandum had to be sent in 1882 urging the cessation of this practice, following a spate 
of coal purchases at high rates.145 This request seems understandable, especially when 
considering that there were over thirty commercial stations, in addition to those owned by 
the Admiralty, where agreements for coals existed.146 Furthermore, in response, the 
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Admiralty sought to extend the amount of individual arrangements it made with local 
agents for export, thus reducing the need for expensive purchases on the open market.147  
Records which show how much coal was sent to each station, and how these 
quantities were estimated and subsequently ordered, are patchy if they exist at all. In the 
period immediately prior to this study, from 1855 to 1870, parliamentary papers detail the 
amount of coal purchased by a selection of foreign depots, and specify how the contracts 
were arranged. From these it appears that in the early years of the steam navy, the 1850s 
and 1860s, there was no overall system for the contracts of foreign stations. Coal was 
ordered either by public tender, through commissioned agents, casual offers, private 
agreements or, if sufficient coal was nearby, local contracts. Larger stations, such as 
Gibraltar, Singapore, and Jamaica used several different methods at once. Aside from the 
large amounts of coal delivered to the Mediterranean and Black Sea during the Crimean 
war, several stations stand out as prime consumers of coal. These stations are hardly 
surprising, being the main naval stations worldwide, including Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, 
Cape, and Jamaica.148  
These station reports come to an abrupt halt in 1871, however, where they were 
replaced by reports of the type and consumption of coal of individual ships.149 As a result of 
this change, there is a lack of official documentation on how coal shipments were arranged 
beyond this date. Where official statistics from other government departments do exist, 
they are too ambiguous to be of much use. These often fail to differentiate between the 
types of coal exported, the specific export destination, or the purpose for which the coal 
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was to be used.150 To compound this, by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Admiralty no longer published how much coal in total it was using, stating it was not ‘in the 
public interest to make a statement as to the amount of coal actually consumed by the 
Navy’.151 Even where figures for individual stations exist, they are not separated from 
commercial coal imports, and as naval coaling imports are in general dwarfed by 
commercial imports, these can tell us little. The only figures that do give meaningful insight, 
therefore, are those that deal with imports of solely steam-coal to ports which only catered 
for naval ships. These only appear to exist in the South Wales Coal Annuals, which began in 
1903. Even with these figures, however, it is difficult to get an overall picture of the scale of 
naval coaling. The only large naval coaling station that was not also primarily a commercial 
coaling station was Gibraltar, which was importing some 221,450 tons of steam and 
bituminous coal in 1903. None of the other purely naval stations, such as Halifax, 
Esquimalt, Ascension, Simon’s Town, and Bermuda imported more than 20,000 tons that 
year, compared to the largest commercial stations which imported several hundred 
thousand tons. Thus is it difficult to assert much from these figures, other than that 
Admiralty coal use was dwarfed by that of the commercial sector.152 
A lack of comparable figures also prevents any meaningful insight into changes in 
supply over time. This greatly impedes analysis of the relative importance of stations and 
how coal supply were affected by wars and political tension, but does not inhibit a useful 
study of this infrastructure. In fact, what was remarkable about the supply of coal to naval 
stations across the world was often not the amount of coal being transported, but the 
distances covered to ensure that quality fuel was available in far-flung corners of the 
oceans. For the Admiralty, naval coal supply was a question of quality, not convenience.  
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Although the estimates themselves no longer exist, it is pertinent to assess how the 
Admiralty attempted to approximate how much coal was needed for the Navy as a whole, 
and at each station. In the early years of the steam navy Admiral Milne attempted to use 
complex calculations to assess future coal usage, but these produced figures that have now 
come to be seen as overestimates.153 Of course, experience produced a level of accuracy in 
approximating the amount of coal needed, but with the expansion of the steam navy more 
systematic methods were introduced. In 1872, the Admiralty announced that marks be put 
on bunkers and storehouses to ensure the maintenance of adequate supplies at stations.154 
Such measures have led Wilson to suggest that ‘by the late 1870s progress had been made 
in regulating coal supplies. A regular plan existed for supply, supply contracts, and monthly 
and annual returns from foreign stations to monitor the coal supply system’.155 However, 
while it is true that the effects of coal consciousness had begun to improve the efficiency 
and accuracy of supply, contract negotiations and supply in the 1870s appear to have been 
largely ad hoc responses to necessity rather than a measured, regular system of supply.  
Estimating coal usage was particularly difficult due to uncertain amounts of ship 
use, different patrol patterns for squadrons, and how much coal was already in store.156 As 
well as estimates of tonnage, the Commander-in-Chief also had to provide costs for the 
purchase and maintenance of coaling craft, as well as the labour for the receiving and 
issuing of coal to the fleet.157 Early in this period coal usage at stations could also be 
affected by confusion about who exactly could be issued naval coal. A letter of 1876 
suggests that the China Station had been issuing coal not just to the Royal Navy, but also to 
commercial ships and foreign navies. In response to this, the Admiralty suggested that 
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foreign navies should only be supplied if coal could not be obtained elsewhere and there 
was enough spare in storage.158 
It was not until the 1880s that real steps occurred to improve and professionalise 
the supply of coal to foreign stations, in line with other changes enacted in response to the 
coaling issue.159 In order to instigate these changes, the Admiralty first needed to gain a 
knowledge of the existing infrastructure. A letter from the naval secretary, Robert Hall, 
dated August 1880, presumably to Commanders-in-Chief of naval stations, contained  
a proposal to obtain and tabulate exact particulars, as far as possible, of the 
quantity, quality, price etc of the coal likely to be available at any time at all ports 
abroad. The advantages of the possession of this information, whether in peace or 
war, especially if it is carefully gathered and periodically revised, are obvious, and 
my Lords have been pleased to approve the proposal.160 
Instructions were enclosed to collect data for each port under their command that was 
visited or may be visited by Royal Naval ships. A form, the D680 (see Figure 4.10), was 
enclosed, which was to be returned as quickly as possible. Due to the extensive use of 
commercial infrastructure, the form required data not just from naval personnel but from 
any organisation importing coal to any ports under their command. The form covered three 
pages, and collected key details about the type of coal at each station, how much was on 
average imported annually and kept in store, what price the stations were paying for their 
coal, which included freight, and who their agent in Britain was. The forms also asked about 
the station itself, how much coal was stored on shore under cover and on hulks, and how 
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many ships could be coaled simultaneously, as well as other details about coaling 
arrangements at the ports.161  
 
Figure 4.10: Form returned by stations informing of the coaling situation, 1882. TNA, ADM 123/110. 
 
With the information it collected, the Admiralty produced a volume in 1882 to be 
distributed amongst Royal Navy vessels. This was not the first of its kind, but was certainly 
the most accurate thus far, as the previous guide had glaring errors. For example, a letter in 
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1880 informed the Admiralty that no coal was stored at Cape Coast Castle, despite it being 
listed as a coaling station.162 Such errors could be calamitous, and could potentially leave a 
ship stranded at a station without fuel. A key facet of the new edition was, therefore, to 
create a more accurate picture of naval coaling infrastructure by eradicating these errors. It 
detailed the coal contracts in place at each station, as well as information on coal storage 
accommodation and fresh provisions. Due to the inconsistent nature of the data gathering, 
some stations were not included and, as the coaling situation was not static, for it to 
remain accurate the Admiralty’s data gathering had to be perpetual. It was therefore 
suggested that corrections and additions be made to the volume by those using it, and 
these were to be sent to secretary of the Admiralty to disseminate. The annual demand 
form was also continually updated to allow the collection of more data about coaling at 
various stations, including details of coal expended in the past year and the amount kept in 
store.  
Through collecting data about coaling stations, and using it to create a more 
informed knowledge of the processes involved, the Admiralty was making a clear concerted 
effort to take better control of its coaling infrastructure. Furthermore, the Admiralty 
recognised that a growing fleet and increasing coal consumption would necessitate further 
changes. This can be seen in requests for information about the future possibility of using 
coal from local mines, and whether the stations could be expanded to cope with a larger 
amount of coal. The Admiralty was also seeking more detailed information about the sites 
themselves, including the speed of loading at the stations, and requesting a sketch or photo 
of the layout (see Figure 4.11).163  
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Figure 4.11: Drawing of Yokohama coaling station included with forms sent to the Admiralty, 1882. TNA, ADM 
185/84. 
 
1884 saw another adaptation to the system, and a new form, the D-609 (see Figure 
4.12), was introduced for commanders to state the annual demand for each station. The 
form was more complicated again, asking for further details on all aspects of coaling at the 
stations. Particularly important was the request to state whether coal purchases were 
made through the Admiralty or through local agents, suggesting that the Admiralty were 
looking to make efficiency savings by controlling supply more effectively. There was also an 
effort to structure the shipping of coal. This was done through informing stations of the 
minimum size of collier available, and thus the smallest amount of coal that could be 
ordered. Shipment periods when coal could be ordered were also defined, and the stations 
were advised that the earlier in this period that they ordered coal, the better.164 Although 
the Admiralty were clearly seeking to improve the effectiveness of its coaling 
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infrastructure, the nature of the queries included in these forms do somewhat question 
how much the Admiralty knew about how its ships were coaling before the 1880s, two 
decades into having a largely steam navy. They also imply that before this, the 
Commanders-in-Chief of each station were almost solely responsible for ensuring that 
coaling worked within their remit.  
 
Figure 4.12: Form D-609 annual demand for coals, 1884. TNA, ADM 123/110. 
 
To standardise naval coaling worldwide, the Admiralty needed a formalised 
communication structure with Commanders-in-Chief of foreign stations the about coal 
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estimates, and this was achieved through the use of uniform contracts and forms. The 
surviving correspondence between Commanders-in-Chief and the Admiralty suggests that 
it was commonplace for differences of opinion to emerge. Unsurprisingly, much of this 
stemmed from stations asking for larger estimates as consumption increased, and the 
Admiralty replying with requests for more economy and restraint. Surviving exchanges 
suggest that the Admiralty generally got its way, despite the protestations from foreign 
stations, who complained that useful exercises and fleet manoeuvres would have to be 
sacrificed.165  
Although these measures improved the Admiralty’s knowledge of coaling 
arrangements in these stations, the issue was evidently not completely solved. In 1903, the 
Admiralty had to be informed by the China Station that naval ships in Japanese waters did 
not use China Station fuel, and perhaps more worryingly that the naval station at 
Yokohama had been out of use for some time.166 Similarly, efforts to streamline shipping 
were not quite as seamless as had been hoped: all that survives of the subsequent 
correspondence is a reply from the West African stations that states ‘that in the case of 
Simon’s Bay and Fernando Po the dates fixed for shipments are unsuitable’.167 Indeed, even 
with these improvements in communication and professionalisation, coal estimates for 
foreign stations still remained a minefield. This difficultly in estimating how much coal to 
send to naval stations can be seen from the constant fluctuation in the additions to or 
reduction of stocks of coals kept in store at overseas stations (see Figure 4.13).  
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Figure 4.13: Chart showing additions to or reductions in stocks of coal at naval stations, 1891−1904. Compiled 
from British Parliamentary Papers, 1904 [Cd. 1991], Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Second report of the 
Royal Commission on Coal Supplies. Vol. II. Minutes of evidence and appendices, 143-155. 
 
Stresses and Failures in Coaling Infrastructure 
 
Efficient infrastructure is often made invisible by its own success, ‘black boxed’, and thus 
often the only time it becomes noteworthy to contemporaries, or evident to historians, is 
when it fails.168 What is remarkable in the case of British naval coaling infrastructure was 
how few failures occurred. Despite its size and complexity, the resilience of this coaling 
infrastructure to unexpected urgency or strain was extraordinary − indeed in 1892, the 
New York Times described British naval coaling as an ‘enormous system under ... splendid 
control’.169 
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Although there were early teething problems with supply, these largely predate 
this study. Indeed, accounts of British ships being unable to obtain coal are very rare, 
suggesting that this was highly exceptional, especially as the period went on. H.M.S. 
Swinger, under the command of John Marx, is one such example from 1884, however. 
Running very low on coal in Matapui, in the south-west Pacific, Marx was forced to 
negotiate with German naval officers to obtain fuel, eventually being able to obtain coal in 
return for taking the German mails. Although this situation perhaps reveals the relative 
weakness of British coaling infrastructure in the Pacific, this failure can be easily explained 
by the unique situation of the ship. Not only was it a twelve-year-old hybrid ship with an 
inefficient engine, but it also had, for unknown reasons, the ability to carry only 40 tons of 
fuel at a time.170 
The main weakness of British infrastructure in this period was caused by the Royal 
Navy’s heavy reliance on Welsh coal, however. Predominantly using one type of fuel meant 
large-scale and long-term strikes in the Welsh coalfields could have been disastrous for the 
navy, causing huge supply issues and the paralysis of the fleet. Moreover, strikes were not 
uncommon. The worst of these occurred in 1898, and showed how easily the Admiralty 
could face a crisis not of its own making. Yet, although the strike precipitated a disastrous 
lock out which lasted some twenty-one weeks and five days, the Admiralty was able to not 
only avoid disaster but largely to continue in only a slightly limited capacity.  
The strike was a result of tensions over the sliding scale used to determine colliers’ 
wages, which had surfaced as early as 1892, but boiled over in 1898.171 Almost as soon as 
the strike began, the press recognised that it would cause significant problems to both the 
                                                                    
170 John Marx, Recollections of the South West Pacific, Royal Naval Museum, Manuscript Collection, 
2009.39/1/20. 
171 ‘Merthyr Miners And The Sliding-Scale’, Western Mail, 19 July 1892; Joseph Morewood 
Staniforth, Cartoons of the Welsh Coal Strike, April 1st to Sept. 1st, 1898 (Cardiff: Western Mail, 
1898), 3. 
195 
 
Admiralty and the liner companies.172 The Admiralty immediately put in place restrictions 
on the use of Welsh coal in the hope that this would allow its operations to be largely 
unaffected by the strike.173 The Admiralty was still able to use coal from those collieries in 
Wales that were not involved in the strike, but this appears to have proved insufficient, 
and, as the strike continued, it was clear that alternative sources for coal would need to be 
found. This temporarily caused the navy to fall back on the previous fuelling arrangement, 
and navy ships used North Country coal in mixture, with the Admiralty inviting tenders for 
emergency contracts.174 It is unclear how the strike affected other foreign stations, but, due 
to the shortage of quality Welsh steam-coal, Bermuda and Halifax bought quantities of 
American Pocahontas coal.175 
With a settlement taking far longer to appear than had been expected by the 
Admiralty, the naval manoeuvres of 1898 were cancelled.176 The restrictions imposed were 
remarkably successful though, and despite the obvious strain on naval coal supplies caused 
by the strike, the Admiralty was able to withdraw the limitations on Welsh coal use almost 
immediately after it ended.177 While this episode was something of an embarrassment for 
the Royal Navy, the strike largely proved the durability and versatility of the coaling 
infrastructure. Although concerns were raised about the levels of coal stock held, there was 
little the Admiralty could do without large amounts deteriorating in storage, and the 
development of patent fuel for reserve use was already underway.178  
The danger of strikes was a serious one, and thus when war came in 1914 the 
government took control of the Welsh coal industry ‘to ensure that strikes over wages did 
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not stop supply of coal to the Royal Navy’.179 When a dispute led to a strike in 1915 did 
occur, however, it is noticeable that the reaction of the government was quite different. 
Whereas the government had largely remained at a distance from negotiations in 1898, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, travelled to South Wales just four days 
into the strike to offer concessions, successfully ending the dispute.180 Even had Lloyd 
George failed to prevent a strike of the magnitude of 1898, however, Britain would still 
have held an advantage over its enemies. Such a strike would sever coal supplies to all 
navies that relied on Welsh coal, and make it more difficult for foreign vessels to obtain 
other sources of coal, as the Royal Navy would dominate those supplies. Furthermore, the 
local coal supplies, such as those in Nova Scotia, Vancouver, South Africa, and Australia, 
although seen as unfit for general naval use, would in emergency situations still be an 
equal, and usually better, fuel than that obtainable by an enemy. It was through this ability 
to control a large portion of suitable coal, and the infrastructure to make it available 
abroad, allowing it to deny its enemies, which made Britain’s coaling apparatus so robust, 
even in times of crisis. 
As well as a reliance on two sources of coal, the other obvious weakness in Britain’s 
coaling infrastructure was its scale, and distance made the metropolitan oversight of the 
sub-imperial coaling network based in Sydney particularly difficult. Indeed, the Admiralty’s 
lack of knowledge of the coaling infrastructure that existed in Australasia meant that they 
were even more reliant on agents in Sydney than they were in Cardiff. The autonomy of the 
local agents caused various problems for the Admiralty. For obvious reasons, such issues 
often involved difficulty in communication. On occasion, coal shipped to a station was 
found to be below the standard expected, and was returned with a complaint from the 
naval officer in charge, but these issues were not always communicated with London, 
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meaning little was done about it.181 There also seemed to be occasional problems with 
communication between agents and the stations. For example, in 1903, Admiral Cyprian 
Bridge, Commander-in-Chief of the China Station, complained that no telegram had been 
sent to inform him of when a coal shipment had actually left. The only documentation he 
had was the agreement form, dated 6 March, yet by 17 July nothing had been heard of the 
shipment. It later transpired that it had not actually left until 13 June, 15½ weeks after the 
form had been sent.  
The autonomy of the agents could also bring about questions about abuses of 
power, such as those Messrs. Parbury and Lamb faced in 1875. With such power over 
Admiralty coal supply, it was inevitable that disgruntled colliery owners would accuse 
agents of favouritism, but the existence of complaints from senior naval officers about 
quality of fuel suggests larger problems. These accusations were also very serious. Not only 
was it suggested that the agents were supplying the Australia Station with low-quality fuel, 
but also that they were using collieries in which they had large interests in.182 Although the 
matter was dismissed by the Admiralty, coal supply was soon changed, even if the agents 
were not.  
These problems appear to have been exceptions, however, usually resulting in 
consultation with the agents, followed by a change of practice.183 It would seem that the 
system as a whole worked remarkably well, and there is no indication of the Admiralty ever 
considering taking command of any facet of the system at any point. This of course was no 
accident, as from the 1880s onwards measures were taken to improve the navy’s ability to 
mobilise swiftly at the outbreak of war. These have been discussed at a departmental level 
in the previous chapter, but it is pertinent to assess how this worked on the ground. As has 
been shown, Britain’s ability to mobilise in a war scare was tested through naval 
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manoeuvres which began in the late 1880s, but it was not until the twentieth century that 
arrangements for the continuance of supply of coal in an extended naval war are finalised, 
with the threat of a major European war looming large.  
In 1900 a statement was sent from the Admiralty to its new agents, Messrs. 
Harrison, Moore and Company, based in Bute Docks, Cardiff, outlining arrangements that 
had been made should Britain be involved in a naval war. This document shows how the 
Admiralty, which was increasingly improving Britain’s ability to swiftly mobilise the Royal 
Navy, planned to provide the navy with coal at short notice. ‘Special arrangements’ were 
made with principal Welsh collieries to provide coal in emergencies, with railways 
companies to dispatch the coal to port by rail, and dock companies were ‘to give 
preference in loading to all colliers taken up on admiralty account’. The Cardiff-based 
agents were also instructed to nominate representatives in the other South Wales ports to 
make arrangements for mobilisation there. Although the agents and colliers would be 
responsible to the Director of Navy Contracts, mobilisation would effectively be carried out 
by private businesses.184 An example of this mobilisation in practice was during a war scare 
in 1911. Fearing a naval war with Germany in the North Sea, the Admiralty co-ordinated 
the movement of Welsh coal, by ship and railway, to the north-east of England and 
Scotland.185 As a result of these preparations, at the outbreak of the First World War the 
Admiralty was able to implement strategies swiftly for coaling in war. Not only were 
transport arrangements already in place, but the Admiralty was also able to order collieries 
to retain coal stocks in the event of the navy needing more supplies.186 The success of these 
actions reflects how a coaling consensus at government level enabled operations to be 
effective on the ground.  
 
                                                                    
184 ‘Instructions to the Admiralty Agents in South Wales for Shipping Coal’, TNA, ADM 116/903. 
185 ‘Coal For The Navy’, The Times, 12 September 1911. 
186 Border Watch (South Australia), 1 August 1914. 
199 
 
Failures of Foreign Infrastructure 
 
The robustness of British coaling infrastructure is particularly apparent when compared to 
the failings of other nations’ navies. Indeed, these numerous examples of disruption and 
disaster are in themselves a testament to the effectiveness of the Admiralty arrangements. 
The first example is particularly pertinent as it directly involved a British vessel that was 
able to escape tragedy, while foreign warships faced disaster. On 13 March 1889, when a 
hurricane hit Apia, Samoa, there was damage to ‘every vessel in the harbour or shore 
except the English man-of-war Calliope, which got to sea’. Of those in harbour, two 
American ships, the Trenton and the Vandalia, as well as two German ships, the Adler and 
the Eber, were a total loss, and two more ships, the American Nipsic and German Olga, 
were badly damaged. Despite many of the crews being saved, the loss of life was horrific. 
Reports state that ‘the Vandalia lost four officers and thirty-nine men ... and the Nipsic lost 
seven men’. In addition, ‘German losses are ninety-six’, bringing the total loss of life to 
146.187 
Such a tragedy brought with it questions about how and why the German and 
American ships had not been able to get to sea as the British had done. Although the British 
ship had been nearer to the harbour entrance, its location was not the reason cited for 
avoiding the disaster, but that it was stocked with quality fuel. While the British ship had 
easily been able to refuel with Westport coal at Auckland on the way to Apia, both the 
American and German ships had arrived without coal, and, despite possessions in the 
Pacific, had been unable to find quality fuel. The American coaling station of Pago-Pago, 
just thirty miles from Apia, had not been adequately supplied, and thus the ships were 
stranded in harbour. A New York Herald journalist remarked that although ‘the island was 
acquired in 1872 ... our government has not apparently discovered in seventeen years the 
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strategic importance of having an ample supply of coal there’. It was then pointed out that 
‘the nearest point at which coal could be obtained was Honolulu, 2,100 miles away’.188  
Even those who had been lucky enough to survive the ordeal faced a long wait 
before they could move on. Although coal had been sent nearly a month before the 
hurricane, the wooden ship carrying the coal from San Francisco would not arrive for 
another four weeks. Another ship, sent from Philadelphia, would have to navigate around 
Cape Horn to reach the Pacific, and thus was ‘months’ away.189 What is obvious from the 
tragic tale is that, although the hurricane was an unforeseeable disaster, Germany and the 
United States, despite growing as naval powers, were not able to match Great Britain in 
terms of naval coaling infrastructure. 
 
Figure 4.14: The London Illustrated News featured the tragedy on its front page on 11 May, 1889. 
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Perhaps a more famous example of a failure of naval infrastructure concerns the 
Russian Baltic fleet in 1905.190 This is of interest to this study because of the way the British 
were able to weaken the Russian fleet through both the control of its own coaling 
infrastructure, and by exploiting Russia’s lack of infrastructure outside its own waters. 
Forced to steam via the Cape when Britain refused the use of the Suez Canal, the Russian 
fleet was also denied fuelling opportunities, delaying its movement and causing vast 
inconvenience (see Figure 4.15). Although the Russians were able to make use of French 
coaling infrastructure, they constantly encountered British ships and possessions, and were 
even escorted by British ships around the Iberian coast.  
 
Figure 4.15: The route taken by the Russian Baltic Fleet, 1905.   
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Much of our knowledge about the Russian fleet on its journey is provided by 
Eugene Politovsky, who was serving Engineer-in-Chief to the squadron, and was killed at 
the Battle of Tsushima. His diary is quick to recognise the value of coal: ‘Coal! It is our weak 
spot. Our comings, our goings, our voyage, and even our success depend on coal’. Later, as 
the delays mounted up, and the precarious situation the Baltic fleet faced was fully 
realised, he remarked ‘the coaling question is the question of life’. The diary constantly 
laments the lack of coaling infrastructure of his country and the struggles the Russian 
squadron faced, even with the ability to utilise the coaling stations of France, with 
infrastructure second only to Britain’s. It also records how the fleet was constantly under 
the surveillance and at the mercy of the whims of the Royal Navy, which, with the ability to 
obtain quality fuel worldwide, was a constant presence for the Russian fleet.191 
When the fleet arrived in Japanese waters, it was beleaguered from an 18,000-mile 
journey that had offered little chance for crucial maintenance, and was therefore heavily 
fouled, reducing its speed significantly in battle.192 The subsequent battle was a disaster for 
Russia, which lost all of its battleships, and a huge number of men, some 4,380 killed and 
5,917 captured, including two admirals.193 While it would be hyperbolic to suggest that it 
was coaling infrastructure that decided the Russo-Japanese War, it is clear that through its 
ability to obtain coal worldwide, and to deny its rivals the same right, Britain was able to 
inconvenience heavily, if not critically damage, a potential enemy’s navy without having to 
engage in battle at all.  
In fact, even outside of a war situation, Britain could cripple another naval power. 
In 1898, reports from Kiao-Chou, China, stated ‘that the movements of the German fleet on 
the China Station are paralysed, owing to Russia and Great Britain having purchased the 
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whole of the coal supplies in the Far East’.194 Perhaps the most pertinent example of this 
was the plight of the famous American ‘Great White Fleet’ of 1907−1909, however. 
Seeking to demonstrate growing American military power and naval capability, the world 
tour instead exposed the fact that ship numbers and technology mattered little without 
infrastructure with which to coal the fleet. To this end, Senator Hale was particularly 
embarrassed that ‘the greatest fleet of formidable ships that the world has ever seen’ had 
to depend on ‘the indulgence of foreign powers’.195 Indeed, the United States only had 
eight colliers and poor port facilities and, as a result, during the cruise it used one Austro-
Hungarian, seven Norwegian, and forty-one British colliers. More humiliation was to come, 
however, when the fleet arrived in Australia. There, the failure of British colliers to arrive to 
fuel the fleet ‘caused great embarrassment’ to Admiral Sperry − in charge of the exercise − 
‘for it illustrated how easily Great Britain could control the fleet’s behaviour, stranding it 
halfway round the world, should the need arise, and causing it to be a “laughing stock”’. 
Indeed, because of Britain’s refusal to supply them with coal, Sperry spent much of his time 
negotiating for Australian coal – generally of poor grade – at Auckland, Sydney, Melbourne, 
and Albany. A similar situation occurred at Port Said, where the Admiral spent most of his 
time arguing with coal dealers.196 Not only was this humiliating for such an impressive fleet, 
but it also caused delays on their progress, with the poor quality of the Australian coal 
forcing some ships to cruise at the most economical speed. They were also delayed by 
problems of supply, especially at Apia, where there was no coal when they arrived. 
Contemporary reports reveal the level of uncertainty on board: ‘the days went by … days of 
anxiety … and still no coal’. With the fleet arriving on 20 September, enough coal for four 
cruisers only arrived on 4 October, with the remaining cruisers stranded until 7 October.197 
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This hugely embarrassing situation, precipitated by a lack of control over the infrastructure 
for the coaling of the fleet, severely undermined the imagined effect of the fleet on those 
who witnessed it. Indeed, despite several world records, there was a feeling in America 
that ‘it had been unwise to display the nation’s inability to coal and supply its own 
fleets’.198  
 
Conclusions 
 
The coaling infrastructure used by the Royal Navy in the late nineteenth century was 
remarkable in many ways. The sheer geographical scale of operations, encompassing 
stations as far away as Esquimalt, Fiji, and Valparaiso was unparalleled, and the number of 
actors involved was extraordinary. Yet, despite this, the infrastructure was remarkably 
robust, even during crises, and especially compared with that used by Britain’s rivals. This 
resilience stemmed from a combination of factors. The Admiralty was immensely fortunate 
that much of what was required already existed in Britain. Welsh steam-coal was the best 
in the world, and even the navy’s secondary fuel, that of Westport, was as good as any 
other bar Welsh. Furthermore, the enormous and world-leading coal export industry was 
situated in Wales, which allowed the Admiralty to utilise commercial coaling networks in 
order to supply its coaling stations. Finally, Britain’s burgeoning empire, both formal and 
informal, provided it with a plethora of strategic sites worldwide where it could store coal 
for the use of the navy, and its vast mail and telegraphic networks allowed swift 
communication.199  
Despite its reliance on the commercial coaling industry, the Admiralty had a 
significant role in the strength of British coaling infrastructure. Its trials of coal in the early 
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part of the period were crucial to establishing suitable fuels, and its supervision over the 
commercial agents it employed to manage the structure was vital to ensuring the navy’s 
needs were met. It was also key in the evolution of the infrastructure over time. With the 
Royal Navy unchallenged and the Admiralty still unfamiliar with the demands of a steam 
navy, the 1870s were a period of ad hoc measures. The rise of coal consciousness in the 
1880s, however, led to a more considered approach to naval coaling, which involved two 
types of changes. Firstly, the Admiralty realised the need for premium quality coal at all its 
stations, and thus performed thousands of tests on coal from all over the world in order to 
find suitable examples. Ironically, in striving to expand the variety of fuel that the navy 
stocked, the Admiralty actually largely reduced itself to relying on two main sources, South 
Wales and Westport, finding that only they had the characteristics required by a modern 
steam navy.  
Secondly, with the navy expanding, the Admiralty needed to ensure that stations 
were stocked with adequate amounts of quality fuel, but not so much that it deteriorated 
in storage. In order to fulfil these aims, the Admiralty standardised the administrative 
forms sent from the stations and the contracts it made with private companies. In doing so, 
it streamlined the naval coaling infrastructure, allowing the coal purchase to be more 
efficient, and export amounts to be more accurate. Furthermore, in line with wider efforts 
for the swift mobilisation of the navy in war, the Admiralty made contingency 
arrangements to ensure that coal of sufficient quality could be bought and exported to 
Britain’s stations. These allowed the Admiralty to be able to react quickly and efficiently to 
crises, without having a hugely detrimental effect on the performance of the Royal Navy. 
These factors meant that, while British naval infrastructure was highly complicated, it 
remained an ‘enormous system under ... splendid control’.200  
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Chapter 5: Coaling Labour 
 
Coaling a naval ship at any station involved substantial work, especially as the amount of 
fuel ships required increased in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Coal, for 
all its advantages, is a solid, heavy, dirty fuel, and transferring it was a long and taxing 
process, however it was carried out. This chapter explores the coaling station as a working 
environment, and investigates the different systems employed to coal naval ships. 
Although one might expect the processes used to transfer coal to become more 
mechanised, even by 1914 coal was still largely loaded by hand, with the use of a simple 
hoist.1 Thus, the history coaling warships in the period 1870−1914 is one largely of human 
labour, and this chapter is a story of the human experience of moving coal on board.  
 The chapter begins by assessing the systems employed for coaling naval ships. 
There was not one overall worldwide system of coaling, but methods varied from station to 
station. In fact, several could be used at a single site depending on labour, cost, and 
congestion. Nearly all methods involved extensive human labour, however, and the 
reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, mechanisation was enormously expensive to 
implement, and secondly, the remarkable efficiency of coaling using human labour made 
the benefits of mechanisation marginal. This was especially true when it is considered that 
the increasingly enormous warships had great difficulty in manoeuvring into harbours 
where more complex coaling systems could be installed. As a result of this lack of 
mechanisation, three main methods of coaling a warship in a station remained throughout 
the period 1870−1914: from a jetty, from lighters, or direct from a collier.   
 A reliance on these methods throughout the period in question makes the 
substantial human labour involved crucial to the story of naval coaling, and it is this human 
history which this chapter next analyses. The labour force employed by naval ships 
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depended on the place and method of coaling, but these can be generally divided into two 
distinct groups, the labour of the ship, and the labour of local populations. The chapter 
examines these distinct groups during coaling, showing how the identity and views of 
sailors shaped their impressions of the processes − whether of the work they were 
required to do or of the labour force employed to heave the coal in their place.  
The heavy, unrelenting work, as well as the filth of the coal dust, meant that 
coaling a ship was the least popular job the sailors did, yet naval discipline ensured that the 
process was done in a swift and organised way. Competition and fancy dress, as well as the 
involvement of the whole crew in coaling, acted as coping mechanisms for sailors, and the 
promise of shore leave and alcohol were enough to keep rates high and discipline intact. 
When local heavers were employed in coaling, they often attracted the attention of 
sailors who considered differences in practices, discipline, and capacity of other people, 
inevitably seen through the racial lens of high imperialism. Responses to coaling practices 
were heavily influenced by the sailors’ ideas of naval discipline and organisation, and local 
coaling labour was accordingly judged by these perceptions of efficiency and hard work. As 
a result, coal heavers were rarely seen as individuals but were largely reduced to cogs in a 
huge coaling machine. Indeed, despite the unique nature of the activities and interaction at 
coaling stations, sailors’ ideas about local labour, and in particular race, reflected those 
held commonly by Britons in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
Finally, the chapter assesses the ever-present danger which existed during coaling. 
With a focus on speed and efficiency eclipsing any concerns about safety, accidents during 
coaling were unsurprising. In fact, these are regular occurrences, repeatedly mentioned in 
logs and other accounts of naval life. As coal was loaded in two hundredweight bags (112 
lb), such accidents were often serious, involving broken bones and, all too frequently, 
death. That accidents involving local heavers are completely absent from records is perhaps 
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most revealing of the place of these labourers − as a part of a coaling system which could 
be easily replaced when used up or broken. 
 
Systems of Coaling 
 
The primary purpose of naval coaling stations was, of course, the storage and provision of 
coal. This part of the chapter will therefore analyse the process of coaling, including the 
storage, methods, and labour involved. The method of storing coal was important to 
ensure it reached ships in optimum condition. Despite this, it often remained open to the 
weather in many coaling stations, whether on dockside or in hulks stationed in the harbour, 
although coal was in general no longer stored loose on beaches by the 1880s (see Figure 
5.1). Old warships were often used as hulks, utilising otherwise obsolete vessels. Leaving 
coal on the dockside was undesirable, and thus concerns about the degradation of 
uncovered coal were aired in Parliament. However, building extensive sheds was expensive 
and, despite discussion at Westminster, large stacks of coal continued to be stored in the 
open. Storage facilities therefore appear to have only been built in larger stations, or when 
other improvements were being made, such as at the new dockyard at Simon’s Town in the 
early twentieth century.2  
There were three methods of coaling naval ships, coaling from a jetty, coaling from 
lighters, and coaling from a collier, each of which are described in detail below. Next, the 
process of washing down the ship is described, a task for the ship’s company whichever 
method was used. Finally, the section analyses the failure of the Royal Navy to develop a 
method of coaling at sea. 
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Figure 5.1: Simon's Town coaling station c.1900. Note the coal hulks in the harbour, and the piles of uncovered 
coal on shore. Courtesy of Simon's Town Historical Society. 
 
 
Coaling From a Jetty 
 
Coaling from a jetty was generally limited to large stations on trade routes or bases of 
supply, where significant stacks of coal were maintained and specialist wharves and jetties 
had been installed (see Figure 5.2). By the late nineteenth century, as a result of the 
growing size of battleships, this method was largely reserved for cruisers and independent 
vessels, rather than fleet warships.3 Although techniques could vary from station to station, 
coal was generally carried on board in baskets from neighbouring stacks, which required 
considerable shore labour.4 These heavers would begin by filling the coal sacks, followed by 
rigging the ships in one of two arrangements. If coal was simply to be carried on board, 
planks were placed between the ship and shore. If this was not possible, stages were rigged 
and baskets passed up. Although techniques varied between stations, this way of coaling 
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tended to be more efficient than from lighters and especially colliers.5 This speed of 
transference could be impeded, however, if shore labour was short, or deemed 
incompetent. In Sydney, for example, the workers of the Union Company left coal in sacks 
on the wharf, leaving the crew of the Encounter to carry 135lbs bags 200 yards across 
springy planks with inclines. Remarkably, the crew still averaged around 60 tons an hour, 
but this was significantly lower than normal rates.6 
Figure 5.2: Coaling H.M.S. Charybdis at from a jetty at H.M. Dockyard, Halifax c.1901−1902. Nova Scotia 
Archives, Notman Studio NSARM, accession no. 1983-310 8717. 
 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, it became more common to use cranes 
at the larger Mediterranean and British naval stations. Some of the early cranes installed on 
quaysides actually did little in terms of the speed of coaling, and could only load five or six 
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bags at a time, although they did save back-breaking labour.7 The machinery installed at 
some larger stations in the last decade of the nineteenth century, such as at Portsmouth 
and Portland, included more advanced hydraulic cranes and hoists for receiving and 
discharging coal. Although each hoist could reportedly discharge at 500 tons per hour, a 
rate around double what could be achieved with manual labour, only cruisers could coal 
alongside. Battleships therefore still had to be coaled by lighter, although the bags were 
transferred from the dockside by cranes.8 At smaller stations such as Crete and Alexandria, 
and in much of the stations further afield, loading by baskets remained as the only method 
of coaling from a jetty.9 
 
Coaling from Lighters 
 
An equally common way to coal was from a lighter, which was especially used where a 
station did not have the facilities to coal a ship directly from the shore. In general, a lighter 
would come alongside a warship and be secured, usually the night before coaling, thereby 
giving as many daylight hours as possible to the task. In the morning, the coal would be 
transported, either passed by hand, or by using the ships winches, from the lighter to the 
deck. From there, it was deposited in the ships bunkers (see Figure 5.3).10  
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Figure 5.3: Coaling the H.M.C.S. Niobe from a lighter or barge alongside c.1910−1914. George Metcalf Archival 
Collection, Canadian War Museum, 20030174-011. 
 
In the 1870s, this coaling technique was less standardised and methods less 
perfected, and ‘it was frequently the deuces own job getting the coal out on account of the 
ship rolling like an empty tub and threatening either to fall on top of you or suck you under 
at every heave’.11 From the 1880s onwards, however, the coal, or less often patent fuel, 
brought out by the lighter was already in bags, allowing a higher rate of transference.12 This 
more uniform use of coal in bags, along with operational experience, went some way to 
alleviate earlier problems, and in time coaling from lighters became so efficient that some 
station records for the rate of coaling were broken using this method.13 Even so, although 
this was done regularly and in the calmness of a harbour, on rare occasions rough seas 
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overnight could detach lighters, which could then suffer damage or even sink with coal 
aboard.14 
 
Coaling from a Collier 
 
The last method, coaling using a collier, was used extensively, especially when large fleets 
were at a station together. As it prominently involved the ship’s crew, it is of this method 
that most records and descriptions remain. Coaling was exclusively performed by a ship’s 
company, and to be efficient, organisation was crucial. A division of responsibilities was 
usually done at the beginning of a commission, and each man kept his role throughout. 
Even so, it still took time for every man to know his duties and perform them competently. 
In the earlier part of the period, coal was loaded by one or several simple pulley systems 
known as whips, but after 1892 the newly invented Temperley Transporter was seen as a 
much superior option (see Figure 5.4).15 Described as ‘a sort of overhead trapeze for 
running the coal from the collier to the ship’, this machinery allowed the swift transference 
of coal, but its use was not without difficulty.16 Some ships ‘could not get along at all with 
the collier’, for example, and this could cause serious delays.17 Moreover, the Temperley 
was far from infallible and regularly broke down, and ‘considerable time [was] lost in 
unshipping cross-beams and shifting gear’.18 Even with these delays, however, coaling 
averages using the machinery were often impressive, if not quite as high as the other 
methods. 
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Figure 5.4: A steam-coaling barge fitted with four Temperley Transporters c.1900. Swan Hunter Collection, Tyne 
and Wear Archives. 
 
Before coaling could commence, the bags, shovels, strops, and other coaling 
equipment, which had been laid out on upper deck beforehand, were the thrown into the 
secured collier, and all unnecessary work aboard ceased.19 Simultaneously, the stokers 
connected the chutes which would convey the coal from the deck to the bunker.20 The 
process of coaling then began with the call ‘Clear lower deck! Hands fall in for coaling ship!’ 
After this, everything on deck was covered, newspaper was used to plaster over crevices, 
and hawsers (mooring ropes) made tight by the foretop men.21 Several of the sailors would 
then board the collier to begin the process of coaling. Once in the collier the sailors formed 
four or five groups of eight men: two for holding bags and slinging, the rest for shovelling 
the coal into the sacks, which held around two hundredweights each (see Figure 5.5).22 The 
collier’s steam winches, colloquially known as donkey engines, would then whip up the first 
hoists of coal, holding ten bags; the coal dust soon turning everything, and everyone, black. 
The sailors would continue to shovel coal into empty bags, while also dodging coal falling 
from those already hoisted. One sailor recalled that ‘to look down into the holds from the 
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deck above was like looking into a little inferno’. The dust was so thick that the collier held 
‘just black toiling beings, with red eyes and lips showing out in bold relief’.23  
 
Figure 5.5: Officers and ratings prepare coal sacks to be hoisted aboard, unknown date. Portsmouth Historic 
Dockyard: http://www.flickr.com/photos/historicdockyard/5811618294/. 
 
On the deck, the crew would jump onto the hoisted coal sacks, release their straps, 
and then load them onto trolleys, which marines would then take to the chute. Here they 
were directed by an engineer sub-lieutenant who was responsible for seeing that each 
chute got equal amounts of coal (see Figure 5.6).24 Stokers, stripped to the waist, would 
wait in their bunker for its chute to begin to be used.25 They would then have the 
unenviable task of moving the coal to fill the bunker completely, clearing the coal 
deposited down the chute into the bunker, just in time for another load to arrive. Down the 
chute with the coal came a cloud of dust and, with nowhere to escape, the stokers 
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increasingly found it impossible to see, had their lungs filled with black dust, and struggled 
to keep their lamps alight.26 The empty bags were then returned to the collier, where the 
process could start again. With practice, this whole process could be done seamlessly, the 
ship’s company acting as a great machine to achieve high efficiency.27  
 
Figure 5.6: Coaling H.M.S. Natal c.1915. Note the marines pushing trolleys full of coal to the bunkers. NMM, 
C7137/R. 
 
 
Breaks for food depended on when coaling commenced and how much coal had to 
be loaded. Generally there would be a race to breakfast, where everything − the men, the 
food and the deck − were black from coal dust.28 After a short time, ‘commence’ would 
sound again, and the men would be back to their stations, with the encouragement of the 
senior officers.29 Other meals tended to be for around half an hour, often of bully beef or 
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salted pork.30 Liquid refreshment would either be oatmeal water or lime juice depending 
on what climate the ship was currently in.31 
 Once the requisite amount of coal had been taken in, a bugle would sound ‘cease 
fire’, after which the whips would be unrigged, the men, shovels, and other tools returned 
to the ship, and the collier shoved off.32 The collier would often then go on to coal several 
more ships: the naval collier Mercedes, while on the China Station, coaled the Glory, Cressy, 
Blenheim, Amphitrite, Argonaut, Goliath, Eclipse, Talbot, Algerine, and Bramble 
consecutively.33 For the smaller destroyers, the coaling routine was similar but, with only 
four or five men to take on the coal, the amounts were smaller − around 50 tons − and 
coaling was done every three to four days.34 It is notable that ships commissioned in the 
early twentieth century were designed with ease of coaling in mind. The Dreadnought, for 
instance, was easy to prepare for coaling: it was merely a case of taking the guardrails 
down before the coal bags could be brought up.35 Similarly, the Encounter was better 
designed for sealing the decks when coaling, to the extent that ‘a lower deck man can sit in 
his mess and eat his scran without the fear of coal-dust’.36 
 
Washing down 
 
Once coaling was complete, the washing down of the ship began. Whether a ship’s 
company had coaled the ship themselves or not, the exhausted men would rig the sea-
water hoses and begin what was colloquially known as the ‘water carnival’ (see Figure 
                                                                    
30 McKee, Sober Men and True, 120-122. 
31
 Lance, ‘Interview with James George Cox’. 
32
 Wheeler, The Commission of H.M.S. Pandora, 123-126. 
33 A.E. Butterworth, The Commission of H.M.S. Glory, Flag Ship of Commander-in-Chief, China 
Station, 1900-1904 (London: Westminster Press, 1904), 72. 
34 Lance, ‘Interview with James George Cox’. 
35 David G. Lance, ‘Interview with Stanley Munday’, 1973, Imperial War Museum, 9048. 
36 Fowler, The Log of H.M.S. Encounter, 12. 
218 
 
5.7).37 Stringent standards of cleanliness aboard a naval vessel, combined with coal dust’s 
ability to penetrate every crevice, meant that for some sailors the ‘painful necessity of 
cleaning down’ deck was ‘the worst part of the whole business’.38 There was some reward 
for completing coaling and washing down, though, and on most ships a draught of beer, or 
tot of rum, was customary.39 Furthermore, unless there was an urgent need for the ship to 
move on imminently, leave was generally given to the ship’s company.40 Before leave could 
be taken, however, a sailor needed to wash. If the ship had the facilities, the crew would be 
given extra bathwater. If there were no baths, sailors would wash from a tub in the mess, 
which had to be shared with a dozen others. At some ports, such as Portsmouth, sailors 
were able to go ashore to bathe.41 Such was the filth accrued on their bodies that, as one 
sailor described, the effects of scrubbing and yellow soap ‘convert our complexions into a 
likeness of salt beef. As red as beets, we are inspected, bundle over the side, and reach our 
pints after well earning them by “coaling ship”’.42 
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Figure 5.7: Scrubbing the decks of H.M.S. Goliath after coaling, c.1900−1915. Photo courtesy of Dave Martin. 
 
Coaling at Sea 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a fourth method of coaling was 
discussed seriously: coaling at sea.43 It was hoped that this method of coaling would 
function in a similar way to that from a collier in harbour, but with the increased 
convenience that it could be accomplished while a fleet was moving or blockading on the 
open sea.  
Stores had often been transferred at sea in the past, and coal was no exception. 
But these processes were slow and limited, and could not hope to satisfy a modern 
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warship’s needs, especially after 1880. To solve this issue, over 60 systems for the coaling 
of the fleet at sea were submitted to the Admiralty between 1888 and 1905, and several 
were extensively tested. Despite this, by 1915, no mechanism for coaling at sea had yet 
been adopted, and British warships on manoeuvres still had to leave the fleet and coal in 
sheltered harbours.44 Indeed, there seems to be little evidence ‘that any of the belligerents 
coaled at sea during the First World War’.45 Warwick Brown has argued that this was 
because ‘no navy considered that the capacity of any of the many systems for coaling at 
sea on offer before the First World War showed sufficient promise to warrant allocating 
them a significant portion of their precious budgets or reorganising their logistical 
agreements to suit the system’s requirements’.46 He also goes on to point out that the 
systems simply did not develop fast enough to deal with the ever increasing demands of 
modern warships. A further explanation can be found in the words of W.H. Whiting, the 
Assistant Director of Naval Construction, who argued that ‘such value as it possesses is a 
minimum in the case of a nation which has a great preponderance in coaling ports and in 
ships, and whose ships are generally larger and can carry a larger coal supply than those 
ships of the same class belonging to foreign powers’.47 With this great advantage over its 
rivals, it was acknowledged that the ability to the Royal Navy to coal at sea was not as 
central to the action of the fleet in war as had been made out earlier in the period. 
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Figure 5.8: Great hope was held for coaling at sea, illustrated here, but it was to no avail. ‘New Method of 
Coaling Warships at Sea’, Dundee Courier and Argus, 14 May, 1900. 
 
Naval Labour 
 
In addition to coaling from a collier, which was always performed by naval men, there were 
several reasons why a ship’s company might be called to coal their own vessel when using 
other methods. Occasionally there was simply not enough local labour to coal all the ships 
in harbour, and at smaller, purely naval sites, this was often the case. At Esquimalt, for 
example, although indigenous labour was sometimes used, it was usually the ship’s crew 
that coaled from the lighters.48 Temporary labour shortages also occasionally occurred at 
large stations, caused by strikes, or during cultural and religious festivals such as Christmas, 
and Chinese New Year.49   
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Although some stations that used local labour continued to do so throughout and 
beyond the period 1870−1914, there is a noticeable decline over time in its use in coaling. 
The log of the Bedford, which was on the China Station from 1907 to 1909, reports that it 
was ‘quite a luxury’ to ‘be stood off’ for coaling. Similarly, the Implacable, during its 
1901−1904 commission, reported that ‘one of the advantages of laying at Malta – native 
labour is employed in coaling ship’, suggesting this was a rarity.50 At some stations this was 
because the individual circumstances changed. For example, in order to reduce costs, 
Malta began to rely more heavily on crew labour, and to a much lesser extent 
mechanisation, than the local heavers who had numbered around 200 at the turn of the 
century.51  
The decreasing use of local labour was more generally linked to the greater use of 
colliers for coaling, however, as a growth in ship size and numbers after 1889 meant it was 
not always feasible to coal at a jetty or by lighter. This situation was exacerbated by the 
amount of coal used by each ship: on average a battleship would coal every seven to ten 
days, and even the comparatively economical Dreadnought consumed on average 300 tons 
a day, and carried 2900 tons of coal.52 This represented a huge change in ships’ capacity for 
coal: H.M.S. Collingwood, launched in 1880, carried just 900 tons.53 The use of colliers 
eased these issues, as they allowed multiple large warships to coal, under their own labour, 
in the relative calmness of a harbour. This was an advantage particularly at stations with 
large fleets where several ships would need to coal at once.54 Furthermore, this allowed 
the navy to tap into a free labour force, and permitted them to coal in convenient harbours 
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while on manoeuvres far from coal stacks. The process of coaling was also seen as easier 
from colliers; the methods being fairly uniform for each class of ship.55 Moreover, there 
was little difficulty in securing colliers: ‘the Royal Navy were able charter private colliers as 
and when required without difficulty in peacetime and considered that the large, privately 
owned merchant collier fleet would able to cater for any additional demands in wartime’.56 
While these advantages were considerable, the rates of transference achieved coaling from 
a collier did not often exceed 100 tons per hour, considerably lower than the highest rates 
seen by the other methods.57  
The largest disadvantage was to the ship’s company though, as when using a collier 
they were now wholly responsible for ‘the unpleasant task of coaling’.58 There seems to 
have been near universal loathing for coaling, especially from a collier.59 Getting in the 
‘black diamonds’ was widely regarded as the most dangerous, most hated, and most filthy 
task: Joiner First-class George Clarkson suggested that ‘a shadow would come over the ship 
as soon as you heard you were coaling’.60 The detestation often made sailors look 
backwards ‘I wish I could get hold of that man who first found coal’, or forwards ‘oh for oil 
fuel!’61 Consequently coaling was a stressful business; the combination of exhaustion, 
discomfort, and irritation could put the ship’s company on edge, and tensions could easily 
spill over.62 The only thing, it appears, that could make the task even less enjoyable was 
inclement weather. Rain in particular made the experience uncomfortable.63 The Encounter 
suffered such a fate in New Zealand with unceasing rain during coaling, ‘which drenched all 
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hands to the skin, making coal-ship a very unpleasant and slow job’.64 Coaling was also 
especially disagreeable in warm climates like Gibraltar, where: ‘for the first four or five 
hours all was well, but when the sun got strong and our feet got sore with running up and 
down the planks things altered, and this did not make our job any easier’.65 Similarly, 
uncomfortable heat was witnessed at Sierra Leone and Yokohama.66 High temperatures 
could also be dangerous, especially if the commander was particularly ruthless. The diary of 
Able Seaman Percy Rooke, serving on H.M.S. Canopus, recalls coaling at Abrolhus Rocks 
near Brazil: 
This has been our hardest coaling, as we were working in the sun and the 
temperature was ninety degrees in the shade. Quite a lot of men collapsed during 
the day, and our captain expressed his gratitude by telling us that the coal must 
damn well come in faster. If not, he would walk around himself and we knew what 
that that meant. Yes, we all knew what that meant: he would get his suit dirty and 
could not drink so much whiskey.67 
 
This episode relates to the First World War during the pursuit of von Spee in 1914, 
however, when it was particularly important to complete coaling quickly. In peace, few 
captains were this tyrannical however, and this entry perhaps shows the extreme toll that 
coaling took on a sailor. Indeed, they often used a diary to vent their anger, and thus a 
detested officer was more likely to be documented than an admired one.68 
 In fact, coaling was one of the only levelling times on a ship. Unlike some foreign 
navies, both British officers and men were involved in coaling, and almost all members of 
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the crew had a role to play − it was usual for even the chaplain and cooks to be involved.69 
Only essential work continued during coaling, and specific jobs such as taking back the 
empty sacks were found for those, like telegraphists, who needed to protect their hands.70 
Other members of the crew performed service roles: ‘perhaps the most welcome figure 
was the ship’s steward who presided over a grog-tub filled with lime juice’.71 Furthermore, 
the Marine band played lively tunes throughout the coaling to keep spirits high (see Figure 
5.9).72 
 
Figure 5.9: The Marine band of H.M.S. Prince George playing during coaling c.1900. Courtesy of E. Mason. 
 
 
Even the commander was (nominally) involved, ‘immaculate under cap-cover and 
sea boots’, circulating with a rating holding a blackboard with a picture of a pint of beer on 
it, proclaiming ‘the sooner you get in, the sooner you can get ashore and have one of 
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these’.73 All naval hierarchy and deference were relaxed during coaling, all being equals 
under the coal dust, and even swearing was permitted.74 This sense of equality was 
furthered by ‘coaling dress’. The log of the Pandora notes: 
It is very amusing to observe the number of grotesque and ludicrous figures that flit 
about on coal-ship days. Any old clothing suffices to coal in, and as a rule the 
bluejacket seems to revel in dressing himself as oddly and outrageously as he 
possibly can. All sorts of characters are represented – from a Prime Minister to a 
shoeblack. 75 
 
The log of H.M.S. Caesar even records one man dressed in a sombrero and cricketing 
gear.76 This practice appears to have been universal, for the log of the Bulwark also notes 
that ‘hands were piped to dress in coaling suits, which presented quite a fancy dress 
display’ (see Figure 5.10). The same log also notes that  ‘everyone was looking pretty black, 
making it quite laughable, for it is rather hard to distinguish one’s own messmates,’ 
suggesting that fancy dress and camaraderie were key coping mechanisms while coaling.77 
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Figure 5.10: Portrait of John ‘Dinkum’ Minogue, the ‘ship’s clown’ of H.M.A.S. Melbourne, wearing fancy dress 
during coaling, 1915. Courtesy of Australian War Memorial: http://cas.awm.gov.au/photograph/EN0132. 
 
 Another mechanism for coping with the monotony, hard work, and discomfort of 
coaling was competition. This was unsurprisingly encouraged by the navy, as the ability to 
achieve high rates of coaling was key to swift mobilisation. As the log of the Pandora 
explains:  
Coaling in the navy is, of course, one of the most important evolutions we do; 
because the quicker a ship can fill her bunkers in time of war, the quicker she can 
put to sea again. Owing to this, the competition is very great between the several 
classes of ships to make or break records.78 
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Flags on the yardarm were used to by the ship’s company to work out the rate needed to 
break the current record, and the doctor would write the record onto a blackboard.79 By 
introducing an element of competition into coaling, commanders were able to increase 
coaling rates throughout the period. Coaling records were a very serious business, and 
rates were noted with great reverence in ships’ logs. The competition appears to have been 
most fierce, and consequently the rates were highest, on the larger and strategically more 
important Mediterranean and China Stations, where they could frequently top 200 tons per 
hour. The importance attached to the breaking of records can be seen by the fact that 
when H.M.S. Barham broke the Mediterranean fleet coaling record, one of the ship’s 
company, John Gilderson, sent a postcard to his mother informing her of the news.80 
Photographs of record breaking crews were also included in logs (see Figure 5.11). 
Enthusiasm for records was not just limited to one’s own ship either, the log of the Glory 
noting that the ‘Ocean coaled ship, doing very well’, and also that the ‘Vengeance coaled 
ship, making a very decent show of it’.81 In particular, the logs of ships abroad give a sense 
of pride in the physical effort of achieving high rates of coaling. The log of the Good Hope 
suggests that the ship’s hands worked ‘like the veritable demons who are credited with 
forging the links of fate’. It even goes as far to suggest that despite coaling being 
‘monotonous [and] wearisome’ the element of competition created ‘cheerful hours of 
coaling’.82  
Although the highest rates of coaling were to be found on the largest stations, it is 
still curious that an enthusiasm for competition appears to be largely absent on the 
Australia Station. Here, rates are less regularly recorded and, where they are, coaling is 
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slow, less of the crew is involved, and smaller amounts of coal are taken aboard.83 The 
records at the end of the period in question on the station remained under 130 tons per 
hour, significantly lower than those on larger stations.84 Perhaps this reflects the Australia 
Station’s relative isolation from danger, its small fleet and the more laid back nature of 
station life.  
 
Figure 5.11: The record breaking crew of H.M.S. Caesar, who coaled at over 200 tons an hour from a collier. 
From Maclean, Macdonald, and Yexley, The Log of H.M.S. Caesar, 1900−1903.  
 
 
Non-naval labour 
 
At stations where coaling was completed from a jetty or by lighter the navy often employed 
specialised local workers to carry out the work. These heavers would either complete 
coaling alone (although the ship’s stokers would often be required to manage the bunkers), 
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or work with the ship’s crews in order to get the coal in. Where it is recorded that local 
workers and crews coaled in tandem, the share of work undertaken by each could vary 
enormously. While it could mean that local heavers would deliver the coal aboard and the 
ship’s company would stow the coal away, it could also mean that a few members of the 
crew were responsible merely for recording how much coal had been taken aboard.  
Although the emotional and physical experience of sailors during coaling is well 
recorded, we have no such record for that of local workers. It is safe to assume, however, 
that these labourers had a similar contempt for coaling as sailors, despite naval officers 
often arguing that their supposed racial characteristics made them ideally suited to the 
work, especially when carried out in inhospitable heat.85  In fact, disdain for coaling was 
probably even more pronounced, as the work − which was unpleasant and back-breaking 
in normal conditions − was almost constant. Not only were local heavers were expected to 
work at day and night, but they often coaled one ship after another.  
What remains are the sailors’ impressions of local labour. What Valeska Huber 
suggests of the Suez region was true across the world: ‘watching the coal heavers amazed 
or disgusted many western travellers; they became one of the sights’. It is remarkable how 
similar and repetitive such observations were, mentioning not only the barges and the 
methods, but the appearance of the heavers, their chanting, and their work ethic.86 As a 
result of the sailors’ views of hard work and discipline, a product of their own naval 
training, the standards expected of heavers were high, and anything below this was 
castigated in their records. In general, sailors observed the local labour force as mere parts 
of the coaling process, almost machine-like. Thus they were not seen as humans, but were 
judged and identified on the basis of their efficiency and the quality of their work. While 
the accounts are not always explicitly racist, they are certainly racialised, with the 
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characteristics of the local labour force, both favourable and not, often attributed to their 
ethnicity. These assessments of coaling labour were, of course, shaped by both the naval 
and the Victorian and Edwardian lens they were viewed through. These views were then 
reinforced by the dissemination of these accounts, shaping wider ideas about local 
populations. 
That is not to say that all of which is written about local heavers was negative. In 
fact, some stations were specifically praised for the efficiency of the local labour. Indeed, 
the ability to coal for long hours, particularly in harsh climatic conditions, was often 
remarked upon, even if it was often ascribed to the imagined racial characteristics of the 
workers. Thus, Singapore was especially noted for being ‘one of the smartest coaling places 
in the world’ because of the efficiency of the Chinese ‘coolies’ employed.87 Those employed 
in coaling would ‘come in one gangway and out another, thus keeping up one continual 
stream’. Particularly impressive was their ability to do this in unbearable heat, and that 
often when they finished they would straight away coal another ship.88 Likewise, Port Said 
was well known to be the ‘acme of coaling ports, as coal can be brought on board ship here 
much faster than at any port in the world’.89 Most British sailors who coaled here recorded 
their astonishment at the speed and efficiency of coaling, where rates could be in excess of 
150 tons per hour.90 The log of H.M.S. Encounter recalls: 
Amidst loud cries of “Allah, Allah,” sturdy niggers are carrying small baskets on 
their heads filled with coal, not walking but running, and as one gaping hole is filled 
up they are fast filling another. They are only of a small stature, and often many are 
mere boys; but it seems to make no difference to them, for they appear to never 
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tire, and seem to be gifted with strength that is not human. If one slackened in his 
speed a torrent of abuse would come from one of the dusty overseers, often 
accompanied by a clout on the head. This place is considered the smartest port in 
the world for coaling, the operation only taking a few hours, whereas a ships’ 
company would be occupied for a whole day.91 
The coal heavers of Perim, another station serving Suez Canal traffic, also impressed British 
servicemen. The log of H.M.S. Bedford records that: ‘we had hardly dropped anchor before 
they were clambering up the ship’s side ... everything seemed to be done at the double’. 
Furthermore, the heavers did not appear to eat but continued to coal for ten hours, in 
which time they loaded some 950 tons.92 Again, particularly impressive was the work rate 
in such an inhospitable climate and it was noted that these ‘ginger haired niggers’ were ‘a 
quiet hardworking race’, as they coaled the ship stripped to waist and without boots, 
singing songs as they worked.93 The ‘negroes’ at Fernando Po passed the coal along in a 
chain, which ensured it was ‘done in no time, and without the least dust or bother’.94  Also 
highly appreciated were Fijians heavers, who ‘worked like slaves ... very scantily clothed 
and took only half an hour for meals’.95 Similarly, the labour at St Vincent, Cape Verde, was 
known for coaling ‘in very good time’, and were noted for their aquatic skills, diving after 
coal that had become dislodged from bags, some pieces as big as themselves, then using 
ropes to haul each other back up.96 
Particular praise was reserved for stations, particularly Gibraltar and Malta, where 
the ship’s company worked in tandem with local workers. Although it required labour from 
the ship’s company, competition between vessels to achieve ever higher rates of coaling 
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was fierce, and the help of specialist local labour drove these rates even higher. Thus, at 
these stations, having local labour to bring coal to the upper deck meant it was a ‘great 
advantage coaling from lighters to coaling from a collier’, as coal could be loaded twice as 
fast.97 In fact, so efficient was this system that rates of over 200 tons per hour were 
regularly recorded, and 292.5 tons per hour became the station record in the early 
twentieth century. Such was the value of swift coaling, especially in terms of mobilisation, 
that when this record was broken, the Admiral signalled his congratulations.98 The skill of 
these workers was so highly regarded that were renowned for their speed and balance on 
the planks while carrying baskets in ‘bee like swarms’.99 
 
Figure 5.12: Coaling alongside the new mole at Gibraltar. Note the use of ‘Rock Scorpions’ to carry the bags on 
board. Army and Navy Illustrated, 10 December 1898. 
 
  
Not all stations with local labour received praise, however. Where labourers did not 
live up to the high expectations of naval men they were roundly criticised. Sailors were 
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particularly scathing of what they viewed as laziness and ill-discipline amongst the workers, 
which was generally attributed to the heavers’ race or culture. This was an accusation 
frequently put to the heavers at Suez. The log of H.M.S. Renown recalled that on arrival 
they were surrounded by 
coal laden dhows swarming with natives. After allowing them about half an hour 
for preliminary jabbering, in which it is hopeless to interfere, we have got them 
properly made fast, and they are rigging the stages, up which they will pass the coal 
in small baskets. At last they start as they pass the coal, they break into a weird 
chant ... The coaling is tedious; ‘stand easies’ are too much the order of the day 
with the natives.100 
Similarly, the log of H.M.S. Sutlej had little in the way of compliments for those working in 
Suez, describing their work as ‘the worst specimen of coaling ever witnessed. The coolies, 
with a lazy indifference, absolutely declined to trouble themselves or hurry in any way’.101 
Not only were the heavers perceived as slow working, but also, on occasion when they ‘got 
tired of coaling, [they] deliberately dived over the side and swam ashore’.102 Similarly, 
heavers in Zanzibar were ‘almost as bad as at Suez, and the crew were very 
disheartened’.103 At Wei-Hei-Wei H.M.S. Alacrity endured ‘a most tedious operation, the 
coolies being quite the laziest lot I have ever come across’. The journal then recalls that 
only 260 tons was loaded in 13 hours, and suggested ‘comment is needless’. In a later 
entry, it again suggests slow progress was a result of ‘the coolies being a very poor lot’.104 In 
Colon, Panama, the heavers were regarded as not being energetic enough, the log of 
H.M.S. Retribution noting that ‘the niggers had got in only 30 tons during the day, so we 
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had to set to and make up the deficiency’.105 A similar accusation was made towards the 
coal heavers of Woosung, with suggestions that the ‘coolies are not very good and no one 
seems to care how long they take to put coal on board’.106 Similarly, Edward Charrington 
recalls that coaling at St Helena in 1897 was ‘very slow work owing to great difficulty in 
getting anything like a regular supply from the shore’.107  
Criticism was not simply along racial lines, though, and fellow westerners were also 
bemoaned for their lack of efficiency. H.M.S. Karrakatta endured its ‘dirtiest and worst 
coaling’ in Western Australia, where the heavers would only get in a few hundred tons 
before ‘they want their Smoke-o’. The log notes, however, that they were still better than 
colliers in Sydney.108 The Royal Arthur coaled at just 20 tons per hour from lighters there, 
‘owing to the men on the lighters knocking off every half-an-hour for “spello”, “smokeo” 
and other “excuseo”’.109 At other stations, the method employed by the heavers was 
questioned as to its efficiency, often with an inference that such techniques represented 
evidence of lesser intelligence. When the Sutlej coaled at Surabaya, Java, it was noted that 
the Javanese method of passing 25lbs buckets in a chain was extremely slow, not helped by 
the workers ‘not hurrying themselves in the least and jabbering all the time’.110 At King 
George’s Sound, Albany ‘baskets with a capacity for 5 cwt of coal were wheeled along 
planks from the lighter inboard to the ship, on small trolleys after the English bag system. 
Each basket was then emptied on to the deck and the coal had to be shovelled up again, 
which seemed an Irish way of doing a job’.111 There was room to improve, however, and 
the locals at some stations seem to have enhanced their reputations over time. Those 
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working in Colombo in the late 1890s were said to ‘work very slowly, and, as a 
consequence, we were all day at it, and the ship, from truck to keel, was one mass of coal 
dust’.112 By 1907, however, the ‘coolies’ were said to be ‘quickly on the job, though not so 
lively as our black friends at Perim’.113 
As well as their efficiency, the characteristic ways that local labour would work also 
featured in almost all descriptions. Such comments ranged from a fascination with the 
exotic and alien nature of the workers, to showing them to be strange, primitive, and 
childlike. At stations where work forces were praised by for their work, such as Port Said, 
sailors suggest that ‘it was amusing to watch the natives at work’, and ‘the chatter and 
chanting in their own “lingo” was interesting to listen to, as well as amusing’.114 Similar 
characteristics were less well received when work was not to the high standard expected, 
however.115 At Suez it was noted how ‘the natives ... did more fighting and quarrelling than 
work’.116 Another log suggests that the singing of the ‘crowd of dark, jabbering, unclean-
looking coolies’ was particularly unwelcome, ‘with their dismal chant sounding in our ears 
like a funeral dirge’.117 Some heavers were so despised that their absence was welcomed. 
During Chinese New Year the log of the Glory recalls that having no Chinese heavers aboard 
was ‘quite a treat ... without their shouting and their foreign jabber and especially their 
smell’.118 When situations reached an impasse, tensions between naval men and heavers 
were particularly noticeable. In an attempt to regain the control and to assert their 
superiority, the commanders had several techniques to ‘convince’ the locals to improve 
their attitude. In Suez, the commander sent marines to ‘persuade’ the locals to 
recommence coaling after they had left the job in the evening, and in Zea, Piraeus, a salt-
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water hose was used to encourage heavers refusing to work in a swell.119 Negotiations 
during disagreements with heavers were often difficult, however, despite the presence of 
overseers, as there was generally a substantial language barrier, which could cause further 
delays.120  
Although officers were primarily concerned with getting coaling ‘finished in the 
least possible time’, efficiency was not the sole reason that sailors were scathing in their 
judgments of local labourers − slow coaling generally resulted in ‘the Commander, hoping 
to expedite matters, [falling] the hands in’.121 This was especially detested, as these were a 
rare opportunity for the crew to avoid coaling.122 Furthermore, there was, perhaps, an 
element of the crew feeling coaling was beneath them when local labour, seen as racially 
inferior, was available. Thus when locals refused to coal, as they did for H.M.S. Implacable, 
it was blamed on it being part of the local heavers’ lack of character: it was ‘too hard work 
in the burning sun for the natives, so us unfortunate bluejackets had to lump it’.123 At Aden, 
the crew of H.M.S. Glory fell victim to this, and the thoughts of the crew can easily be 
understood from the tone of the log entry: ‘the niggers didn’t seem to relish the job, so the 
ship’s company had to coal’.124 These occasions did allow sailors to show their own prowess 
at coaling, however. One log suggested that the ship’s company made the best heavers, 
claiming that the ‘niggers could not touch them; bag after bag was filled and passed from 
hand to hand until the end of its journey’.125  
 At stations with only European settler populations, there was more difficulty with 
employing coaling labour, particularly in Australia. Not only did ships face problems with 
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work rate, but an ability to unionise, due to their status as men of British or European 
descent, also caused disturbances to regular coaling practices, particularly after 1900. As a 
newspaper article of 1912 explains: ‘the annual report ... shows that even the Imperial 
Navy in Australian waters has not been free from the inconvenience caused by the 
demands of unionists’. Sydney was unique in that the coal heavers (or ‘lumpers’ as they 
were known) had their own union distinct from that of the wharf labourers.126 These 
unions could do little to protect the heavers from working conditions, which necessarily 
included long hours, horrific conditions, disease, danger, and death, but their actions did 
ensure that ‘Sydney coal lumpers earned a higher hourly rate than even wharf labourers, 
and thus may have been the most highly paid casual labour in Australia at that time’.127 The 
example of Australia shows the advantage held by white workers over non-white heavers, 
in their ability to form unions, demand better pay, and have regulated working hours. 
Furthermore, with a buoyant employment market, labourers were not faced with the 
choice between heaving and unemployment.   
In contrast, the case of Simon’s Town, Cape Colony, shows how labour pools could 
also be exploited at coaling stations. There the authorities rejected the use of a white 
labour force in order to avoid strikes, instead, using them only for skilled dockside jobs, an 
explicit example of the existence of racial hierarchies at imperial coaling stations. When the 
option of using convict labour was objected to by local residents, the Cape ports employed 
black labour to do the majority of coaling.128 This appears to have been a decision made on 
the basis that black Africans were considered the lowest of all races and, although they 
could not be constrained in the same way as convicts, the employers could easily exploit 
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these labourers. This was done through their large-scale importation, beginning in 1874, 
which created a saturated labour market despite a high turnover of labour, allowing firms 
to unite in fixing wages at low rates.129 The majority of the labourers appear to have come 
from the Gold Coast and East Africa, and were in general preferred to other non-white 
labour forces. This was largely because Kaffirs, Indians, Portuguese, and Greeks were all 
more expensive to employ, and thus were only used as stop gaps. This difference in wages 
suggests that racial hierarchies existed even between types of ‘non-whites’ at these 
stations.130 By 1890, the majority of dock workers in the Cape were black, and were 
oppressed with segregation and low pay.131 Although this was true of the whole of the 
Cape, the Admiralty harbour works at Simon’s Town were a ‘principal centre’ of ‘native 
work’.132 
 While most stations employed adult male labour, some stations employed women 
and children in coaling ships. This appears to have been a phenomenon largely occurring in 
the West Indies and Zanzibar, where it was predominantly women who coaled, and Japan, 
where men generally coaled alongside women and children. In the log of the Indefatigable 
it states that at St Lucia ‘native labour – mostly women – [were] employed, as usual’.133 The 
log of the Retribution adds that the heavers were ‘mostly women with baskets on heads’ 
and they ‘seem to do the work quite easily’. (See Figure 5.13).134  
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Figure 5.13: Local heavers coaling the Balantia in St Lucia in 1911. NMM, neg. no. P28491.  
 
An earlier account from Port Royal, Jamaica, suggests that the practice of 
employing women in coaling warships was a long standing one. Sailors seemed to regard 
the use of women for this task as a novelty, but not a shocking one. A visiting female 
traveller, Isabelle Walton, however, was horrified by the practice. She recalls: 
We arrived quite early in the morning at Kingston for coal. The deck was opened 
and a wooden shaft was put down. A man sat at a table with a large book. With a 
pen and ink, he kept a tally of the buckets of coal brought in. Then came the coal 
heavers, to my horror, all women with great buckets of coal on their heads, holding 
them with one hand and the other on their hips. Their only garment, a gown 
reaching about half way from the knees to the feet held on by straps over their 
shoulders. One of them seemed quite young, some middle aged, and some were 
evidently nursing mothers. I exclaimed, “Oh horrors, these women are doing work 
like that. Where are the men?” One [young man named] Chris said carelessly, 
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“They are nxxxers”. “But Chris, they are women, and men should be doing work like 
that.” I said no more because Chris had been raised to look on such people as 
cattle. These women came around and dumped the coal into the shaft, and then 
passed the man at the table and he [wrote] down the number of buckets. 135 
The use of women for coaling appears to be something that happened all over the West 
Indies, as Figure 5.14 illustrates. It is not entirely clear why this was the case, although it 
was probably related to wage levels, and might also have been linked to the concentration 
of women workers in urban Caribbean spaces at the time.136 The only other case of large 
amounts of women being used to coal British warships recorded is found in Zanzibar, 
where ‘the coaling is principally done by women who work very well’.137 
 
Figure 5.14: ‘Recruited local labour spares H.M.A.S. Melbourne’s men the chore of coaling at Martinique, 
c.1915’. Naval Historical Collection, Australian War Memorial, ID EN0158. 
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Figure 5.15: Large coaling basket used in Bermuda. Courtesy of Bermuda Maritime Museum. 
 
 
At Nagasaki, the log of the Goliath recalls that the coaling party were made up of a 
‘cheerful company of men, women and children ... passing their baskets from hand to hand 
... the women [coaling] were a marvel the way they worked at it’.138 Henry Swartz, who 
lived in Japan for some years, explained how the system worked: 
Men in the barges shovel it up in shallow baskets holding a little less than half a 
bushel. This basket passes from hand to hand until it reaches the ladder, when the 
first girl seizes it and swings it straight up in front of her above her head, where it is 
caught by the girl above her; and so it goes on, from girl to girl, never stopping for a 
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single minute until it finds its place in the bunkers of the ship. A line of small boys 
passes the empty baskets back to the barge to be refilled. 
By operating in this way, Swartz worked out that coaling could be achieved at an almost 
unbelievable rate of 353¾ tons per hour.139 This use of all types of labour suggests that 
British ships merely used the unrestricted labour available in Japan, where the method of 
coaling was tailored for the use of women and children as well as men. A photograph 
included in the Army and Navy Illustrated (Figure 5.16) suggests some surprise at the use of 
these ‘dainty little maidens’ to coal ships in Japan, however, remarking they were almost 
unrecognisable from the most famous Japanese women of the day, those in Gilbert and 
Sullivan’s The Mikado. There is no sense of outrage, however, suggesting that although 
seen as quite peculiar, contemporary Britons had little problem with women engaged in 
manual labour. This is perhaps explained by the fact that many of the seaman originated in 
coastal towns, where female labour at the dockside was common. Indeed, women were 
often employed in the British fishing industry, curing and gutting fish, mending nets, and 
doing other general labour.140 
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Figure 5.16: ‘Female Labour and the Fleet’, Navy and Army Illustrated, 4 February, 1899. 
 
Levels of exploitation of the local labour force appear to have been variable. The 
log of the Grafton suggests that at Singapore the ‘Chinese [coal heavers] … make a very 
good living out of the game, being paid so much per basket’.141 Conversely, contemporary 
evidence suggests that other heavers, in Jamaica at least, ‘would work for twenty-four 
hours, then receive a pittance earned for their work while the white man would fill his 
pockets with the money they had earned for him’.142 As has been mentioned, however, at 
some stations there were few other employment opportunities. This was particularly the 
case in the more remote stations and those which were not significant towns or cities in 
their own right. The populations of St Vincent, Cape Verde, were nearly entirely employed 
in coaling, as were those in Port Royal, Jamaica, and Suez. Although coaling offered 
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employment, with little other options, it also allowed low wages and high labour 
turnover.143 
Although little evidence survives, it is clear that there were also more serious 
ramifications for some of the populations of coaling stations. The need for labour brought 
large numbers of workers, either by free will or otherwise, to some coaling stations, which 
subsequently created areas of cramped accommodation, low wages, and disease. Similarly, 
the presence of large numbers of naval men encouraged high levels of prostitution, which 
in turn spread venereal disease throughout sailors and local communities, which is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
Dangers of Coaling  
 
Regardless of methods or labour type, coaling a warship was fraught with danger. Both full 
coal sacks and the coaling equipment were easily heavy enough to crush anyone 
unfortunate enough to be underneath them when they fell, and this happened with 
alarming regularity. This danger was escalated by the sense of competition that infected 
nearly every coaling day. Speed led to an increased chance of improperly secured 
equipment, collisions, and carelessness. Such was the rate of accidents that one sailor 
suggested that on ‘nearly every ship some poor soul lost his life’ coaling. In fact, death and 
serious injury were so common during coaling that the process would not stop when it 
happened.144  
As a result of these accidents, concerns about the dangers of coaling were raised, 
somewhat belatedly, in Parliament, both in 1909 and in 1913. On the second occasion, the 
new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, answered that: 
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The risks attached to coaling are great, but in many cases accidents occur through 
want of care at a critical moment, and this, no action on the part of the Admiralty 
can prevent ... I am informed that as compared with the large quantities of coal 
handled under so many varying conditions, the number of serious accidents is 
small. 
Even if it was ‘doubtful whether it would serve any useful purpose’, the question did 
precipitate a Parliamentary Paper: The particulars of the more serious accidents which have 
occurred during the coaling of His Majesty's ships in the years 1910, 1911, and 1912.145 The 
report detailed only the most serious accidents that had occurred while coaling, stating 
that in these three years, 16 crew members had been killed, with 23 seriously injured. Most 
common serious injuries and deaths were a result of a hoist of coaling bags falling and 
several were as a result of the coaling apparatus collapsing. Although most accidents 
happened above decks, stokers could easily be trapped in bunkers, should the engineer 
sub-lieutenant’s attention wander and too much coal was sent down the chute. As a result, 
there were several occurrences of carbon monoxide poisoning in the coal bunkers, and 
although these were usually not fatal, one case included in the report proved to be.146  
Reports given in logs suggest most accidents and deaths involved the hoist wires 
snapping, and the bags falling, confirming the findings of the Parliamentary Paper.147 They 
also record less frequent types of accidents, which show just how dangerous and 
unpredictable coaling could be. The log of the Eclipse recalls ‘several accidents occurred’ 
during coaling, including a petty officer slipping down an empty bunker, fracturing his ribs 
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and being sent to Yokohama Hospital.148 Accidents also included collisions with other 
vessels. The Retribution, coaling ‘alongside’ in rough weather in the West Indies, ‘nearly put 
her funnel through the bottom of the first cutter’.149 Similarly, on the Mediterranean 
Station, the steamship Henry Aming, supplying coal for the Inflexible and Trafalgar, was 
pierced by H.M.S. Edinburgh in a collision.150 Surprisingly, although the danger of fire was 
constant, there is only one serious incident recorded in surviving logs, when, at Chefoo on 
the China Station, a collier full of Welsh coal caught fire.151 
Conspicuously absent are accounts of accidents involving local labour. It seems 
inconceivable that the rate of accidents, and indeed deaths, amongst indigenous coal 
heavers could have been lower than that of sailors. Indeed, with local workforces coaling 
ships far more regularly, it seems highly probable that injury and death would have been 
quite common. That such occurrences are completely nonexistent in records underlines the 
view of the local labourer as part of the coaling machine, to be replaced when necessary. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has sought to understand the physical process of coaling a naval ship. As a 
result of the slow and very limited adoption of mechanised coaling, this process was still 
largely a human one throughout the period. As such, this chapter has been a history of 
human labour, both of naval men and of local and imported heavers. That is not to say that 
the process was static − in fact, due to the regularity of coaling, and the familiarity with the 
methods involved, rates of coaling improved throughout the period.  
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The use of manpower for coaling may have made sense economically and 
logistically, but it was a dirty, exhausting, and dangerous process. Indeed, surviving records 
from those seamen involved in coaling present it as a detested procedure only made worse 
by inclement or oppressive weather. As a result, coping mechanisms developed aboard. 
Competition with other ships for station records and the promise of a beer afterwards not 
only helped to conceal the monotony and pain of coaling, but also helped to improve 
mobilisation speeds. Other methods, such as coaling dress and the band playing jolly tunes, 
helped to create a more informal atmosphere during coaling, and the allowance of 
swearing and the fact all members of the crew had an active role in coaling were integral to 
morale. Such mechanisms were effective, and this is reflected in the high coaling rates 
achieved by naval crews. These coping mechanisms also show us that these seamen were 
defined during coaling by their highly disciplined nature, epitomised by co-operation and, 
often, a spirit of competition.  
 These ideas of discipline and efficiency, inherited from the navy, heavily influenced 
sailors’ views of local coal heavers. These descriptions also show that they were also 
heavily shaped by perceived racial hierarchies. This is particularly visible where the heavers 
were deemed to be sub-standard, through the negative and racialised language used in 
these descriptions. Even where accounts are positive about the work of local heavers, there 
is a strong suggestion that they were treated merely as cogs in a coaling machine, as much 
part of the machinery of coaling as the lighter or the winch, not people, but tools for the 
use of the navy. This idea is furthered by the exploitation of labour in places such as 
Simon’s Town, where economy came at the expense of labourer’s health, safety, living 
standards, and earnings. Indeed, whereas the frequent accidents involving ships’ crew 
members are described regularly in logs and journals, local heaver casualties are 
conspicuously absent. This again shows the place of local labour − when broken, it was 
simply replaced.  
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Chapter 6: Sojourning at the Coaling Station 
 
Although their primary purpose was for refuelling, coaling stations were also sites of leisure 
and recreation for visiting sailors. As E.G. Anning explains, a sailor’s time at a station was 
usually not a fleeting visit: 
A ship on a foreign station, moving from port to port, offers continual opportunity 
for diversion, and as an abundance of leave is granted to men of good character, 
they have ample opportunity to visit the different towns, see the sights, and study 
the ways of the natives.1 
Indeed, these stays could be reasonably lengthy, Edward Charrington recalled that he spent 
‘a very pleasant fortnight at the island’ of St Helena.2  
The regularity and length of these stays makes sailors’ leisure time at these stations 
a particularly important instance of how Britons interacted with the wider empire and 
world. Furthermore, sailors did not only encounter local places and people, but were parts 
of wider networks of westerners, connected by multiple interactions across Britain’s chain 
of coaling stations. Thus, stations were not just centres of labour, merely pauses in a 
sailor’s commission, but meaningful places which defined time spent abroad. Indeed, with 
significant numbers of sailors abroad, these periods of leisure are an important example of 
the everyday experience of empire. 
The chapter considers how the sailors’ time sojourning at coaling stations was 
shaped by both the character of the station and the opportunity to explore it at length. 
Indeed, although coaling stations did not stand apart from ports, cities and hinterlands, the 
naval man’s experience was distinct from others at these places due to his more 
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encompassing interactions with the station, and with other westerners present. The nature 
of coaling stations is therefore particularly important because they were not places merely 
passed through, but explored by naval visitors as tourists. Thus, although many coaling 
stations acted as points of entry to large imperial cities, ports, islands, or hinterlands 
inhabited by other Britons, the ample leisure time afforded to sailors, and encounters with 
the transient crews of other naval vessels, were key in shaping their experience of these 
places. Indeed, the ability of sailors to act as tourists meant they were more fully immersed 
in these hybrid ‘place[s] of economic and cultural exchange’ where ‘races, cultures, and 
ideas as well as goods from a variety of places jostle, mix, and enrich each other and the life 
of the city’.3 
Coaling stations were therefore important sites of regular transnational exchange 
between British naval men, local populations, and other transient people found there. This 
chapter examines how the sailors’ sense of themselves, as Britons, Europeans, and 
mariners, influenced their views when on leave at coaling stations. Although different 
stations were perceived to have distinct characters, it is possible to draw a distinction 
between those with ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ populations. Attitudes towards non-
western populations tended to be shaped by ideologies of race and civilisation typical of 
Britons in this period. In particular, a pervading assumed racial superiority was evident in 
patronising and often denigrating views of local populations, comments on the civilising 
power of British influence, and a fascination with the exotic. These same attitudes towards 
racial difference also precipitated the fraternisation between sailors and other 
‘westernised’ visitors, including members of the Japanese navy, and inhabitants at coaling 
stations in unfamiliar climes.  
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The continual interactions with westerners at each station meant that the mobility 
of sailors formed transient trans-oceanic bonds which spanned thousands of miles. The 
aggregation of these relationships linked these stations in a wider international maritime 
community which shaped the experience of British naval men at coaling stations. Although 
these interactions are integral to understanding the leisure time of British seamen abroad, 
the coaling station was not merely a neutral space in which these events took place, but 
differences in location, landscape, commercial importance, and local populations shaped 
the mobile communities that emerged. This chapter therefore argues that it was through 
the shared encounters of the unique facets of each station that the distinctive experience 
of sailors at coaling stations emerged. Indeed, it was through the way that sailors explored 
these places, coming together and crossing boundaries in ways other westerners did not, 
that was a major factor in transforming stations from being merely an amalgamation of the 
western cultures present there, but rather a distinct culture of their own.4 
Finally, the chapter considers the most predictable pastimes for unsupervised 
single men abroad: vice and the abuse of alcohol. Although these were occluded from 
almost all of those records disseminated in Britain − in order to preserve a moral image of 
the navy − this was not a reflection of the reality abroad.5 While alcohol was an integral 
part of naval life, and of socialising on leave, the use of prostitutes was more problematic 
for the Admiralty. The spread of venereal disease, which was exacerbated by the 
movement of the maritime community who frequented these stations, was a particular 
concern. Losing large numbers of sailors to the sick bay for not inconsiderable amounts of 
time led to measures to control venereal diseases, but this was solely for the benefit of the 
seamen. In fact, the instigation of such measures clearly shows the place of the stations’ 
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local populations in the minds of the navy, merely there to service British personnel, and 
only of concern if their wellbeing affected that of naval men. 
 
The Sailors’ Experiences of the Coaling Station  
 
For ships’ companies, shore-leave in an interesting port provided relief after the exhausting 
and dirty work of coaling. Leave was generally granted as standard once the coal was 
loaded, unless orders were given for immediate departure.6 This leave was in almost all 
cases enjoyed by the crew, officers and bluejacket alike.7 During a three-year commission, 
these men would spend significant time at leisure on numerous stations. As a result, 
despite sailors’ mobile existence, coaling stations were not experienced as places of work, 
but explored as ‘authentic, rooted, bounded place[s]’ with distinct ‘histor[ies] that 
permeate[d] the networks that flow[ed] through’ them. Thus, sailors did not see coaling 
stations as a series of ‘non-places’ of little significance, merely filling the time between 
naval manoeuvres. Instead, the individual characteristics of each place were crucial, as they 
shaped the experience of British naval men. 8  
As most of those aboard naval vessels initially had no knowledge of foreign lands, 
the experience of being given leave on a foreign station was usually a culture shock, 
especially for those on stations outside European and ‘western’ waters. Even those who 
had extensively travelled remained captivated by the landscapes of coaling stations. Thus, 
recollections of their stays at stations are littered with references to the local peoples, 
landscapes, flora and fauna, and entertainments. 
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During leave, relieved of official duties, sailors could become travellers, tourists, 
and explorers. This was in contrast to other Britons present at these stations, meaning that 
they experienced stations in a different way.9 Even fellow British seamen working for 
commercial shipping companies, and sharing the same need for fuel, did not experience 
the station in the same way. They were tied to schedules and stopped at these stations 
solely for coaling or business, with little time for leave, making their experience briefer and 
less leisurely than a sailor’s time at a station. There were also differences in the experience 
of a sailor and resident Britons at some coaling stations. Unlike the colonial elites who 
remained in these spaces permanently, and often segregated themselves from local 
populations, the fleeting and recreational nature of the visits to these places meant that 
sailors were far more likely to interact with local people and stations through visiting 
landmarks, enjoying the landscape, and immersing themselves in foreign bazaars.10 
Moreover, the necessary positioning of coaling stations on the coast meant that sailors 
were thrust into imperial contact zones as soon as they came ashore, with local workers 
filling the port areas. Thus, unlike spaces such as the Indian military station or British 
Administrative Areas, the surrounds of the coaling stations were not ‘occupied, modified 
and principally inhabited by representatives of the colonising society’ nor were they spaces 
marked ‘in terms of separateness, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking 
understandings and practices, and often within radically asymmetrical relations of 
power’.11  
The way in which sailors interacted with others at stations was also influenced by 
the issue of class and rank. As opposed to permanent British residents, the variance in class 
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of naval men meant they would form relationships with different levels of society at the 
stations, not just those colonial elites resident there. There was, of course still some level 
of segregation, at places like naval clubs, but bluejackets and junior officers were 
noticeably more likely to mix in bazaars and to have a common interest in local cultures. By 
recognising this, it is clear that in entering these coaling stations, sailors became ‘one of the 
ingredients of an existing hybridity’, a ‘colonial third culture’ which was not just a 
combination of distinct cultures, but a new culture in itself.12 As nodes of naval coaling 
networks, the stations were therefore linked ‘contact zones’, where transient communities 
interacted with permanent residents.13  
Even much smaller stations based on islands or tiny littorals were distinctive 
because of their place in a wider maritime system. By the later nineteenth century, most 
were connected with each other and other parts of the empire by telegraph, making them 
far less isolated than many island spaces. Furthermore, most had regular naval visitors, 
who interacted with local populations and each other, which fostered a sense of maritime 
community that spanned the thousands of miles between stations. The connections 
between these nodes are crucial, as ‘places need to be understood as sites that are 
connected to others around the world in constantly evolving networks which are social, 
cultural and natural/environmental’.14 As a result, the analysis of the transient maritime 
community which emerged across these stations requires the inclusion all naval coaling 
stations within the same scope of enquiry.  
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Interactions with Non-Western Local Populations 
 
It seems obvious to state that when arriving at naval coaling stations sailors could only 
access land through the harbour, but this had an impact on the way that they experienced 
these imperial places. Indeed, from their arrival seamen were thrust immediately into the 
most diverse racial and cultural space, particularly at large trading centres. Interactions 
with local peoples encountered in these places were often reciprocal: naval vessels 
provided a captive market for the local merchants and opportunist pedlars, and sailors 
were usually in want of goods, laundry services, and hospitality. Indeed, it was the mobility 
of the sailors that was crucial to the survival of many local populations, such as at Valletta, 
where the local populations ‘depend[ed] very largely on the fleet for a living’. 15 
 Often, sailors would encounter local peoples even before disembarking, as many 
traders took a more aggressive attitude to selling their goods, coming directly to the ship at 
anchor (see Figure 6.1). When the Retribution arrived at St Lucia, ‘there was a fine crowd of 
niggers there waiting [its] arrival with baskets of fruit’, where they would swap fruit for 
jumpers.16 At Madeira, ships were surrounded by boats of all descriptions, selling wicker 
baskets, fruit, parrots, and canaries, which would be swapped for sailors’ old clothes.17 At 
Cape Coast Castle H.M.S. Swallow witnessed ‘natives’ in war canoes ‘chanting their wild, 
weird litanies like people possessed’, and selling bananas, pineapples, pomegranates, 
mangoes, yams, ivory, wood, and jewellery.18 At Singapore the Karrakatta was swarmed 
with locals selling silks and fruit, and at Bombay people came aboard not only to sell 
cashmere and silk, but also to repair boots and perform chiropody.19 It was not just to sell 
wares and services that locals visited warships, but also to entertain the sailors, and these 
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visitors appear to have been welcomed by sailors. At Penang, ‘natives’ came aboard to 
dance and juggle.20 At Bombay, sailors were again entertained by ‘native jugglers’, and also 
by snake charmers and fortune tellers. In Suva, Fiji, sailors enjoyed a catamaran race, 
dancing, fire walking and even a visit from a Royal party.21 More primitive entertainment 
was also enjoyed, including pitting a mongoose against a snake in a fight to the death, 
allowing the sailors to partake in gambling.22 Although some accounts bemoan such 
invasions of naval space, evidence of the employment of services, goods, and 
entertainments by sailors aboard ship suggests that these interactions were mutually 
beneficial. 
 
Figure 6.1: Local people coming aboard a warship, c.1900. NMM, ALB 10/254. 
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Whereas local merchants saw the arrival of these warships as a business 
opportunity, some visitors came only to witness the size and modernity of a British 
warship. Such impressive ships and large numbers of men inevitably drew interest from 
local populations, and thus, at those stations less frequently visited by state-of-the-art 
warships such as Piraeus, Karachi and Madras, large crowds would visit to marvel at these 
wonders of technology.23 Those who encountered these vessels and seamen interpreted 
their identities in different ways, and these interactions were deeper than merely 
transactional, but were also potent symbols of the power of the British Empire abroad. As 
such, they could variously be interpreted as a reassuring presence and deterrence to 
potentially aggressive rivals, or as a statement of power and a warning against rebellion. 
The need for services provided by locals is further reinforced by the fact that sailors 
would often seek them out on land. In particular, naval men would usually frequent the 
markets and bazaars of non-westernised foreign stations to purchase wares and immerse 
themselves in local maritime culture (see Figure 6.2). Although purchasing essential goods 
and services was often the reason for visiting such places, sailors would usually buy 
souvenirs. These purchases suggest an interest in the cultures of stations which went 
beyond simply buying essential supplies. This appears to have happened at almost all 
stations, for example when the Royal Arthur arrived at Malta ‘the usual invasion of vendors 
took place, making bargains (?) for lace, holy stone, etc’.24 Most was written about the 
markets of the more culturally different stations, however. Several cities were well known 
for their bazaars − Tokyo was said to ‘swarm’ with them – and the products and people 
drew many comments from sailors.25 In Shanghai, for example, ‘practically anything could 
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be obtained, Chinese or English’.26 Similarly, on Hong Kong’s Queen’s Road there were 
‘merchants of every type’.27 At Yokohama, a sailor’s appetite for silk, bronze, lacquer, 
porcelain, and other curiosities could be met, and at Chefoo, they could visit the silk 
factories themselves.28  At Karachi, cashmere was abundant in markets, at Gibraltar one 
could purchase Indian shawls, and at the Turkish port of Smyrna a visitor could buy silk 
scarves, carpets, and Turkish delight.29  
 
 
Figure 6.2: A sailor’s photo of fruit for sale at a market in Kingston, Jamaica c.1900. NMM, ALB 10/37. 
 
The sense of fascination with the unique facets of individual coaling stations 
suggested by these purchases of local wares is augmented by the descriptions of the racial 
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and cultural diversity of traders at the station. Bombay’s bazaars were said to contain a 
‘motley population’, just as Colombo’s were ‘teeming with every variety of oriental race 
and costume’.30 In Hong Kong, although there were many Chinese, often wearing national 
dress, a visitor could also expect to see ‘Jew, pagan, and Christian, Buddhist and Parsee, ... 
Japanese, and European fill[ing] the streets’.31 Singapore, although dominated by a large 
Chinese population, was also home to Malay, Japanese, ‘Hindoo’, Persian, ‘wild tartar’, 
Bornese, Sumartran, Japanese, ‘jet black Africans’ and even New Zealanders. This variety of 
races and customs made ‘Singapore’s human panorama most exciting and interesting’.32 At 
Bombay, the ‘gaudy headdresses of its mixed population turn the streets into a blaze of 
colour’.33 European stations also presented visitors with a vast array of cultures and 
peoples. Both Malta and Gibraltar contained ‘men of pretty well every nationality’.34 This 
variety made these places unique, containing ‘a mixture of races, customs, and manners, 
such as can scarcely be found at any other place in Europe’.35 Even at small stations such as 
Freemantle, Western Australia, ‘the streets [were] crowded with all nationalities’.36 
Such diversity was generally celebrated as creating a thrilling and novel 
environment, but local peoples were often seen as objects of curiosity, merely part of the 
exotic landscape.37 Attitudes towards local people at stations in general adhered to 
contemporary ideas of race and their characteristics, even if they were not chiefly negative 
or denigrating. In fact, it is remarkable how much interest naval men took in at least some 
indigenous peoples, perhaps as a result of the nature of these interactions. Indeed, just as 
impressions of local heavers were shaped by the fraught nature of coaling, impressions of 
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local populations during leave were tempered by the touristic nature of these encounters. 
Of particular note were the comments devoted to Polynesian and Melanesian peoples, 
which reflected the accepted idea of them as ‘exotic, distant and other’, illustrated by the 
log of the Karrakatta, which dedicated twelve pages to notes on traditional Maori culture.38 
Similarly, the praise of Fijians for their ‘splendidly formed bodies’, reflected the connection 
between ideas of Pacific Islands as idylls and their peoples as ‘a valuable backdrop for 
island dreaming’.39 The wider idea that these South Sea islanders were ‘almost Caucasians’, 
was supported by the reports given by naval men of the progress of the civilising mission 
on the Australia Station.40 Indeed, reports in naval logs suggested that Aborigines, Maoris, 
and South-Sea Islanders were, somewhat patronisingly, ‘fast coming within the pale of 
civilisation’. Even though they were held back by ‘strange customs and superstitions’, they 
were still of great interest to the sailor.  41  
Similarly, ideas about civilisation, or indeed westernisation, brought about positive 
reports of some local peoples on the China Station. The company aboard the Grafton took 
great interest in the ‘figure, physiognomy, costume, and customs of the people’ of 
Yokohama, concluding that they were, ‘on the whole, a short, sturdy race of people,’ who 
were ‘also very intelligent, industrious, and very courteous in their manners’. Such was the 
impression that the locals made on the ship’s company that the log records ‘Yokohama had 
endeared itself to the hearts of our ship’s company, and we left with many regrets and 
wishes for a speedy return’.42 It was also noted that on stations such as Nagasaki and 
Yokohama, locals were slowly adopting English customs.43 The idea of a racial hierarchy is 
particularly shown in these examples, with the adoption of western, and particularly 
                                                                    
38
 John Connell, ‘Island Dreaming: The Contemplation of Polynesian Paradise’, Journal of Historical 
Geography, 29, no. 4 (2003); Silk, The Log of H.M.S. Karrakatta, 54-65. 
39 Callow, The Commission of H.M.S. Royal Arthur, 74-76; Connell, ‘Island Dreaming’. 
40 Connell, ‘Island Dreaming’; Silk, The Log of H.M.S. Karrakatta, 54-65. 
41 Fowler, The Log of H.M.S. Encounter, 124. 
42 Gibbs, The Cruise of H.M.S. Grafton, 10-11. 
43 Anning, Bentley, and Yexley, The Log of H.M.S. Argonaut, 33. 
261 
 
British, customs seen as a step toward civilisation for these peoples. Many imagined the 
British sailor to be an object of admiration to ‘orientals’.44 In fact, sailors consistently used 
themselves as a yardstick to measure other against, and there was an assurance that 
contact with Britons would act as a catalyst in their progress towards civilisation. Thus, the 
log of the Bedford considered that ‘Chinamen at the ports’, who had been in contact with 
sailors, ‘in many respects [were] a more advanced and enlightened being than those of 
inland towns’, who had not.45 The influence of British servicemen appears to have had less 
of an impact at Chefoo, however, where ‘the natives [were] evidently learning the English 
language, but their ideas are still confused’.46 Sailors would often divide populations by 
their perceived civility. Thus, the population of Kowloon, Hong Kong, were ‘very noisy and 
dirty. The company’s officials however are most civil and obliging to one’.47 
Those peoples observed by sailors to lack the willingness to ‘civilise’, or to conform 
to western expectations, were portrayed more critically, and sailors often resorted to crude 
stereotypes. Whereas there were many examples of praise for inhabitants of the China 
Station, some populations received more disparaging comments. At Chinampo it was 
observed that ‘Korean people seem to be a slovenly race; the women only dress to the 
waist, the upper part of the body being exposed and very dirty’.48 Sailors of the Alacrity 
paint a similar picture describing them as ‘most curiously dressed’, and as a ‘decidedly dirty 
race’.49 Similarly, at Singapore, the people were lambasted for their ‘ridiculous attire’.50 At 
Canton, it was reported that the population was some two million, ‘the majority of them 
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are an awful looking lot of ruffians and blackguards’.51 The populations of some parts of 
Asia were seen as particularly barbarous. At Formosa, the ‘natives’ were ‘considered 
savage and warlike, and have given much trouble to the Chinese and Japanese due to their 
proclivity for head hunting’.52 
Almost universal criticism was reserved for those inhabitants of South America and 
the Caribbean. At Acapulco, for example, the populace were criticised for their ‘indolent 
nature’, as they spent ‘most of their time in wine shops and watching cock fighting’.53 
Similar criticism was aimed at the black inhabitants, particularly at St Lucia and Jamaica. 
Not only were these ‘niggers’ idle, but they were ‘dressed in the most grotesque rigs 
imaginable: one in a pair of pants which are tied round his neck, and a bluejacket’s old 
cap’.54 
Judgements of a station’s population were not always based solely on perceived 
race, however. At some stations, less savoury incidents coloured perceptions of its people. 
By the 1910s, the sailors’ relationship with the locals of St Helena was in severe decline, 
with locals complaining that naval ships drained its vital resources, causing the ship’s 
company to not be sorry to leave.55 Minor tensions such as these were put into context by 
more serious events, though. A sailor who went to buy provisions for the ship at St Vincent, 
for example, was drugged by a ‘vile looking Portugee’, robbed, stripped, and left on some 
rocks. Once found, the offender was hanged by the local authorities, leading one sailor to 
suggest that he would ‘wager none in that cinder keep of an island ever wanted to interfere 
with a British bluejacket again’.56 Other serious incidents at stations included a member of 
the Mediterranean fleet, at Salonica, Turkey, being ‘badly stabbed’, and at Malta, a young 
                                                                    
51
 Journal kept by Edward Charrington, 1899-1902, Royal Naval Museum, Manuscript Collection, 
1999/51/7. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Albert Newton, The Commission of H.M.S. Grafton, 125. 
54 Watts, The Commission of H.M.S. Retribution, 99-100. 
55 Journals of Donovan C. Roe, 1911-1912, NMM, JOD/92/2. 
56 Noble, ‘Tween Decks in the Seventies, 90-92. 
263 
 
bluejacket was murdered ‘in cold blood’.57 These incidents appear to have been rare, 
however, and in general relationships appear to have been cordial between sailors and 
local populations. 
 
Interactions with other ‘Westerners’ 
 
At most stations, sailors would also interact and spend extensive time with other 
westerners. Here the term ‘westerner’ is used to refer to other Britons, the crews of 
European, American, or Japanese naval vessels, or local Europeanised populations, 
especially on stations in the settler colonies. That British sailors interacted with Japanese 
sailors in the same way as Europeans and Americans was a result of the westernisation of 
Japan by the later nineteenth century. Furthermore, there was a strong connection with 
Britain, which became an official ally in 1902, and manufactured many of Japan’s ships, 
trained its cadets, and provided a model for the Japanese navy.58  
Depending on the facilities of a station and the rank of the naval man, these 
interactions could be formal, such as dinners and balls, or informal, such as enjoying local 
cultural activities, or the local hospitality. Such interactions, unlike those between British 
sailors and non-western populations, were made on an equal footing, and this 
fraternisation created human networks that spanned across stations. 
 
Sport 
 
One of the most pervasive interactions between British sailors and other westerners was 
through sport, and this was a key factor in the formation of these transnational, imperial, 
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naval, and maritime relationships.59 Sport not only fostered a sense of competition among 
sailors, useful for fleet exercises such as coaling, gunnery and signalling, but also helped 
naval men foster the imagined characteristics of the ‘imperial man’: self control, discipline, 
and espirit de corps. It also encouraged the development of relationships between British 
naval ships, British populations at the station, foreign warships, and local western 
populations. It helped to cultivate solidarity in colonial societies, and developed a sense of 
imperial fraternity in the settler colonies. Indeed, ‘sport played a major role in the 
transmission of imperial and national ideas’.60 During almost every leave and at practically 
every station some sort of sport occurred. 
The simplest of these were impromptu swimming and boat races – both easy to 
organise at short notice. These were often informal races between sailors from two 
warships, attracting gamblers from both sides. Rivalries grew between ships on a station, 
and challenges and counter challenges ensued. British crews also competed against foreign 
crews, generally Americans, as a matter of national pride.61 As well as informal racing, there 
were also regular organised regattas on stations, where each ship would enter various 
classes of boats, such as launches, whalers, skiffs, pinnaces, and cutters, in a general fleet 
competition which would last several days.62 These were taken extremely seriously, often 
with trophies for winners, and detailed results were recorded in ships’ logs.63 There was 
also a level of interaction with local populations, particularly in the settler colonies, with 
ships’ racing crews competing against local crews. At the Australian Anniversary Day 
Regatta in Sydney, for example, some events were open to naval crews, and British crews 
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raced each other and ‘Yankee’ crews. There was a large amount of local interest in these 
races, as shown by the reports in Australian newspapers.64 Likewise, at the Victoria Regatta 
near Esquimalt, locals competed with navy and army crews, watched by holiday-makers 
from the shore or on launches and canoes.65 Less frequent were sailing races, although at 
Malta there were regular races for the Gibraltar Cup.66 Outside of the settler colonies, 
however, it appears only in Japan did local participation occur. At the annual regatta at 
Yokohama, for example, Japanese crews entered the sampan race.67  
Although sport was primarily between different ships of a fleet, or between the 
services, there were occasions where sports were played against other teams. These could 
be against foreign warships also present in harbour, against British nationals resident in a 
port, or against local populations. Against foreign naval teams, the sports competition was 
limited by what sports those nations played. For example, British naval teams would 
compete regularly against American ships, but generally only in boat racing, swimming, and 
track and field.68 Similarly, when the Bedford was at the German port of Tsingtau, China, 
the crews were limited to competing at football.69 Competition against local populations 
was less often limited in the same way, as the British influence permeated into sporting 
pursuits. Thus we see cricket being played against local populations at Corfu, Cyprus, Port 
Said, Alexandria, Zanzibar, Valparaiso, and Fiji.  
These matches were predominantly against British settlers, but it was certainly not 
rare for sailors to play against local populations at ports, although these teams tended to 
be largely made up of Europeans.70 Football was played against locals at Port Said, Smyrna, 
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Alexandria, Esquimalt, Zanzibar, and Valparaiso.71 At the gymkhana at Suda the crew of the 
Implacable had ‘a most enjoyable afternoon ... the foreigners greatly delighted at being 
permitted to take part in the many races and sports’.72 At Esquimalt, crews competed 
against local loggers at tug-o’-war as well as football, and at King George’s Sound, the crew 
of the Royal Arthur were invited to a shooting match against West Australian Artillery.73 
Although most sports were taken seriously, there were chances for sailors to participate in 
less competitive sports. At the Shanghai gymkhana for instance, sailors took part in an 
unusual bicycle race. Firstly, they would don fancy dress, then ride to a specified point, 
drink a pint of beer, then cycle back to the finish.74 In a similar vein, at a sports day on an 
American ship stationed at Hong Kong, sailors partook in a pie race, an eating contest 
performed with hands tied.75 Sport could also bring tragedy, however, and the log of the 
Crescent records the death of E. Case, a petty officer killed by a field gun in the naval sports 
in 1903.76  
 
Figure 6.3: Royal Navy ships often played local teams at sport, such as this rugby game in Halifax, c.1900. NMM, 
ALB 10/39. 
                                                                    
71
 Wheeler, The Commission of H.M.S. Pandora, 39-41; Journals of Donovan C. Roe, 1911-1912, 
NMM, JOD/92/2; Newton, The Commission of H.M.S. Grafton, 90, 93, 117, 130, 132; Moore, 
Commission and Travels of H.M.S. Good Hope, 49. 
72
 Parker, The Commission of H.M.S. Implacable, 48. 
73 Newton, The Commission of H.M.S. Grafton, 90; Callow, The Commission of H.M.S. Royal Arthur, 
11. 
74 Dunslow and Jones, The Commission of H.M.S. Eclipse, 80. 
75 Gibbs, The Cruise of H.M.S. Grafton, 34-35. 
76 M.E. Donoghue, The Log of H.M.S. Crescent (London: Westminster Press, 1907), 64. 
267 
 
Some sports were enjoyed solely by officers, and these included racquets, tennis, 
and fives.77 Golf courses, often laid out by British officers, were also immensely popular, 
especially on the Mediterranean Station, allowing them opportunity to spend time with 
other men of their rank, while enjoying the often spectacular scenery of these coastal 
courses. Again, such pursuits were very competitive, and regular tournaments were held, 
with medals as prizes. In many cases, local men were used as caddies, reinforcing 
hierarchies of rank and race.78 
 
 
Figure 6.4: British naval officers playing golf in Crete. Note the use of local caddies. Navy and Army Illustrated, 
18 February 1899. 
 
Many of the activities enjoyed by British seamen abroad required specialised 
facilities. These often belonged to local sports teams, but for the servicemen stationed at 
larger stations such as Hong Kong and Malta there were extensive sporting facilities 
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provided for their use. Those at Hong Kong were particularly impressive. Happy Valley, as it 
was known, was immensely popular. Converted into a racecourse for the amusement of 
British residents, the log of the Sutlej describes it as ‘one of the finest sports fields I have 
ever seen’, with its stands, running track, and facilities for football, rugby, golf, hockey, and 
cricket (see Figure 6.5).79 Such facilities allowed Hong Kong to host regular sporting fixtures, 
including the Hong Kong Shield for football, which included local clubs, regiments of the 
garrison, and teams from British ships. They were also well supported, with the log of the 
Goliath recalling that ‘as many men as can be spared from the fleet’ were allowed to watch 
the semi-final of the Shield.80 At Malta, sports were played at the Corradino sports ground. 
Although the calendar included regular Army versus Navy football matches, it was the 
annual naval athletics sports which were the highlight of the year.81 The two days of 
competition attracted thousands of viewers, leaving those who could not fit into the 
ground to spectate from tree tops and roofs. Events included the gun crew competition, 
sack race, obstacle race, flat racing, and tug-o’-war, with the ship’s officers the ‘chief 
encouragers of our naval sports’.82  
Sporting facilities also existed at other, smaller stations. When the crew of the 
Vulcan arrived in the Platea, they found ‘nothing but dense scrub’, but quickly set about 
creating a sports ground. By 1899, there was a tennis court, two football pitches, and a 
cycling track made from ash. The ‘Empress of India Football Cup’, played at the recreation 
ground, was soon one of the most coveted prizes for the Mediterranean fleet.83 
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Figure 6.5: Happy Valley, 1895. From Round the World (London: News of the World, 1895). 
 
Even outside these centres with organised leagues and competitions sport was 
taken very seriously. Indeed, such was the importance of a cricket match against the 
Gibraltar garrison for the team of the Pandora that they almost drowned in heavy swells 
getting from the ship to land.84 Furthermore, all the scores for cricket, football, rugby, 
water polo, hockey, and shooting, whatever the venue or opponent, recorded in each 
ships’ logs, illustrating the depth and importance of sport at naval stations (see Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6: Nearly all sports results were recorded in ship’ logs. From the cover of W.T. Cole, The Log of H.M.S. 
Carnarvon, Mediterranean Station 1905−1907. 
 
Leisure 
 
Sport was a prominent method of integration in port life, at least in daylight hours, but was 
by no means the only way that a ship’s company would interact with other members of the 
maritime community. Finding themselves in a strange port, it is unsurprising that many 
sought the company of fellow Britons. Often, other British ships would invite sailors aboard 
for smoking concerts and supper, offering the chance to fraternise with old friends.85 
Sailors could also guarantee British company by visiting spaces designated for naval men, 
whether they were naval canteens, Junior Officers’ Clubs, United Services Clubs, or sailors’ 
homes, depending on their rank and the station they were at (see Figure 6.7). In general, 
these offered refreshments, billiards, bridge, reading materials, concerts, and singing, as 
well as sleeping quarters.86 Some, such as those on the Mediterranean Station also had 
                                                                    
85 Brodie, Ray, and Yexley, The Log of H.M.S. Goliath, 62, 74; Tyler, The Commission of H.M.S. 
Lancaster, 42. 
86 Dougherty, The East Station, 27, 130; Callow, The Commission of H.M.S. Royal Arthur, 12-16; 
Journals of Donovan C. Roe, 1911-1912, NMM, JOD/92/2. 
271 
 
fives, racquet, and tennis courts, which were immensely popular with junior officers.87 
Where a station had a garrison, sailors would frequently visit to enjoy a meal and beer, 
smoking concert, or be guided round the sights by the soldiers.88 There were also joint 
recreation rooms for services, which offered similar facilities to the purely naval ones.89 
British service personnel also patronised certain public houses, hotels, and clubs, such as 
the Central Hotel in Hong Kong, the Prince of Wales Hotel in Colombo, or the George  and 
Dragon at Corfu, where they could find company, cheap food and beer, and spend time 
singing.90 Again, who mixed in these meeting places would be a question of rank, with the 
officers and bluejackets largely frequenting different establishments. At some stations, as 
well as mixing with Britons, seamen could pick up mails from home, giving them a 
connection with people and events back home.91  
 
Figure 6.7: The Sailors’ Home in Simon's Town, c.1900. NMM ALB 26/130. 
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At stations in the settler colonies, there were similar levels of interactions and 
communal feelings between sailors and the populations at the ports. Although these 
populations were not strictly British, they often felt a strong familial bond between 
themselves and Britain. Interactions often occurred through visitors coming aboard 
warships in harbour, a phenomenon particularly prominent on the Australia Station (see 
Figure 6.8). Here ships’ arrivals were greeted with pride and celebration, and visitors not 
only came to marvel at the technology, but also to reinforce the feeling of the fraternity 
between the metropole and the wider empire. Indeed, these naval men were ‘flying the 
flag’ for the navy, Britain, and the empire abroad. When the Nelson was stationed at 
Melbourne, it attracted around 3,000 visitors in one day, and at Wellington it was again the 
centre of attention with thousands visiting during its stay.92 The Royal Arthur attracted 
visitors from hundreds of miles away, which gave the crew opportunity to converse with 
woodsmen, cattlemen, and miners, many of whom had been born in England.93 There 
appears to have been a unique bond on these stations, and its log notes that in each port it 
visited the ‘Nelson did much to bind closer the ties that unite Australia to the mother 
country’.94 The log of the Encounter also recalls that on the Australia Station the ‘spirit of 
brotherhood strongly manifested at each and every port we called at’.95 
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Figure 6.8: Visitors aboard H.M.S. New Zealand in Wellington, 1913. Sir George Grey Special Collections, 
Auckland Libraries, AWNS-19130501-2-2. 
 
 
This sense of kinship was sustained by a reciprocal relationship between locals and 
the company of the ship on land. Residents of the Australia Station in particular went out 
their way to entertain the seamen. In Wellington, for example, ‘socially, here as elsewhere, 
the “Nelsons” were everywhere welcomed – nay, even sought after – both officers and 
men sharing alike in the general goodwill’.96 As a result of this, it became ‘well known that 
New Zealanders are Big Navy people’.97 In Sydney, residents ‘found pleasant exercise in 
entertaining their welcome friends’.98 These entertainments included balls, dinners, and 
concerts, which were often held by residents ashore, then reciprocated by the ships’ crew 
aboard.99 Relationships with the ‘friends on shore’ were also cemented through the ship’s 
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company becoming part of community life. At Sydney and Auckland the ships’ bands would 
play weekly in Botanical Gardens whenever they were in town. 100 
Similar occurrences can also be seen on other stations with westernised 
populations. Often, these interactions came through the ships’ theatrical companies, which 
entertained local populaces (see Figure 6.10). At Malta the Bulwark’s amateur theatre 
company put on a show for a few nights in Royal Clarence Theatre, and when the Swallow 
stopped at Port Stanley it gave islanders a theatrical performance.101 A benefit 
performance in St Helena was so popular that people were turned away from the door.102 
The seamen would also join in special occasions if they were in port; at Melbourne the 
Royal Arthur marked the King’s birthday along with colonial troops, sailors, and dignitaries 
in front of lots of spectators.103 The Bonaventure likewise joined in the concerts and 
celebrations for Victoria Day and Dominion Day in Victoria.104 
 
Figure 6.9: The theatre of the Royal Navy Canteen, Malta. Navy and Army Illustrated, 11 March, 1899. 
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Figure 6.10: An advert for a theatrical performance by British sailors on the China Station, c.1900. NMM, ALB 
10. 
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Just as the crews of different British ships would socialise and explore stations 
together, if a foreign man-of-war was in port their crews often joined British sailors in 
activities. On occasion British ships would be visited by high-ranking naval officers: at 
Yokohama the Goliath attracted visits from Japanese and American Admirals, and at Wei-
Hei-Wei a ball on board the Glory was attended by the wife of the American rear admiral.105 
These visits were not limited to just the top ranks, though, and often sailors from foreign 
vessels were invited to celebrate special occasions on board British warships. At Port-of-
Spain, Christmas dinner was shared with Italian sailors, at Esquimalt it was Americans, and 
at Malta Russian, Greek, and Italian officers came aboard to celebrate New Year’s Eve.106 
Invitations for foreign sailors to come aboard British warships were not limited to special 
occasions, but appear to have occurred almost every time British and foreign naval vessels 
were in port together.107 Nor, perhaps surprisingly, were they reserved for allies of Britain. 
Indeed, even with war looming on the horizon, German sailors and marines visited a British 
warship at Tsingtau.108 This suggests that the tensions of European high politics were felt 
less keenly in these alien environments, and instead British sailors were glad to have the 
company of what they saw as fellow westerners.109 
These interactions were not limited to ships, but extended into the port itself. 
Here, British seamen would integrate with westerners of a similar rank. Often, officers 
would attend official banquets in town, such as that at Malta when a French warship visited 
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for the first time that century.110 Bluejackets similarly embraced encounters with foreign 
naval men, and when the Japanese visited Malta, they were entertained by the crew of the 
Implacable at the Royal Naval Canteen, and also at a smoking concert at the Clarence 
Theatre. The log recalls that ‘it was pleasant to see the jolly tars fraternising with their 
gallant allies, and many warm friendships were thus cemented. On their departure from 
Malta, the hands ... cheered the little Japs’.111 A similar feeling of fellowship was 
manifested when American ships arrived at Esquimalt − in the evenings all over town 
‘groups of English and American men-o’-war’s-men could be seen fraternising sociably 
together’. While the officers enjoyed dinner, the ratings could be found singing and 
enjoying refreshments.112  
As well as a high level of social interaction, an overriding sense of fraternity 
amongst the crews of warships of different nationalities on foreign stations was manifested 
in other ways. On foreign stations the dressing of a ship − a sign of celebration − was 
extended to include foreign celebrations if they were in port together. For example, British 
ships on the China Station dressed in honour of birthdays of the German Emperor, the 
Chinese Emperor, the King of Italy, and the Queen of Denmark.113 Royal Navy ships also 
flew an American ensign for Independence Day. In return, foreign warships joined in 
celebrations for Queen Victoria’s diamond jubilee, and for coronation day, the Chinese 
warships at Woosung had ‘Long live H.M. King Edward VII’ stretched between their 
funnels.114 This communal feeling was also manifested in less celebratory matters, and was 
especially prominent when a sailor died in port. It was common practice that the funeral of 
a seaman of any nationality was attended by representatives from every warship in 
harbour. Thus, forty British seamen were at the funeral of the captain of the German 
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gunboat Tiger in Amoy, as well as Italian, Japanese, and American naval men.115 This sense 
of community is also shown by the actions of the crew of the Goliath at Yokohama, when 
they helped Japanese firemen to tackle a blaze at the Oriental Hotel.116 Of course, 
fraternity was most keenly felt between British warships. A memorandum circulated after 
the Bonaventure was towed off an ‘unknown rock’ praised the actions of other British 
vessels. It argued that such deeds showed ‘that a good wholesome spirit for work and 
feeling of comradeship exists in the China Station’.117 
This fraternising amongst an international naval community suggests that British 
seamen saw themselves as something more than just British, but as part of wider, 
interconnected communities. Indeed, through these examples it is possible to see that 
British seamen abroad had complex identities which changed depending on context. As 
mobile imperial subjects, they identified with other Britons abroad, such as expatriate 
communities, soldiers, and imperial administrators, just as their shared heritage helped 
them identify themselves with the white populations in the settler colonies. That they 
spent extensive time with European, American, and Japanese sailors suggests that not only 
were European tensions not borne out, at least as strongly, in the wider world, but also 
that there was a strong naval identity which transcended nationalities.  
 
Exploring the Station 
 
Although, as described above, many of the same interactions occurred between sailors and 
other westerners across naval coaling stations worldwide, each station also offered 
opportunities for sailors to fraternise while exploring its unique attractions. The ability to 
explore at length the areas surrounding British coaling stations was distinctive to the 
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sailors’ experience, and they appear to have used at least some of this time to experience 
the cultural attractions, often with other westerners. These interactions not only allowed 
new associations between different groups at stations, but also helped to reinforce old 
friendships, which had been made on previous visits or at other stations. As such, these 
connections linked coaling stations across the world.  
Stations became synonymous with certain attractions, whether they were religious, 
ancient, or royal, and there was often a loose itinerary visitors would follow. Furthermore, 
if they were at a station at the right time of year, crews could attend the religious, cultural 
and sporting festivals which some stations were famous for. Such an itinerary and cultural 
calendar suggests a body of knowledge that existed at these stations, and that was 
disseminated across sailors of all nationalities. That these itineraries, and indeed the 
experiences themselves, were shared not only between British sailors, but also by 
residents, soldiers, and naval men of differing nationalities suggests such activities 
strengthened the sense of a western maritime community at these stations, and, in turn, 
that these relationships were shaped by the stations themselves. These shared experiences 
were key to the ‘third culture’ which emerged across these stations.118  
Visits to these attractions were generally group affairs. Usually these were made 
with other British sailors, but, just as British sailors joined their foreign counterparts in the 
sporting and social activities, they also accompanied other naval men as tourists. At 
Sydney, for example, some of the officers of the Challenger travelled to the Blue Mountains 
from Sydney with German officers.119 Similarly, at St Helena sailors explored the island with 
the crew of a French warship, seemingly finding it a pleasant experience: ‘we common 
Jacks found the Frenchmen splendid fellows, ready to hob-nob with us to our hearts 
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content’.120 These visits indicate an encompassing enthusiasm from sailors for the 
exploration of local sights at these stations. Although it is not within the scope of this 
chapter to explore the unique attractions of each naval station, it seeks to provide some 
examples that demonstrate the extent of interests manifested by sailors. 
A fascination with ancient oriental civilisations meant that those on the China 
Station would often take the opportunity to visit the ancient temples and other religious 
sites. These remnants of past civilisations were visited throughout the station: Hong Kong 
and Shanghai had many famous temples, and Nagasaki was well known amongst visitors 
for its many thousands of Buddhas.121 At Kobe, sailors would make a journey to Kyoto, 
where they would be shown around the Buddhist Temples, Mikado Palace, and Shinto 
shrine.122 Interest in the Far East also extended to its contemporary culture. The crew of 
the Sutlej were treated to a garden party at the Kyoto Nanko temple, where they witnessed 
wrestling, ju-jitsu, sword dancing, and fencing, and at Osaka they were entertained by 
geisha girls and Japanese theatre. 123 As the author of the log, G.H. Gunns, is not included in 
the accompanying list of officers, it seems that this was a party that included even lower 
ranks of the crew. British sailors also experienced traditional Hong Kong musical theatre, 
although few appear to have been impressed, one suggesting ‘melody there is none’.124 
Sailors on the Mediterranean Station also sought out religious and historic 
buildings and monuments, particularly in Malta. The log of the Implacable suggests that 
Valetta’s ‘chief features may be summed up in four words – steps, holy-stones, bells, and 
goats’.125 The churches, and especially the Chapel of Bones, were frequently visited and 
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processions during religious festivals generally added colour to a stay there.126 Of particular 
interest was the Citta Vecchia, the ancient capital just a few miles from Valetta. Here were 
the cathedral, catacombs, and a spectacular view of the whole island.127 Stopping to coal at 
Piraeus allowed visits to Athens, where ships’ crews could immerse themselves in ancient 
history, visiting ancient monuments such as the Acropolis, as well as the museum.128 
Where the port itself was uninteresting or there was a major city or attractions 
further afield, sailors often left the confines of the station, frequently in large groups, and 
used whatever local transport was available to reach them. Especially after 1890, this often 
involved a train, including between Woosung and Shanghai, Kobe and Osaka, Piraeus and 
Athens, Callao and Lima, and Simon’s Town and Cape Town.129 Similarly, trams connected 
Esquimalt with Victoria, and Yokohama with Tokyo.130 On the Australian Station, naval men 
were given free railway passes, suggesting that they were being actively encouraged to visit 
and explore local towns and cities.131 At Hong Kong, a cable tramway would take visitors to 
a view of the highlands and islands: ‘one of the finest in the world’.132 Likewise, if they were 
granted enough leave while at Yokohama, sailors could catch the train to Fukyama (Mount 
Fuji) where they could feel the tremors of earthquakes.133 Sailors enjoying leave in Japan 
would explore the countryside on bikes, often in large groups. The log of the Grafton recalls 
how 70 or 80 bluejackets explored the area surrounding Yokohama by bike, many for the 
first time, and caused chaos by hitting walls and colliding with rickshaws.134 Crew members 
would also experiment with local methods of transport. In Colombo and Durban, for 
                                                                    
126
 Journals of Donovan C. Roe, 1911-1912, NMM, JOD/92/2; Brown, The Log of H.M.S. Repulse, 16. 
127
 Parker, The Commission of H.M.S. Implacable, 9. 
128
 Ibid., 36; Wheeler, The Commission of H.M.S. Pandora, 25-28. 
129
 Gunns, The Log of H.M.S. Sutlej, 140; Butterworth, The Commission of H.M.S. Glory, 15; Wheeler, 
The Commission of H.M.S. Pandora, 25-28; Breaks, The Log of H.M.S. Bonaventure, 10; Journals of 
Donovan C. Roe, 1911-1912, NMM, JOD/92/2. 
130
 Newton, The Commission of H.M.S. Grafton, 19; Brodie, Ray, and Yexley, The Log of H.M.S. 
Goliath, 103. 
131 Shearston, H.M.S. Nelson. 
132 Butterworth, The Commission of H.M.S. Glory, 5-6. 
133 Ibid., 24. 
134 Gibbs, The Cruise of H.M.S. Grafton, 53-54; Butterworth, The Commission of H.M.S. Glory, 14. 
282 
 
example, men would take a rickshaw.135 In Osaka, they used jinrikisha, the main mode of 
transport there, which consisted of a two-wheeled vehicle pulled by two men, or used 
sampans, traditional Japanese boats (see Figure 6.11).136  
 
 
Figure 6.11: Using local transport on the China Station c.1900. NMM, ALB 10/285. 
 
Landscape 
 
As well as the towns and cities, the natural surroundings of a station also provided areas to 
explore, study, and hunt in, and seamen took these opportunities at almost all stations. 
This fascination with foreign landscapes shown by sailors was something of a naval 
tradition going back centuries. Although this most famously included observations made by 
those on official survey ships, explorers, and surveyors, there was a rich tradition of 
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ordinary crew members recording the landscapes of stations. The interest sailors had in 
these places was ‘not simply [in] the global reach of empire, but also the very specific sites 
constituted as ports of call’.137 Thus they were keen to explore beyond the shoreline, and 
into the hinterland. 
Often these natural spaces outside of the ports would be walked to. To avoid the 
‘rather uninteresting’ Jamestown, sailors at St Helena would trek into the countryside, 
where they enjoyed the large variety of plants and breeze of the mountains.138 Also 
mountainous, the Seychelles possessed extraordinary vegetation, and was, according to 
Donovan C. Roe, ‘one of the prettiest places we have visited on the station’.139 Less 
extreme, but no less beautiful, were the surrounds of Hobart, which possessed ‘lovely hills, 
covered with gardens and orchards’.140 In the same way, Zanzibar was celebrated for its 
impressive flowers, and Simon’s Town was particularly noted for its sunsets and Table 
Mountain.141 The environment of a station was also linked to a sailor’s wellbeing, and thus, 
although Ascension Island ‘may be dull’ it was ‘reasonably healthy’.142 
It was not just the striking scenery surrounding many of the stations that fascinated 
seamen. Further evidence of the interest of ships companies’ in the exotic was found in 
textual and visual recordings of the local wildlife, and in particular the many references to 
the more extraordinary animals, such as the whales at Simon’s Town or the sharks at Fiji 
and Suez.143 Stations such as Cape Coast Castle, offered ample opportunity to see wild 
animals like crocodiles, lions, and zebra, as well as natural events such as turtles laying their 
eggs on a beach. Similarly, at the French Station at Cape Lopez, Gabon, the sailors viewed 
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elephants, buffalo, parrots, and gorillas.144 Those given leave at Colombo would often see 
elephants, and Colon in Panama was infested by alligators (see Figure 6.12).145 Within 
Beacon Hill Park at Esquimalt there were two bear pits, ‘which contain five bears of the 
grisly species’, which could be viewed from a safe distance.146  
 
 
Figure 6.12: An elephant photographed in Ceylon, c.1900. NMM, ALB 22/98. 
 
Sailors did not always remain as passive spectators of the wildlife, and hunting was 
a major pastime, especially amongst the officer class. Hunting was a ‘central part of 
imperial culture’ at this time, being a ‘ritual of prestige and dominance’ for an ‘imperial and 
largely masculine elite’. As well as being a statement of manliness, it was also a metaphor 
for British global dominance. Moreover, it was linked with romantic ideas of adventure, 
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and gave officers a chance to immerse themselves in ‘genuine wilderness’.147 At 
Trincomalee, officers of the Perseus hunted deer, jackal, wild boars, and cheetahs, and 
encountered lizards, centipedes and snakes.148 In Port Mahon, ‘sport [was] fairly good’, and 
officers hunted partridges, rabbits, woodcock, and snipe.149 Fishing was also popular, at 
Port Hamilton the crew of the Glory enjoyed fishing, oystering, camping and hunting for 
game, and the Grafton’s men fished at Esquimalt.150 
As well as hunting, many seamen collected exotic animals and kept them aboard. 
Although some were collected for specific scientific missions, and some to sell to zoos and 
pet shops, many were simply adopted as pets and mascots. Buying them from local traders, 
the animals would become a part of the shipboard life, and were often then distributed 
amongst the fleet at the end of its commission.151 This helped form a sense identity and 
continuation at the station, and also suggests a strong sense of community amongst British 
naval ships on stations together. While for some, pets merely helped pass time at sea, 
many returned to Britain with exotic animals, thus reinforcing the domestic connection 
between the empire and the exotic. 
The most common of these pets were exotic birds, which could easily be taken 
home with the sailors after the commission.152 The log of the Implacable records that two 
to three hundred birds were purchased at Malta, the Bonaventure adopted 104 canaries, a 
parrot, and five parakeets, and the Encounter brought home over fifty parrots.153 Also 
common, depending on the stations visited, were monkeys, dogs, and cats.154 A more 
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bizarre but relatively common pet was the mongoose, which was ideal for catching the 
cockroaches and rats on board.155 Surprisingly, these were not the strangest animals taken 
aboard; others included donkeys, squirrels, hawks, and eagles.156 Some stations were 
synonymous with animals. In these cases, these mascots were clearly more than just 
company, but also a powerful connection to the station. At Esquimalt, it was common to 
adopt a black bear cub.157 Malta was popular for adopting goats, an animal it was 
synonymous with.158 Similarly, in the Falklands, one ship adopted penguins as pets.159  
This contact with the hinterlands and wildlife at coaling stations show an enduring 
fascination amongst naval men with stations’ landscapes. This interest is another example 
of the interactions that took place at the stations, and the records, images, and animals 
that returned with the sailors added to metropolitan ideas about the empire. That these 
experiences were often shared with other members of the maritime community found at 
British coaling stations both reinforced these connections and crafted a unique character at 
each station, as these activities defined the experience of a particular station, and 
therefore the nature of the maritime community found there. 
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Figure 6.13: A Venezuelan deer adopted by several British sailors, c.1900. NMM ALB 10/81. 
 
Prostitutes and Alcohol 
 
Absent from published accounts of sailors at coaling stations, in order to preserve a 
wholesome image of the navy, were the two most predictable pastimes for unsupervised 
single men abroad, vice, and the abuse of alcohol. Seen as part of catering for a sailor’s 
needs, these activities were widespread in stations.160 Both of these had an effect on the 
transient maritime communities. Alcohol was a key part of the social element of station 
life, and was often invaluable in the integration of sailors into a wider community. Although 
alcohol often caused bar brawls and other altercations, the widespread use of prostitutes 
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at the majority of stations, combined with the transient nature of the communities present 
at them, caused far more damage through the proliferation of venereal disease.  
The almost complete omission of these activities in the records published by 
Westminster Press, which make up the bulk of the surviving evidence, is not surprising. Not 
only did these logs portray sailors as the moral guardians of empire but also only included 
those ships whose commissions had been ‘happy’.161 Despite these occlusions, evidence for 
the widespread nature of these past times can be found through other sources. The 
existence of much of this evidence shows that these pastimes were seen as physically and 
morally destructive, both to naval personnel and to local populations.  
The use of alcohol by naval men was widespread, although there were sailors who 
were part of the temperance movement. Indeed, alcohol was officially sanctioned through 
the daily rum ration, and was used as an incentive by some captains to achieve higher 
coaling rates.162 Furthermore, ships’ logs make frequent references to men enjoying a beer 
at local naval clubs, or while fraternising with garrison soldiers in barracks. It is noticeable 
how few mentions of excessive drinking there are however.163 Although alcohol often 
caused bar brawls amongst Royal Naval sailors, it was not on the scale of the U.S. Navy, 
which, in 1909 had restricted shore leave because ‘the riots in Rio and Auckland were not 
forgotten, nor was the Melbourne orgy’.164 Perhaps this reflects the fact that the Royal 
Navy was more established abroad at this point, and that US sailors were smaller in 
number and relatively new to stations outside their homeland. The towns adjacent to 
coaling stations offer evidence of more excessive consumption, however. Valetta in Malta, 
for example, was well known a favourite of bluejackets where ‘his requirements are 
catered for on a somewhat lavish scale’, and a sailor’s pain from coaling could be drowned 
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in drink.165 Local traders gave their public houses anglicised or naval names, such as 
Flagship, British Flag, British Crown, or after naval ships, and provided British beer, cheap 
lodging, and the opportunity to drink with army men.166 Although Malta was well known 
for its hospitality, most coaling stations offered ample opportunity for refreshment. Many 
of those who visited Simon’s Town would take travel to Cape Town by stagecoach or by 
railway after 1890, ostensibly to drink.167 When sailors did over-consume, and were sick in 
their cabins, they could expect to be punished on board.168 If caught by local authorities, 
they could expect double the punishment. Drunken sailors caught in Coquimbo, Chile, for 
example, were made to sweep local streets at sword-point in the morning, and were then 
fined and punished when they returned aboard.169  
At some stations, especially those with little else in way of entertainment, alcohol 
consumption was seen as a problem, but these concerns were rarely aired.170 It is therefore 
difficult to assess how acute the problem of over-consumption was, as most logs and 
diaries fail to mention all but the most interesting anecdotes. Furthermore, official health 
records only show when it resulted in a visit to the sick bay. What they do show, however, 
is that ‘Poisoning (by alcohol)’ was seen as serious enough to be given its own subheading 
in annual health reports, but the statistics suggest that there were relatively few cases. In 
1903, for example, in the whole of the navy afloat, there were only 88 cases, a rate of 0.85 
personnel in 1000, and of these just one was invalided, and two died.171 Perhaps for this 
reason, despite much evidence of heavy drinking, the Admiralty do not appear to have had 
much concern about the practice.172 Indeed, the use of alcohol not only provided the 
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seamen with an outlet for the frustrations of life at sea, but also lubricated the social 
interactions with other groups met at stations. Although some moral reformers may have 
baulked at the frequent use of alcohol by naval personnel abroad, it was a crucial part of 
creating a maritime community that extended beyond the single ship, and indeed beyond 
solely Britons. 
Unlike the abuse of alcohol, prostitution was far more of a concern to the 
Admiralty. Anxious to present a wholesome image of the navy, there is only one suggestion 
of immorality in over forty logs in the series published by Westminster Press at the turn of 
the century. Within an entry for Mauritius, some of the ship’s company visited several 
‘houses of refreshment and entertainment’, where they enjoyed ‘wine, women and song’ 
after which, ‘they went for an orgie’ with several of the women.173 Beyond this, there is 
little direct evidence in the logs of the use of prostitutes by ships companies on foreign 
stations. Overwhelming evidence is provided, however, by the Statistical Reports of the 
Health of the Navy published each year. Each gives figures, with varying degrees of detail, 
for the rate of contraction of venereal diseases, particularly syphilis, on each station. These 
reports not only show that the use of prostitutes in foreign stations was commonplace, but 
that it was a major cause of ill health within the fleet, due to the spread of venereal 
disease. Indeed, while the flows of people into these coaling stations created many positive 
cultural exchanges, they also allowed for the flow and exchange of diseases throughout the 
maritime world. 
The infection of sailors was a serious issue, as an infected man needed a 
considerable amount of time in the sick bay to recover. Furthermore, in the case of syphilis 
the recurrence of the disease in its secondary form was another significant reason for a 
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sailor to be incapacitated. The transient nature of maritime communities meant that 
infections could easily spread between stations, especially if concealed by infected men.174  
 
 
 
Station 1868 1874 1877 1884 1892 1897 1903 1908 1913 
All - - - - 47.53 - 35.9 9.49 5.66 
Mediterranean 47.5 45.6 27.87 56.14 41.73 31.45 24.33 7.87 5.4 
North America and West Indies 68 22.7 28.84 37.6 31.46 37.65 29.25 7.66 5.07 
South East Coast of America 15.5 16.5 27.77 24.33 12.9 27.53 - - - 
Pacific 54.7 30.6 34.39 35.33 33.33 25.98 27.02 - - 
West African 20.6 21.8 35.71 31.42 32.43 25.62 - 11.4 12.71 
East Indies 45.1 47.8 57.61 39.37 65 64.7 25.87 9.3 4 
China 112.1 106.3 69.01 39.63 59.72 98.44 34.8 10.68 5.68 
Australian 21.6 40.2 51.16 15.7 19.67 42.8 31.6 13.01 6.66 
 
Figure 6.14: Primary syphilis infection rate (per 1000) on British naval stations, 1868−1913. Compiled from 
British Parliamentary Papers, Navy (Health). 
 
In general, syphilis was deemed to be more serious than gonorrhoea, as it was 
congenital and could cause systemic consequences, and even death. It accounted for an 
average of 31.6 days of service time lost per case over the period, although in some cases 
this was as high as 43 days. It would also, of course, have effects on local populations, but 
this seems to have been of little concern to the navy. Indeed, measures taken to reduce 
venereal disease were not for the protection of prostitutes but, as the Governor of Hong 
Kong, Sir J. Pope Hennessy, suggested, for ‘the provision of clean Chinese women for the 
use of British soldiers and the sailors of the Royal Navy’.175 Such statements suggest that, 
like the local coal heavers, local prostitutes were seen as there merely to serve the needs of 
the navy, dehumanised to the point of becoming no more than a tool with which to 
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perform the ‘necessity of catering to the sexual requirements of service personnel’.176 The 
use of prostitutes in this way was judged the best way of tempering the sailors’ sex drive – 
‘an aggressive, active force’ – preventing life at these stations from becoming ‘morally and 
physically dangerous’. This was deemed acceptable, perhaps even natural, as prostitution 
was seen as ‘living evidence of the native disorder’.177 
This stance is confirmed by the fact that those prostitutes catering solely for local 
men in Hong Kong and other stations were often exempt those measures implemented to 
control venereal diseases, as they posed no threat to naval or military personnel.178 Where 
measures were in place, regular invasive checks and mandatory incarceration for infected 
prostitutes were enforced. Squarely placing the blame on prostitutes, these measures were 
often ‘a matter … of intrusive, authoritarian government founded on the subject status of 
the native population’.179 Not only did this confirm contemporary views of racial 
hierarchies, but also established the status of women as more likely to be subjects of 
control than men.180 This allowed the satisfaction of the sexual needs of naval men, while 
justifying the close control of local peoples, and especially women.181 Thus, these measures 
were ‘derived from the same principles and assumptions, the same kinds of biases and 
blindspots about gender and sexuality, class and race, much the same view of the world’.182 
Such degrading and prejudiced measures were justified in the minds of the Royal 
Navy by what appeared to have been positive outcomes of the policies,  at least in terms of 
naval rates of infection. Again, the reports of lower infection rates at stations assert that 
the blame for these diseases lay solely with the prostitutes, not with those sailors soliciting 
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sex at each port they visited. Thus it was reported that in Yokohama, which was previously 
been notorious for disease, ‘the condition of the native prostitutes had been considerably 
ameliorated by the judicious measures adopted for their benefit’.183 Similarly, at Port Royal, 
Jamaica, where prostitutes had once been described as ‘in a very diseased condition’, the 
measures had brought ‘very beneficial results’.184  
Where there was less success in reducing rates of disease, it was inevitably 
concluded that this was down to the prostitutes. In Barbados, the measures were seen to 
be of ‘very little use’ as it was suggested that ‘nearly all the coloured population are 
prostitutes’. In Hong Kong, as brothels for Europeans were ‘as a rule, entirely free from 
disease’, syphilis contracted by naval men was blamed on ‘sly’ prostitutes and boatwomen. 
Similarly, even though Tokyo’s red-light district had medical surveillance, it was seen as too 
far distant from the naval stations, so Yokohama prostitutes not subject to examination 
were used, and then blamed for outbreaks. The uneven implementation of the 
recommendations at stations also led to problems. Other stations, such as St Helena, did 
not implement the recommendations fully, while some, such as Bombay and Cape Town, 
withdrew their measures because of the costs it involved. These stations therefore 
remained rife with venereal disease, inevitably blamed on local populations.185   
Even where it was recognised that the flows of people around maritime spaces, 
which included foreign stations with no measures in place, caused outbreaks of venereal 
diseases, it was suggested the blame lay with the women, other seamen, or the town itself. 
The rate of infection at Barcelona, for example, was ‘very remarkable, but easily 
understood, when one considered the lamentable condition of that town, as far as the 
propagation of venereal diseases is concerned’.186 Similarly, Coquimbo in Chile did not fare 
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well ‘as there is less amusement they [the sailors] are more likely to plunge into dissipation, 
and there is a considerable amount of syphilis, as women have been attracted by the 
prospect of ships being stationed here, and of more money being thus spent’.187 A further 
problem was that infected men would arrive en masse at stations with previously low rates 
of infection, and cause an outbreak. This was the case at Malta and Esquimalt, where 
British sailors carried venereal disease from home to their new stations, which was blamed 
on the state of prostitutes in Britain.188 Similarly, an especially virulent form of gonorrhoea 
arrived with whalers ‘of all colours and nationalities’ because of their ‘filthy habits’.189 
Moral fervour against what was seen as state sponsorship of prostitution in 1886 
caused the repeal of the measures implemented in Hong Kong and Singapore. This meant 
that prostitutes no longer had to attend regular examinations and brothels spread all over 
cities, rather than being confined to small areas. The result of this was that in 1897 half the 
soldiers stationed in Hong Kong and sixty per cent in Singapore were under treatment for 
venereal diseases.190 One can only assume the numbers for sailors were similar. Although 
this was caused by sailors continuing to solicit sex, this unsurprising rise in infection was 
attributed to the lack of ability for the British to control the bodies of colonial women, and 
similar measures were reinstated soon after. 
Venereal diseases were, of course, not the only ailments which affected the 
seamen at coaling stations. Just as sexually transmitted diseases were easily spread due to 
the global nature of maritime connections, other contagious diseases could be transmitted 
across an entire station if they were not effectively controlled. Regulation of these diseases 
seems to have been fairly successful in the period 1870−1914, at least amongst naval 
seamen, with few cases of epidemics appearing to have been recorded in surviving 
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documentary evidence. This was generally achieved with the use of quarantine.191 Little 
appears to have been done for local workers, however. The types of diseases that affected 
locals at stations varied, but were most common at stations with climates and conditions 
conducive to contagious diseases. Heat and the presence of mosquitoes were generally 
singled out as the most likely causes of illness on a foreign station.192 Furthermore, stations 
with large areas of dock workers living in close living quarters, such as Simon’s Town, were 
especially susceptible to disease epidemics.193 
What is clear from these sources is that the presence of a mobile maritime 
community at these stations not only influenced the experience of sailors while on leave, 
but also facilitated the spread of diseases. Although the use of quarantine at stations could 
be effective against some diseases, the nature of the movements of naval ships meant that 
diseases would often spread from station to station. Indeed, the demand for labour at 
coaling stations often created the perfect conditions for epidemics to occur, with labour 
forces often housed in cramped conditions.194 Furthermore, the widespread use of 
prostitutes throughout British coaling stations worldwide aided the spread of venereal 
disease, not just between naval men, but into local, and domestic populations. Whereas 
measures were instated for the benefit of naval men, not only was little done to protect 
local populations. Instead, diseases were often blamed on them. Such actions not only 
reinforce the idea that British concepts of racial and gender hierarchies existed at these 
stations, but also demonstrate the view that local peoples were seen as merely there to 
service naval needs. 
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Conclusions 
 
Coaling stations were key contact zones between Britons, colonial populations, and other 
European people abroad, and are one of the foremost examples of everyday encounters 
between Britons and the wider world. It is therefore especially important to have an 
understanding of these experiences and communities found there, as they shaped both the 
British seaman’s perception of empire, and colonial population’s impressions of Britain and 
the navy. Furthermore, through the diffusion of these accounts to the domestic British 
population, they were crucial to how the empire and sailor were perceived at home, and 
reinforced the idea that the Royal Navy was a primary agent of empire in the public 
consciousness. Moreover, as Mike Crang has suggested, to understand a globalised world 
of transitory experience, we need to understand the points and nodes at which mobilities 
are produced.195 
This chapter has shown that coaling stations were not transient, insignificant 
places, but had distinctive characters that defined the experience of the sailor on leave. 
The ability of ship’s companies to act as tourists allowed them to fully interact with a 
station’s unique attractions, populations, and landscapes. In doing so, sailors were able to 
both satisfy their curiosity and to reinforce their perceptions of an exotic and alien empire. 
These activities were often performed as part of an established itinerary, along with other 
westerners present at the station. As a result, the coaling stations itself shaped the 
relationships formed by those present there, with sailors becoming ‘one of the ingredients 
of an existing hybridity’.196 The character of these stations was not only defined by what 
                                                                    
195 Cited in Cresswell, On the Move, 220. 
196 Lucy Lippard  cited in Cresswell, Place: A Short Introduction, 49; King, Colonial Urban 
Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment, 58-59. 
297 
 
was found at the stations, but also by the fact they were not isolated sites but 
interconnected contact zones. Linking these stations were the mobility and fraternisation 
of British and other western naval men, and these connections helped to create a maritime 
community, which existed across coaling stations worldwide. These were places where 
sailors would renew friendships with those on other ships, resident at local barracks, part 
of local westernised populations, or aboard foreign warships. The extensive contact 
between these groups, through sport, concerts, at sailors’ homes, and in exploring the 
stations, cemented these connections, and the western identities of the seamen. 
Furthermore, at stations with populations of British descent, this spirit of community 
helped foster and strengthen imperial ties between themselves and the motherland.  
The context of the station and the nature of the interactions also shaped the 
seaman’s sense of identity, and consequently how he viewed and interacted with these 
places and their populations. This chapter has shown the sailor largely identified himself as 
a western maritime man in alien climes, which not only drew him to other westerners but 
also shaped how local populations were viewed. Although of great interest, views of many 
local peoples expressed by British naval men tended to revert to those held by many 
Britons in the period 1870−1914, and accounts were influenced by ideas of race and 
civilisation. Even where attitudes were largely positive, local people were often seen as 
part of the landscape, becoming mere ‘exotic object[s]’ in cultural panoramas.197 Even so, 
the interactions between locals and sailors at many stations provided inhabitants with work 
and trade, and sailors with goods, services, and entertainment. Again, however, these 
encounters were often racialised, with local peoples often seen merely as there for the 
sailors’ needs, entertainment, and sexual desires.  
These periods of leave were not completely harmless, either to sailors or local 
populations. Despite the use of quarantine, the presence of a mobile maritime community 
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at all of these stations facilitated the spread of diseases from station to station. 
Furthermore, the use of local labour forces often housed in cramped conditions often had 
disastrous consequences through epidemic diseases. Perhaps more damaging, both to local 
populations and the moral and physical health of sailors was the widespread use of 
prostitutes throughout British coaling stations worldwide, which aided the spread of 
venereal disease amongst naval men and within local populations. 
These moments of leisure therefore provide us with more than just interesting 
anecdotes, but are in fact integral to understanding the nature of the maritime and naval 
networks which spanned the British Empire. The lengthening of stays on foreign stations 
due to the emergence of a steam navy had huge effects on the populations of naval coaling 
stations and the seaman’s experience of visiting it. These were spaces that were not foreign 
or British, neither imperial nor local, but contained ‘a mixture of races, customs, and 
manners, such as can scarcely be found at any other place’.198 
  
                                                                    
198 Spry, The Cruise of Her Majesty’s Ship Challenger, 14; Gunns, The Log of H.M.S. Sutlej, 8. 
299 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has assessed the wider ramifications of the expansion of a steam-powered Royal 
Navy in the second half of the nineteenth century, and its subsequent reliance on coal 
across the world. The aims of this have been twofold. Firstly, it has sought to understand 
how a focus on the coaling issue adds to the understanding of the navy’s global role in the 
period 1870−1914. Secondly, it has sought to use naval coal as a lens through which to 
view wider aspects of British imperial and naval history. By emphasising the importance of 
coal and coaling infrastructure, it has not only redressed the coal-blindness of previous 
histories, but also shown how an understanding of coaling infrastructure and networks can 
inform and connect wider histories of navy, nation, and empire.  
It has been demonstrated that the history of naval coaling extends far beyond local 
studies of mines, ports, islands, and littorals. Although coal has been largely ignored in 
histories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, naval coaling infrastructure 
was integral to Britain, its empire, and the world.1 In fact, this coal-blindness − perhaps a 
result of the unglamorous nature of coal − is a modern trend, and coal was far from a trivial 
concern for contemporaries.2 By centring the analysis on the crucial part that the navy 
played in sustaining the trade and defending the interests of Britain and its empire, this 
thesis has shown that the availability and security of coal were integral to the two pillars of 
British imperial power: trade and control of the oceans. As a result, by using the subject of 
coaling, and coaling infrastructure, this thesis is able to elucidate and connect issues of 
imperial defence, mobilisation, state control, labour, imperial encounter, and ‘exotic’ 
adventure in the later nineteenth century.  
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More widely, this study has used naval coaling abroad to show the importance of 
maritime worlds to the global history of empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In this way, it has sought to extend the scope of existing histories of imperial 
networks and infrastructure, giving a fuller understanding of previously ignored naval and 
imperial connections that existed in the period 1870−1914. In doing so, it shows a far more 
complex situation than is suggested by the idea of periphery and centre, but instead 
demonstrates the existence of transnational, international, and sub-imperial connections. 
By highlighting these linkages, it shows the importance of considering three often 
separated areas of study – those of the state, the navy, and the empire – in the same 
frame.  It does this by analysing each in four contexts, showing connections which are not 
only evident in high politics and imperial defence, but also in questions of coal supply, 
working practices, and sailors’ imperial encounters.  
 
Politics and Geostrategy 
 
The third chapter of this thesis assessed the strategic challenges faced by Britain when it 
introduced a steam navy in the mid-nineteenth century. It showed that steam warships 
needed large qualities of high-quality coal safely stored across the globe, a huge 
infrastructural and strategic challenge for the Admiralty. Coal was crucial to the ability of 
the navy to function in the period 1870−1914, and without a secure supply, changes in 
technology and ship numbers would have counted for little. In modern scholarship this fact 
has been largely ignored, but to contemporaries it was hugely significant, and had 
considerable implications for government foreign policy. As well as being a central worry to 
the navy, both in terms of supply and protection, it also became a growing concern to the 
state and across the empire, owing to the importance of imperial commerce. As a result, 
this thesis has used a wider scope than previous histories to analyse the effect of the 
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introduction of coal as fuel for the fleet, emphasising that its ramifications were felt 
beyond the ship’s engineers and the boardroom at Admiralty House. Furthermore, it has 
also shown that the strategic and infrastructural changes necessitated by a coal-powered 
navy were also directly affected by broader changes in government, state, empire, and the 
global balance of power. By assessing the coal question in this wider scope, therefore, it 
has linked histories of naval technology and strategy, with studies of imperial defence and 
transnational infrastructure.  
This thesis has argued that the growing acceptance of the importance of coal in the 
political and public perception was an integral part of wider efforts to develop and improve 
imperial defence. This ‘coal consciousness’ was initially small-scale, but developed 
significantly and gained political credibility from the 1880s, becoming what might be 
termed a ‘coaling consensus’ in the 1890s. By demonstrating how this reflected and 
affected political shifts, this thesis has extended existing studies by showing that such a 
consensus could only grow with a more general move away from the detached liberal 
imperial policies of the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, each influenced the other, and 
with the rise of coal consciousness the fuel issue became part of wider debates about 
imperial defence. These debates were given high importance due to a popular perception 
of an increased danger to British trade, which had grown enormously in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Furthermore, an increasing belief in a change in naval balance of 
power augmented this fear, and was responsible for the rise of popular imperialism and 
navalism. Fundamentally, these debates and measures were about protecting and 
facilitating trade, not acquiring colonies, and the navy played a crucial role in ensuring this. 
As a result, the provision and security of quality naval coal worldwide was key to addressing 
these concerns. Thus, although contemporaneous, this emerging proactive imperial 
defence policy was a movement less linked with aggressive pro-imperialism, but one rather 
more in tune with ideas of a ‘Greater Britain’ and of imperial co-operation.  
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As the coal question was increasingly understood as part of wider questions of 
imperial defence, it was both a victim of Gladstone’s indifferent attitude towards colonial 
policy, and then, in the mid-1880s, a beneficiary of wider support for action on imperial 
defence. The relationship between coal consciousness and the state was not one-way, 
though, and as well as being affected by the political climate, it also had significant 
consequences for government policy. In particular, the Carnarvon Commission of 
1879−1882, and the subsequent leaking of its key details in the press, had a considerable 
impact on the beginning of a shift away from Gladstonian attitudes towards imperial 
defence. Although the Commission’s reports were important in instigating these debates, 
the slow progress of change suggests that it merely acted as a catalyst along with other 
factors.  
The influence that the Commission was able to exert in imperial defence matters 
was a result of its creation of a formalised and legitimised coaling knowledge, which 
endured as the basis of a coaling consensus that lasted until the adoption of oil. Assumed 
to be fact and rarely questioned, this coaling knowledge held great power. Indeed, it was 
only with its suppression that Gladstone was able to slow the growth of coal consciousness, 
and its leaking and subsequent publication in the press was a vital accelerant to changes in 
imperial defence. These changes to imperial defence could only be implemented with the 
emergence of a more efficient imperial defence bureaucracy, however, and the permanent 
bodies created to deal with the coal question were critical parts of this. Seen in a wider 
context, these developments can be viewed as part of the expansion of a modern state 
apparatus in the late nineteenth century. 
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Infrastructure and Supply 
 
A growing coal consciousness within the state not only acted to instigate changes to its 
imperial defence ideology, but also required it to invest significantly in the improvement of 
systems for the distribution of quality coal worldwide. In order to assess this, the fourth 
chapter shifted the focus from high politics to infrastructure. In doing so it extended 
histories of supply and victualling − ably covered for the sail navy of the early nineteenth 
century − to shed light on the mechanisms for coal supply in the period 1870−1914. It 
showed that although changes in state and government were crucial to measures for the 
protection of coaling stations and networks, the effectiveness of naval coaling was not 
solely reliant on the actions of those in Whitehall. Indeed, an essential part of this thesis 
has been to emphasise the role of state and non-state infrastructures working together. 
Supplying the navy with coal involved a large number of actors, networks, and processes − 
coal did not simply appear at a foreign station. These networks were considerable physical 
entities – including mines, railways, ships, and stations − which spanned huge distances 
and served the interests of international commerce, the Royal Navy, and many rival navies. 
The Admiralty’s ability to control and monitor this commercial export infrastructure was 
integral to its contingency plans in case of war or shortage. Thus, this infrastructure, and 
measures enacted to allow it to function effectively in war, are central to histories of 
mobilisation. Not only did this chapter shed light on how this infrastructure functioned, but 
also suggested that studies of the mobility of commodities – in this case coal – should both 
consider the start and end-point in conjunction with the processes, actors, and 
infrastructural elements in between. 
Britain’s dominance of this coaling infrastructure was imperative to its naval and 
maritime success in the nineteenth century, as it allowed it both to facilitate the movement 
of its own ships and interests, and to choke or deny the mobility of its potential enemies. 
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Such power in much of the empire was as important as ship numbers, and was vital to 
Britain’s ability to dominate the trade routes worldwide. The significance of this 
infrastructure has been largely overlooked in scholarship, however. This thesis has 
addressed this gap, highlighting the materiality, infrastructures, and processes of global 
networks and flows. Furthermore, it shows that although mobilities and commodities have 
become a welcome part of imperial history, studies of those ordinary journeys, less 
glamorous commodities, and the infrastructure which allowed their movement are still 
largely absent.  
To fulfil the navy’s need for fuel worldwide in the period 1870−1914, its coaling 
infrastructure had to be remarkable in many ways. The sheer geographical scale of 
operations was unprecedented, and the number of bodies involved complicated the 
process. Despite these problems, the infrastructure that developed was extraordinarily 
robust, even during crises, and especially compared with that used by Britain’s rivals. The 
government was immensely fortunate in that by the 1870s Britain already held a 
considerable advantage over its rivals in terms of naval coaling through it huge empire, 
which gave it a large number of strategic spaces to store coal, allowing the Royal Navy a 
truly global reach. Crucially, it also possessed the best fuel available to send to these 
stations. Welsh coal was universally agreed to be of the highest quality for steam engines, 
and the discovery of Westport coal in the 1880s provided Britain with a second source of 
high-quality coal on the other side of the globe. Not only did this give Britain the ability to 
maintain the high performance of its navy worldwide, but, with few other sources of such 
high-quality coal, it was able to deny its rivals the same advantage. The huge demand for 
Welsh coal also meant that Britain possessed a world-leading commercial coal export 
infrastructure. Throughout the period 1870−1914, the Admiralty took advantage of this 
and, as had been the case in the age of sail with victualling, the commercial sector was 
extensively used in the purchasing and transporting of coal for the navy. The Admiralty 
305 
 
acted merely as an overseer, with commercial agents and companies ensuring the supply of 
coal from pit to station.  
Although it did not run each process on a day-to-day basis, the Admiralty still 
played a key role in ensuring the robustness and efficiency of British naval coaling. The 
evolving demands of the navy not only required the Admiralty to maintain these physical 
networks and processes continuously, but also to seek out ways to refine and improve 
them. The tests it carried out, and especially the refinement of quality standards in the 
1880s, were fundamental to guaranteeing British warships the ability to obtain adequate 
fuel wherever they were. Just as coal consciousness had been key in promoting measures 
for the defence of coaling infrastructure, it was also critical to changes instigated in the 
1880s by the Admiralty for the organisation of stock-levels at stations and in increasing the 
efficiency of supply. These developments allowed a growing navy to be confident in its 
supply of quality fuel, despite the challenge of its rivals. Issues of supply were also 
paramount to mobilisation strategies devised as part of defence plans in the 1880s. Thus it 
was a coaling consensus that allowed the Admiralty to make contingency plans for coal 
supply in war, enabling the provision of adequate fuel to most stations at short notice. The 
combination of these measures to improve fuel supply allowed Britain to maintain the 
most robust coaling infrastructure of any power throughout this period. Its ability to use 
the private sector to distribute the highest quality of fuel across the largest network of 
coaling stations was key in its pre-eminence as a global naval power. 
 
Labour and Coaling Methods 
 
A central part of the naval coaling story was the station itself. Fuel, usually in huge 
quantities, needed to be loaded onto warships, and this was the focus of the fifth chapter. 
Even in 1914, the methods employed nearly always required substantial human labour, 
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which was provided by both local heavers and ships’ companies. By analysing the process 
of coaling a ship, this thesis shows that the history of coaling also tells us much about 
labour in the navy and empire. Through its examination of the use of sailor labour, it has 
added to our knowledge of the mechanisms of a crucial naval duty. Moreover, it has shown 
sailors’ attitudes towards menial and unpleasant tasks, the coping mechanisms employed, 
and the responsibility of the whole crew to get coal in, albeit with roles designated by rank. 
The method employed was dictated by several factors, including the facilities and 
workforce available at a station and the size and number of ships needing to be coaled. 
Although each method was different in terms of techniques used, all involved considerable 
physical labour, and were therefore disliked by those employed to coal. Not only was 
coaling exhausting but it was also very dangerous, and accidents were frequent, and could 
be fatal. It is unsurprising, therefore, that coping mechanisms developed amongst those 
men coaling. Competition with other ships for coaling rate records amongst naval men was 
common, as was dressing up, and music from the marine band was a frequent fixture.  
In examining the use of local heavers, this chapter connects to histories of imperial 
labour and ideologies of racial difference. It elucidates how coaling stations witnessed the 
articulation of racial hierarchies and ideas about race and civilisation, and how the 
attitudes of British seamen towards local heavers were shaped by these, as well as by naval 
expectations of work ethic, discipline, and order. Many of the recorded comments confirm 
contemporary ideas, with local workers seen as particularly suited to certain menial tasks 
due to their racial difference. Often seen as nothing more than constituent parts of a 
coaling machine, criticism was particularly harsh when heavers did not conform to what 
observers expected of workers. Furthermore, although some white labourers were 
rewarded relatively well for heaving coal, many of the local workers employed in naval 
coaling were exploited. At these stations, the availability of labour and shortages of work 
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allowed employers to fix wages at low rates and stop workers forming unions, which 
resulted in workers living in large slums rife with poverty and disease.  
 
Local Encounters 
 
Although coaling stations were primarily designated as places of work, sailors were 
regularly granted extended leave after coaling, and thus they were also places of leisure, 
which provided the theme for the final chapter. With time enough to explore the environs, 
these stations were also key places of encounter and exchange between Britons, the 
empire, and the world. Furthermore, these contact zones were interconnected through the 
mobility of the men who visited them. Indeed, because these connections between sailors, 
both British and foreign, were made and remade across many spaces, a maritime 
community existed that stretched across coaling stations. These bonds between Britons 
and fellow westerners were cemented through sport and social occasions, and extended 
between all manner of people of similar class and rank. Links were also formed with 
western populations, especially with expatriates and people of British descent, where an 
imperial fraternity was maintained with those in the settler colonies. 
In light of the infrastructural and cultural ‘turns’ in the humanities, this thesis has 
assessed these largely overlooked everyday encounters engendered by naval coaling 
infrastructure. In doing so, it has shown that the need for coal, and therefore the necessity 
of visits to sites across the maritime world, allowed British seamen to build connections 
with imperial, maritime, and international communities. At its most basic level, the final 
chapter is a much-needed response to the neglected subject of the naval man in the 
nineteenth-century empire. Beyond this, however, coaling stations have been shown to be 
key contact zones between Britons, the empire, and other European people abroad in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Such was the frequency of these interactions 
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that they shaped both the British seaman’s perception of empire, and how colonial subjects 
viewed the British and their navy. As a result, this chapter adds to previous studies of 
imperial spaces and interactions. Furthermore, through the diffusion of these accounts to 
the domestic British population, accounts of these experiences were central to the 
perceptions of empire and sailor, and cemented the connection between navy and empire. 
Thus these seamen also played a fundamental role in the domestic imperial imagination, 
circulating impressions of foreign landscapes and peoples, in turn determining racial 
ideologies and ideas about the imperial exotic.  
The ways that sailors wrote about others present at stations also show how their 
own backgrounds and outlooks would shape, and also be shaped by, time spent abroad. As 
a result, this thesis has added to previous studies of identity and the navy to show that to 
see sailors as ‘British’ is too simplistic. Certainly a British identity, marked by naval ideas of 
discipline and work ethic, pride in the empire, and assumptions of superiority over local 
peoples, was frequently displayed, but often juxtaposed with others. In fact, it is perhaps 
more accurate to see these men as ‘western’, ‘imperial’, or ‘maritime’, such was their 
identification with men of other during these periods abroad. Indeed, such interactions, for 
example with Germans in the early twentieth century, often contradict the domestic 
‘British’ identity of that time. These interactions also suggest that the navy should be seen 
as more than just a highly important instrument for the state and empire, but also as a key 
cultural agent in the wider empire. Although the interactions were transient, they were 
regular and numerous. In fact, to many contemporary Britons and colonial populations, the 
navy and empire were intimately connected, and perhaps to those residing in small spaces 
where coal was stored, one and the same.  
 The extended shore-leave given to sailors allowed them to be more fully exposed 
to life at the station. Although this was often used to fraternise with other Britons and 
westerners, these interactions often included exploring local peoples and attractions. As a 
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result, the maritime communities created by these naval visitors at each station were not 
just an amalgamation of the cultures of those present, but one defined by nature of the 
station itself. British seamen spent extensive time exploring coaling stations, and a 
fascination with the exotic emerges from these records. Indeed, many of the recollections 
of the peoples encountered, the landscapes, and the cultural treasures reflect this idea of 
imperial adventure. Descriptions of local populations are prevalent in many of the 
recollections of station life. Many of these were admired, either as ‘noble savages’ with 
exotic cultures, or as backwards peoples slowly coming within the pale of ‘civilisation’. 
Often, however, even if a fascination did exist, populations were in reality reduced to part 
of the background − exotic objects in exotic landscapes. Comments about local people 
often went along with ideas of civilisation and progress. The yardstick against which these 
populations were judged was, of course, the British sailor himself, and anyone who did not 
measure up to his values or ideology was castigated. These opinions were particularly 
manifested through comments about dress, language, hygiene, and work ethic.  
At many stations, relationships between the navy and local populations were 
reciprocal − providing inhabitants with work and trade, and sailors with goods, services, 
and entertainment. Despite this, local populations are often presented merely as peculiar 
providers of services to the navy. In this way, attitudes towards local traders, businesses, 
and entertainers reflect those shown towards coal heavers. Moreover, despite relying on 
their trade, sailors would often complain about the invasions of space when these vendors 
came aboard, or the hassle they would encounter at many bazaars.  
Nowhere was the idea of the local population as a service provider more ingrained 
than in the use of prostitutes found at stations, who were treated as objects for the 
gratification of naval men. Not only were venereal disease outbreaks squarely blamed on 
sex workers, but measures to combat them showed little regard for local populations. Such 
measures were not only invasive to these women, but were explicitly designed only to 
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provide a clean service to seamen, with prostitutes used solely by local men exempt. The 
race and gender of prostitutes therefore allowed the navy to shift the blame for these 
diseases away from sailors soliciting sex. The Admiralty’s stance on the use of prostitutes 
abroad was not shared in Britain, however, and moral outrage was enough to force the 
repeal of many of the measures to control venereal disease amongst prostitutes. Domestic 
opinion also explains why this practice, so frequently occurring, was excluded from all 
published accounts, upholding the idea of the sailor as a moral defender of empire in the 
popular consciousness. 
 
Wider Conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to show that the story of infrastructure, resources, and labour are as 
much part of naval and imperial history as strategy and high politics. By exploring the 
history of a particular resource with specific chemical properties, this thesis has 
demonstrated a novel way of thinking about naval, imperial, and global history. By showing 
how one problem, the coal question, had wider ramifications across the empire, it has 
revealed a multitude of procedures, relationships, and connections not always seen as 
important or, in some cases, even omitted from other histories. By thinking about naval 
coal, it is possible to underline the links between these processes, states, individuals, and 
institutions. The historical actors which populate this history of naval coal are diverse in 
terms of class, location, occupation, and race. These included those in the Admiralty, 
agents in South Wales, men on the spot in the empire, members of parliament, exporters 
of coal, those on bulk trade sail ships, engineers at testing sites, members of the press, 
sooty naval men on deck, and silenced coal labourers appraised by Britons. The thesis has 
been truly global, and has shown flows that go beyond the metropole and periphery. 
Instead, they were both British and foreign, crossed national and oceanic boundaries, and 
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connected other nodes of empire in sub-imperial networks. The most obvious of these 
flows comprised of the material mobilities of coal, ships, and people, but with their 
movement came the diffusion of information and knowledge, imperial experiences, and 
animals. Yet this thesis is not solely about mobility, but also the specificity of the places 
involved. Sailors and coal were not freely mobile, but moved between an established series 
of strategic spaces, where much of the local populations were tied to the employment 
found there. These places – which included harbours, wharves, towns, and landscapes – 
were defined by their fixed geography, in terms of their strategic importance, but also by 
the distinctive character of the populations, entertainments, and sights found there.  
Despite only concentrating on one key issue, the thesis reveals much about how 
the British state functioned, and how this had consequences far beyond Whitehall, and 
even Britain. It does this by recognising that this was not a static story, but was one that 
was constantly evolving, reflecting the changing priorities and needs of the state. These 
emerged from the Admiralty, the government, and from navalists outside the state 
apparatus, and reflected diverse and often conflicting strategic and economic concerns. As 
a result, this thesis shows that the state increasingly functioned on a basis of contingency 
planning. These were designed to allow British coaling infrastructure to cope with almost 
any foreseeable disaster, whether it emerged from rivals or potential rivals, coal shortages, 
vulnerabilities within the infrastructure, or costs. The changes this planning necessitated 
ranged from high-level geostrategy – including expensive and wide ranging global defence 
schemes – to the seemingly insignificant and the mundane, such as monitoring stock levels. 
By following one issue, this thesis is able to show that these seemingly inconsequential 
actors, processes, and decisions are crucial to understanding how the strategies of the 
state were achieved, the processes of coal supply was carried out, the labour that was 
required, and the cultural encounter that resulted.    
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 This thesis has also shown that material mobilities matter to naval and imperial 
history. In using the lens of coal to explore different connections between the naval, 
imperial, and global aspects of this period, it has demonstrated that studies of commodities 
can be more than economic histories of the global, but also inform social, cultural, and 
political subjects. Indeed, although it began by establishing how the coal question was a 
strategic and political problem for the state and navy, the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis demonstrate how the history of naval coal is more than a history of high strategy, 
but also of people and everyday encounter. Thus its shows how a focus on bulk 
commodities can inform the imperial studies of structures and networks, discourse, and 
identity. 
 
Further directions 
 
It is perhaps the connecting of different areas of study that is most pertinent when 
contemplating future directions for study. This thesis has shown that a work which had 
naval and imperial history as its focal point need not limit itself to such stringent 
parameters. Indeed, it has shown that the history of coal is also a history of science and 
technology, of culture, of the media and press, of human labour, of politics and 
geostrategy, and of networks and infrastructure. Although the subject of coal is perhaps 
exceptional in terms of its ability to shed light on many sub-disciplines, this thesis has also 
shown that using naval history more generally as a lens can precipitate studies which 
inform other areas of history. In particular, it is clear that naval history can be used to 
elucidate the transnational and transoceanic networks of empire in the nineteenth century.  
Historians and historical geographers have increasingly looked to the sea in studies, 
and scholars such as Frances Steel, Valeska Huber, and Anyaa Anim-Addo have brought the 
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mobility of steam ships in the nineteenth century to the forefront of academic thought.  3 
Despite this, little has been said about naval men, the infrastructure they used, or the 
spaces they inhabited. Although this thesis goes some way in addressing this gap in the 
historiography, it is clear that much still needs to be done. Although the navy was at the 
forefront of empire in the period of high imperialism, little has been written about this 
connection, and there is a need to assess the imperial nature of the navy at this time. What 
is true of imperial history is also true of naval history, and far more needs to be written 
about the navy outside of European shores, beyond war, strategy, and local histories. 
Indeed, due to their interconnectivity, such a history might provide a platform for a truly 
global history.  
In addition, the importance of British coal globally in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries goes far beyond the scope of this study. Although perhaps less 
glamorous than those goods which have been assessed in commodity history thus far, the 
global impact of British coal was immense. From trade steamships and luxury liners to 
railways in Europe and South America, coal had an impact which changed demographics, 
industries, trade, leisure, politics, and wars. Moreover, its movement was subject to 
acceleration, deceleration, and choke points, and these ideas need to be applied to wider 
trade patterns. Only by doing this will a fuller picture emerge of how the juxtaposition of 
trade, maritime spaces, sovereignty, and naval power were crucial to mobilities and 
immobilities in this period.   
                                                                    
3 Steel, Oceania under Steam; Huber, Channelling Mobilities; Anyaa Anim-Addo, ‘“With Perfect 
Regularity Throughout”: Hybrid Geographies of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company’, in J. 
Anderson and K. Peters (eds), Water Worlds: Human Geographies of the Oceans (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2014), 163-176. 
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